Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2006

Ronald Watson Lafferty v. State of Utah : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Thomas B. Brunker; Attorney for Appellee.
Grant W.P. Morrison; William P. Morrison; Aric Cramer; Attorney for Petitioner.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Lafferty v. Utah, No. 20060201.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2617

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Appellate No. 20060201
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
On Appeal from an Order of the Fourth District Court,
Provo Department, Honorable Anthony W. Schofield presiding
Grant W. P. Morrison (3666)
William P. Morrison (7587)
MORRISON & MORRISON, LC.
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Tel: (801) 359-7999

Thomas B. Brunker
Assistant Attorney General
160 E. 300 South, 6th Floor
PO Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Tel: (801) 366-0180

Aric Cramer (5460)
CRAMER & CRAMER L L C .
Smith Hyatt Building
845 South Main Street, Suite 23
Bountiful, UT 84010
Tel: (801) 299-9999

Attorney for Appellee

i«..

R

*-ED

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page:
TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE
STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

A.

Nature of the Case

4

B.

Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below

C.

Statement of the Facts

...

5
6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

13

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 1,2,3,
15, 16, 18 (PARTIAL), 19, 5, 6, 11, (PARTIAL), 12 (PARTIAL),
13, 17, 20 (PARTIAL), 30, 32 (PARTIAL), 47, 33, 35, 37, 38,
34, 41, 42, AND 46 ON THE GROUNDS THAT (1) THESE
CLAIMS, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL,
COULD HAVE BEEN, AND THUS WERE IMPROPERLY
RAISED, FOR THE FIRST TIME, IN A MEMORANDUM
OPPOSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (2) THAT PETITIONER
HAD THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THERE WAS A
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WITH RESPECT TO
WHETHER APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE AND
i

FAILED TO MEET THAT BURDEN, AND (3) THAT SUFFICIENT
FACTS WERE AVAILABLE TO PETITIONER THAT AT THE
TIME OF HIS DIRECT APPEAL HE COULD HAVE RAISED ALL
OF THE FOREGOING CLAIMS BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT
13
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR CLAIM 31 IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER, BY NOT
SPECIFICALLY RESPONDING TO THE STATE'S MOTION
ON THIS CLAIM, WARRANTED SUMMARY DISPOSITION . 21

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY FINDING THAT DR.
GOLDING'S DENIAL OF "SITUATIONAL COMPETENCE" AS A
VALID DIAGNOSIS DID NOT AMOUNT TO NEW EVIDENCE
WHEN IT WAS THE THEORY DR. GOLDING ADVANCED TO
FIND LAFFERTY COMPETENT
24

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY FINDING THAT
THE INEFFECTIVE TRIAL COUNSEL ISSUE ON CLAIMS 12
(PARTIAL), 20 (PARTIAL) 22, 23, 11 (PARTIAL), 24, 25, 26,
AND FOR APPELLATE COUNSEL FOR CLAIMS 27 AND 29,
WERE NOT SATISFIED UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD
OF STRICKLAND
26

V.

A.

Claim 12 (Partial): Improper Jury

26

B.

Claims 22, 23, 11 (Partial), and 24: Ineffective Mitigation 29

C.

Claim 25 and 29: ABA Guidelines and Rule 8

D.

Claim 26: Closing Argument

E.

Claim 27: Failure to Appeal Change of Venue

...

31
32

..

33

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CLAIM 44
WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHEN IT ARGUES
INEFFECTIVE WAIVER OF A CONFLICT OF INTEREST WITH
ii

HIS TRIAL COUNSEL, WHO HAD ALSO PREVIOUSLY
REPRESENTED HIS CO-DEFENDANT DAN LAFFERTY ON
THE SAME MATTER
34
CONCLUSION

38

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

40

ADDENDA
ADDENDUM A - Ruling on Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment
dated November 29, 2005
ADDENDUM B - UT. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and 65C(c)(3)
ADDENDUM C - Petitioner's Second Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus
ADDENDUM D - Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and for Partial
Summary Judgment
ADDENDUM E - Memorandum in Opposition to State's Motion for Summary
Judgment and to Dismiss
ADDENDUM F - Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary
Judgment

iii

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Page

/Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62

22

Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626 (Utah 2001)

33

Gardnerv. Holden, 888 P.2d 608 (1994)

37

Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982)

22-23

Johnson v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2006 UT 15 (Utah Supreme Court)
2-4
Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991)

5

Lafferty v. Utah, 534 U.S. 1018(2001)

6,7

Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994)

20, 30

State v. Andrews, 576 P.2d 879, 859 (1978)

27

State v. Brian Mitchell, Case No. 031901884

25, 39

State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989)

33

State v. Jones, 545 P.2d 323 (1976)

27

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah1988)

5, 7, 34

State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342 (Utah 2001)

6-7,17

State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15,1J66 n. 11 (2005)

24, 26

iv

State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699 (1980)

34 , 36

State v. Wach, 2001 UT 357

26

State v. Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001)

33-34

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

. . . . 3, 11, 15, 20, 29, 33, 38

United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah
1993)
2
United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1972)

27

United States v. Hill, 496 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1974)

27

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003)

23, 29

Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981)

34

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
U.S. Constitution 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments
Utah Const, Art. I Sections 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 24, and 25

4,17, 34, 35
4,17

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206 to 207,76-5-202,77-15a-101 through 106,78-2-2(3)(l),
78-35a-104 through 107
1,4,16-17 21-22
UT. R. Civ. P. 56(c), 56(e), and 65C(c)(3)
UT. R. Crim. P. 8(b)

4,21,24-25,38
4, 32

UT. R. Prof. Conduct 1.9

4, 34-36

v

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY,
Petitioner/Appellant,
Appellate No. 20060201
v.
STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent/Appellee.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3) (i).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Issue #1:

Whether the trial court erred in granting the State's Motion for

Summary Judgment on claims 1, 2, 3, 15,16, 18 (partial), 19, 5, 6,11, (partial), 12
(partial), 13, 17, 20 (partial), 30, 32 (partial), 47, 33, 35, 37, 38, 34, 41, 42, and 46
on the grounds that (1) these claims, although not raised on direct appeal, could
have been, and thus were improperly raised, for the first time, in a memorandum

opposing summary judgment, (2) that Petitioner had the burden of showing that there
was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether appellate counsel was
ineffective and failed to meet that burden, and (3) that sufficient facts were available
to Petitioner that at the time of his direct appeal he could have raised all of the
foregoing claims before the Utah Supreme Court? Record Citation: This issue was
raised below in Lafferty's Memorandum in Opposition to the State's Motion for
Summary Judgment and to Dismiss at 9-13 (Record at 361-363). Standard of
Review:

The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo under the

correction of error standard of review, and this Court will accord no particular
deference to such conclusions. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City
Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).
Issue #2:

Whether the trial court erred in granting the State's Motion for

Summary Judgment for claims 28 and 31, concluding that the Petitioner, by not
specifically responding to the State's motion on these claims, warranted summary
disposition? Record Citation:

This issue was raised below in Lafferty's

Memorandum in Opposition to the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and to
Dismiss at 15-16, 18 (Record at 361-363). Standard of Review:

Appellate

courts review a grant of summary judgment for correctness and afford no deference
to conclusions of law. Johnson v. Utah Department of Transportation, 2006 UT 15
(Utah Supreme Court), citing Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 Utah 79.

2

Issue #3:

Whether the trial court erred in granting the State's Motion for

Summary Judgment by finding that Dr. Golding's denial of "situational competence"
as a valid diagnosis did not amount to new evidence when it was the theory Dr.
Golding advanced to find Lafferty competent? Record Citation:

This issue

was raised below in Lafferty's Memorandum in Opposition to the State's Motion for
Summary Judgment and to Dismiss at 13-14 (Record at 361-363). Standard of
Review:

Appellate courts review a grant of summary judgment for correctness

and afford no deference to conclusions of law. Johnson v. Utah Department of
Transportation, 2006 UT 15 (Utah Supreme Court).
Issue #4:

Whether the trial court erred in granting the State's Motion for

Summary Judgment by finding that the ineffective counsel issue for trial counsel on
claims 12 (partial) 20 (partial), 22, 23, 11 (partial), 24, 25, 26, and for appellate
counsel for claims 27 and 29, were not satisfied under the federal standard of
Strickland?

Record Citation: This issue was raised below in Lafferty's

Memorandum in Opposition to the State's Motion for Summary Judgment and to
Dismiss at 14-15, 16-18. (Record at 361-363) Standard of Review: Johnson v.
Utah Department of Transportation, 2006 UT 15 (Utah Supreme Court).
Issue #5:

Whether the trial court erred in finding that claim 44 warranted

summary judgment, when the argument was there was ineffective waiver of a conflict
of interest with his trial counsel, who had also previously represented his co-

3

defendant Dan Lafferty on the same set of facts? Record Citation: This issue
was raised below in Lafferty's Memorandum in Opposition to the State's Motion for
Summary Judgment and to Dismiss at 20-21 (Record at 361-363). Standard of
Review: Appellate courts review a grant of summary judgment for correctness and
afford no deference to conclusions of law. Johnson v. Utah Department of
Transportation, 2006 UT 15 (Utah Supreme Court).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
The following statutory authorities are either determinative in this appeal or
are of such central importance as to merit their inclusion herein:
U.S. Constitution 5th, 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendments.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206 to 207; 76-5-202; 77-15a-101 through 106; 7835a-104 through 107.
Utah Const. Art. I Sections 5, 7, 9,11,12, 24, and 25.
UT. R. Civ. P. 56(c), 56(e), and 65C(c)(3).
UT. R. Crim. P. 8(b).
UT. R. Prof. Conduct 1.9.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

A±

Nature of the Case:
This appeal is from an Order of the Fourth District Court, Provo Department,

Honorable Anthony W. Schofield presiding, granting the State's motion to dismiss
and for partial summary judgment.

EL

Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below:
Lafferty was convicted in May 1985 of two counts of first degree murder, two

counts of burglary, and two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder.
After a sentencing hearing, the jury returned a verdict of death on each of the first
degree murder convictions.

Lafferty then appealed his conviction and death

sentence to the Utah Supreme Court. On January 11, 1988, the Court issued its
decision rejecting all of Lafferty's challenges. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1988) (Lafferty I).
Rather than seeking state collateral review of his conviction and sentence,
Lafferty opted instead to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah. This petition was denied by the federal
district court and Lafferty appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit Court reversed the district court and granted
Lafferty's writ of habeas corpus, thereby vacating his conviction and sentence. The
Tenth Circuit Court concluded that the state trial court had relied upon an incorrect
legal standard in evaluating Lafferty's competency. See Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d
5

1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
The State then chose to retry Lafferty for the offenses originally charged
against him. In April 1996, Lafferty was again convicted of two counts of first degree
murder, two counts of aggravated burglary, and two counts of conspiracy to commit
first degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the jury returned verdicts of
death on each of the first degree murder convictions. Lafferty then appealed his
conviction and death sentence to the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
affirmed Lafferty's conviction and sentence, see State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 20
P.3d 342 (Lafferty II). The United States Supreme Court denied review. See
Lafferty v. Utah, 534 U.S. 1018(2001).
On October 10,2002, Lafferty filed his Preliminary Petition for Habeas Corpus
and/or Post-Conviction Relief in the Fourth District Court, Provo Department. On
October 29,2004, Lafferty filed his Second Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus, Parts
1 and 2, raising numerous claims challenging his conviction and death sentence. In
response, on February 23,2005, the State filed its Motion to Dismiss and for Partial
Summary Judgment. Lafferty filed his opposition to the motion on May 16, 2005.
On June 20, 2005, the State filed its reply. On October 16, 2005, the Court heard
oral argument on the motion. On November 29, 2005, the Fourth District Court,
Provo Department, granted the State's motion. Lafferty now appeals this order.

C.

Statement of Facts:
6

1.

Appellant Ronald Watson Lafferty ("Lafferty") is an inmate at the Utah

State Prison, sentenced to death on two capital murder charges.
2.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed his sentences in State v. Lafferty,

749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988).
3.

Petitioner did not seek collateral relief in the State courts; instead, he

proceeded directly to federal collateral review. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit reversed on the ground that the trial court had applied the
incorrect legal standard for evaluating petitioner's competency. Lafferty v. Cook,
949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
4.

The Tenth Circuit ordered petitioner's convictions and sentences

vacated; however, it elaborated that "[t]he state is of course free to retry Lafferty."
Id. at 1557.
5.

Lafferty was retried. A second jury convicted him and he was again

sentenced to death. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT
19,20P.3d342. The United States Supreme Court denied review. Lafferty v. Utah,
534 U.S. 1018(2001).
6.

A Writ of Habeas Corpus and/or Post-Conviction Relief was filed on

October 10, 2002 by prior counsel. On or about August 19, 2002, an order was
entered allowing prior counsel to withdraw and also allowing the recusal of the sitting
judge, Judge Hansen. On November 13, 2003, current counsel were appointed.

7

7.

Current counsel were successful in having a mitigation specialist and

investigator appointed and a Second Amended Habeas petition was filed on or about
October 29, 2004. The Second Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus included Part 1,
which was drafted by Appellant's counsel of record, and Part 2, which was drafted
by Lafferty.
8.

The State filed a Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment

on or about February 23, 2005, which was opposed by Appellant. Oral argument
was heard on the 6th day of October, 2005 and the matter was taken under
advisement. The Court found for the State and dismissed Lafferty's Petition for
Habeas Corpus, with prejudice. The order of dismissal forms the basis of the instant
appeal.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Summary judgment is, at best, a tool to terminally end a pleading. It is not
favored by the court, and requires a strict and narrow application of Rule 56 of the
Utah R. Civ. Proc. It also allows the non-moving party to be given the benefit of
having all inferences considered in a light most favorable to that party. The lower
court granted summary judgment in favor of the State of Utah on each and every
claim raised in the Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The trial court granted the State's Motion for Summary Judgment on claims
1,2,3,15,16,18 (partial), 19,5,6,11 (partial), 12 (partial), 13,17, 20 (partial), 30,
8

32 (partial), 47, 33, 35, 37, 38, 34, 41, 42, and 46 on the following grounds:
(1) That these claims, although not raised on direct appeal, could have been,
and thus were improperly raised, for the first time, in a memorandum opposing
summary judgment.
(2) That the Petitioner had the burden of showing that there was a genuine
issue of material fact with respect to whether appellate counsel was ineffective and
failed to meet that burden.
(3) That sufficient facts were available to petitioner that at the time of his
direct appeal he could have raised all of the foregoing claims before the Utah
Supreme Court.
Petitioner argues that, essentially, both the State of Utah and the lower court
concede that the issues raised in the claims specified were not raised in an appeal.
Therefore, under the exception to the Post Conviction Remedies Act (utilized now
in place of the Writ of Habeas Corpus), relating to ineffective counsel, these claims
are now properly before the court. Petitioner submits that under the federal standard
of Strickland, the trial counsel's performance was so constitutionally deficient as to
effectively prejudice the defense. In other words, the Petitioner, at trial, did not
receive sufficient and satisfactory representation as contemplated by the guarantees
of the United States Constitution in the Sixth Amendment. This is the underlying
thread throughout the entirety of the Petitioner's brief, and the brief is permeated with
examples relating to all of the Petitioner's claims.
9

The second part of (1), that these issues are raised for the first time in a
memorandum opposing summary judgment, is disputed. It is implicit within all of the
claims raised in Petitioner's Writ, that, but for the lack of effective counsel, the claim
would not have been raised. It was not the Petitioner who created the trial strategy,
called and examined witnesses, cross-examined witnesses, introduced exhibits,
made the opening and closing statements, did the research for the case, and so
forth. It was the Petitioner's attorney. Issues that were not raised, testimony that
was not objected to, evidence that was not introduced falls directly at the feet of the
attorney tasked with the duty and responsibility of providing a constitutionally
guaranteed, Sixth Amendment representation of his client. Further, in at least one
claim, claim 12, the ineffective assistance argument was raised formally. It was not
necessary, however, to formally argue in each claim that it was not Mr. Lafferty who
was the attorney and was thus derelict in his duty, it was Mr. Lafferty's attorney.
As to (2) the issue relating to appellate counsel's lack of effectiveness, a
comparison between the arguments raised by appellate counsel and Mr. Lafferty's
reflect that (a), they are markedly different, and (b), that appellate counsel missed
other, equally salient issues. When the failure to raise these issues may be death,
then the ineffectiveness of counsel becomes pronounced.
The last of the issues, (3), that sufficient facts were available to Petitioner that
at the time of his direct appeal he could have raised these issues, is not supported
in any fashion by any evidence. There is not a solitary record citation, but the court
10

only states that, "From my view of the record, sufficient facts were available to
Petitioner at the time of his direct appeal that he could have raised all of the
foregoing claims...". This should be clearly inadequate for summary disposition.
The Petitioner's second argument, that by not responding specifically to claim
31 (claim 28 is not argued; both were ruled on by the lower court), summary
judgment should issue, is not supported by the law. All pleadings can be considered
with respect to a summary judgment, and when the initial Writ of Habeas is
considered, a material and genuine issue of fact was created, and summary
judgment on claim 31 ought to have been denied.
The third argument of Mr. Lafferty, that Dr. Golding's finding of "situational
competence", should now be considered as "new evidence" is compelling, if only
because it was not available during Lafferty's trial. In fact, Dr. Golding's testimony
was just the opposite. Ergo, the need for scrutiny. Apparently psychology has now
progressed to where, as with the finding in law almost two hundred years after the
constitution was created, of "penumbras of privacy" hidden in the Ninth Amendment,
new evidence has surfaced in psychological circles of "situational competence". At
the very least, this one hundred eighty degree position by a psychologist utilized by
the State at trial needs a re-examination to insure fairness, and summary disposition
should be available at this stage.
The fourth argument, i.e., that the federal Strickland standard was not satisifed
with respect to the ineffective counsel issue on claims 12 (partial), 20 (partial), 22,
n

23, 11 (partial), 24, 25, 26, and for appellate counsel for claims 27 and 29, is
disputed by the record. Claims 12 related to the failure of the trial counsel to seek
to sequester the jury when one of the jurors disclosed he had been given an
instruction by his religious leaders. Considering the cultural background of the clear
majority of the citizens in Utah and the high profile nature of this case, there ought
to have been a sequestering of the jury to avoid this very possibility. The motion to
sequester was never sought, and trial counsel was remiss in his trial duty.
Claims 22, 23, 11 (partial), and 24 all related to there being a lack of a
substantial investigation by trial counsel into every plausible line of defense. No
mitigation expert was hired. No investigation of any exculpatory evidence or witness
tampering was undertaken. The only mitigation evidence introduced at trial were
prison officials testifying that Mr. Lafferty was a relatively trouble free inmate and the
write-ups he had were of a non-violent type, plus some pictures from a yearbook and
a few photos of Mr. Lafferty and his family. There was no attempt introducing Mr.
Lafferty as a whole person; i.e., no witnesses of neighbors and family testifying to
his good character, no educational records from either high school or Brigham Young
University, no mental health records or psychological test results, not even his
National Guard records showing an Honorable discharge. There was no testimony
or evidence submitted showing how a person could go from a City Councilman and
a respected member of his church, to a convicted murdered of a mother and child.
Clearly, this failure of Mr. Lafferty's attorney could constitute nothing else than
12

ineffective counsel.
Claims 25 and 29 relate to the American Bar Association Guidelines and Rule
8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The American Bar Association

guidelines require, inter alia, that there be two "death certified" trial attorneys who
are qualified under Rule 8. Trial counsel did not qualify, and this lack of qualification
is the epitome of ineffectiveness of counsel.
Claim 26 is in regard to trial counsel's not making objections to closing
arguments that prejudiced Mr. Lafferty. In particular, when the prosecutor stated
improperly that the punishment for the death of a fifteen month old child should be
greater than the punishment of the death of an adult, there was no objection. The
obvious attempt by the prosecutor to elicit sympathy (and what normal person would
not have enormous sympathy?) was so flagrant as to substantially prejudice the
case. An objection was required to be made to ensure that Mr. Lafferty received a
fair trial. It was not, and trial counsel was therefore deficient in this regard.
The last argument by Mr. Lafferty is that claim 44, wherein it is argued that Mr.
Lafferty received ineffective assistance of counsel, goes to the fundamental issue
of conflict-free counsel. Trial counsel in Ronald Watson Lafferty's case was Mr.
Esplin. Trial counsel in Dan Lafferty's case was Mr. Esplin. This case was not a
simple civil dispute, it was a capital homicide. Mr. Esplin, even years apart, should
not have represented both parties because of the obvious conflict of interest.

13

ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON CLAIMS 1, 2, 3,
15,16,18 (PARTIAL), 19, 5, 6,11, (PARTIAL), 12 (PARTIAL),
13,17, 20 (PARTIAL), 30, 32 (PARTIAL), 47, 33, 35, 37, 38,
34, 41, 42, AND 46 ON THE GROUNDS THAT (1) THESE
CLAIMS, ALTHOUGH NOT RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL,
COULD HAVE BEEN, AND THUS WERE IMPROPERLY
RAISED, FOR THE FIRST TIME, IN A MEMORANDUM
OPPOSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (2) THAT PETITIONER
HAD THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THERE WAS A
GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT WITH RESPECT TO
WHETHER APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE AND
FAILED TO MEET THAT BURDEN, AND (3) THAT SUFFICIENT
FACTS WERE AVAILABLE TO PETITIONER THAT AT THE
TIME OF HIS DIRECT APPEAL HE COULD HAVE RAISED ALL
OF THE FOREGOING CLAIMS BEFORE THE UTAH SUPREME
COURT

The trial court held that the claims identified above should not be considered
for three reasons. They are: 1), these claims, although not raised on direct appeal,
could have been, and thus were improperly raised, for the first time, in a
memorandum opposing summary judgment, 2) that Petitioner had the burden of
showing that there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether
appellate counsel was ineffective and failed to meet that burden, and 3) that
sufficient facts were available to Petitioner that at the time of his direct appeal he
could have raised all of the foregoing claims before the Utah Supreme Court.
As to the first, these claims, although not raised on direct appeal, could have
been, and thus were improperly raised, for the first time, in a memorandum opposing
14

summary judgment; a blanket application of the statute is incorrect. It is conceded
by the State that these claims were not raised on direct appeal. The issue then
becomes if they were not raised on direct appeal, are they precluded from being
raised by the Post Conviction Remedies Act?
The Utah Post Conviction Remedies Act allows claims to be raised if failure
to raise them was due to ineffective assistance of counsel (§78-35a-106(2)).
Ineffective assistance of counsel is defined under Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984) as " (1) that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient
and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 686. Under
the first prong of the test, an attorney's performance is deficient if he has "made
errors so serious that [he] was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a]
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687.
Lafferty's trial counsel was clearly ineffective. Effective assistance of counsel
mandated that the issues now raised by his current counsel, i.e, those set forth in
claims 1, 2, 3, 15, 16, 18 (partial), 19, 5, 6, 11 (partial), 12 (partial), 13, 17, 20
(partial), 30, 32 (partial), 47, 33, 35, 37, 38, 34, 41, 42, and 46, had to be raised by
prior counsel. Failure to raise these issues deprived the Petitioner of not only
potential defenses to a capital crime, but hamstrung defense strategies. If the failure
was knowing and intentional, as a trial strategy, it was woefully below a recognized
standard of competence required for a capital offense. If it was not, there is no other
conclusion that can be drawn but that counsel was ignorant of the law. Irrespective
15

of the reason, it is clear that Lafferty's representation was below par.
In fact, this is the very kernel of ineffective assistance of counsel: had prior
counsel actually provided effective assistance, then these claims would have been
brought on direct appeal. The fact that prior counsel did not bring these claims on
direct appeal demonstrates a lack of competence and ineffective assistance.
Furthermore, by failing to raise these claims, Lafferty suffered prejudice because
these claims were never heard by the court or the very jury that would make a life
or death decision. The efficacy of their arguments could never be heard because
they were not raised. On capital cases, the lack thereof is even more pronounced
because the consequences are so much more severe.
The State acknowledges that Petitioner's Habeas Corpus claims 1-3, 5-6,11
(partial), 12 (partial), 13,15-17,18 (partial), 19, 20 (partial), 30, 32 (partial), 33-35,
37-38, 42, and 46-47 were not raised on appeal. Failure of Petitioner's previous
counsel to raise those claims is a direct evidence of the ineffective assistance of
counsel because of the prejudice to the Petitioner. Therefore, in accordance with
§78-35a-106(2), Petitioner is entitled to raise them in his Habeas Corpus petition at
this time.
As to the second ground, that there was a genuine issue of material fact with
respect to whether appellate counsel was ineffective and Petitioner failed to meet
that burden, Lafferty responds to as follows. On appeal, the Petitioner raised eight
separate challenges:
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"(1) whether the trial court erred in determining that he was competent
to stand trial; (2) whether the trial court erred in granting the State's
challenge for cause to remove Juror 220; (3) whether Utah's insanity
defense, section 76-2-305 of the Utah Code, violates the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of
the Utah Constitution; (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting
victim impact evidence during the penalty phase; (5) whether the trial
court erred by allowing the introduction of statements made by
defendant and his brother Dan Lafferty to the media; (6) whether the
trial court erred by refusing to give defendant's requested instruction
that the jury could consider sympathy or mercy in reaching its verdict
during the penalty phase; (7) whether Utah's death penalty statute,
section 76-3-207 of the Utah Code, is unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of
the Utah Constitution; and (8) whether the retrial of defendant violated
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution."
See State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342 (Utah 2001).
Lafferty raised the following claims in his writ of Habeas Corpus:
"1) Utah law unconstitutionally shifted the burden to him at the penalty
phase because the State had already proven at least one aggravator
by the time the penalty phase began (claims 4,14, and 18 (partial)); 2)
the Court erroneously removed Juror 220 for cause (claim 7); 3) the
Court erroneously admitted at the penalty phase a videotape of the
crime scene showing the victims' bodies (claim 8); 4) the Court
erroneously admitted a videotape of petitioner's media interviews; 5)
the Court erroneously denied petitioner's request for a penalty-phase
sympathy instruction (claim 10); 6) petitioner's retrial violated double
jeopardy (claim 21); 7) the large number of aggravators gives
prosecutors unlimited discretion in choosing whether to charge capital
murder (claim 32 partial)); 8) the Court erroneously found petitioner
competent to stand trial (claim 43); and 9) the Court erroneously denied
petitioner's motion for a new trial (claim 45). These claims repeat
claims that petitioner raised and lost on direct appeal. See State v.
Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 2001 UT 19, cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1018
(2001). (See State's Memorandum, at fl 9.)"
As stated in Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 11, even a cursory comparison
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between the claims on appeal and in the Writ of Habeas Corpus shows that the only
claims that even remotely can be considered similar are the following: number 1
(shifting the burden of the penalty phase to the Petitioner); number 2 (removal of
Juror 220 for cause); number 3 (admission of a videotape at the penalty phase);
number 4 (erroneous admission of the videotape of Petitioner's media interview);
number 9 (competency to stand trial); and number 10 (denial of Petitioner's motion
for new trial).
However, claims of shifting of the burden at the penalty phase, claims 4,14,
18 (partial), 5, penalty phase sympathy instruction 6, double jeopardy claim 21, or
discretion to choose to charge with capital murder claim 32 (partial), were not raised
during the appeal. These are clearly issues that ought to have been raised by
appellate counsel but were not. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on these claims.
The next issue is whether sufficient facts were available to Petitioner at the
time of his direct appeal so that they could have been raised by his counsel? The
trial court, in p. 19 of its ruling, held that sufficient facts were available to Petitioner
at the time of his direct appeal that he could have raised all the foregoing claims
before the Utah Supreme Court. The trial court based this "From my view of the
record. . ." yet, even though this is a death penalty case, there is not a solitary
reference to a single evidentiary fact that is supportive of the court's "view of the
record." Certainly Mr. Lafferty is entitled to some substance, rather than opinion as
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to the court's view. In a motion for summary judgment, especially in a capital case,
we should demand no less.
The lower court also concludes, as to the overall claim of ineffectiveness of
counsel on p. 19 of its ruling, that in its view,
"claiming that the foregoing issues were not raised on appeal because
appellate counsel was ineffective amounts to a new claim that was not
previously raised in the Second Amended Petition, and raising new
claims in a Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment is improper."
[Emphasis added].
It is respectfully submitted that the Court was wrong on both counts.
First, although present counsel did not specifically add the sentence "the
failure to make this claim was ineffective counsel" at the end of each sentence of all
of the claims, and especially claims 1,2,3,15,16,18 (partial), 19,5,6,11 (partial),
12 (partial), 17,18 (partial), 20 (partial), 30, 32 (partial), 47, 33, 35, 37, 38, 34, 41,
42, and 46 [in the same order the Court alluded to them]; nevertheless ineffective
assistance of counsel is implicit within the claims. It was not Mr. Lafferty who was
captain of the ship, it was Mr. Lafferty's attorney. That is, it is the captain of the ship
who has the requisite knowledge of navigation to avoid the shoals, not the seaman
swabbing the deck. Likewise, it was Mr. Lafferty's counsel who has the purported
background and experience necessary to ensure that the defense is fairly presented,
without egregious errors. Each and every claim raised by Lafferty is a recitation of
a failure to act as a prudent attorney in like circumstances should have acted in
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protection of Lafferty's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. This is not a "new" claim
raised by current counsel in their Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment, but
a continuation of the Second Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Last, the lower court apparently also overlooked claim 12, which did, in fact,
reference "Due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness. . ."; which, as indicated in the
preceding, did not have to be specifically listed and was a redundancy. It was not
necessary to add "ineffective counsel" to each claim since the failure to raise the
claim was not Mr. Lafferty's.
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in December 1991 vacated the Petitioner's
original sentence and conviction and indicated that the State was free to retry the
Petitioner. The reversal was made due to errors made by the court regarding the
Petitioner's competency to stand trial in the first case, which again demonstrates the
ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the Petitioner did not receive the
benefit of counsel that was functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment as required in Strickland and he was prejudiced by the counsel's
deficient performance.
Also, the court in Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994) stated that:
"absent the existence of unusual circumstances, a 'party may not raise
the issues in a habeas corpus petition that could or should have been
raised on direct appeal.'.. .We have held that unusual circumstances
exist when a trial counsel represented the defendant on direct appeal
and the defendant in a subsequent habeas proceeding contends that he
had ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, on appeal, or both."
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The showing of "unusual circumstances" is met in the Lafferty case where the
same counsel represented Petitioner at trial and on appeal. Thus, the Petitioner's
unusual circumstances allow him to raise the issue of an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim and the trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment
Moreover, pursuant to §78-35a-106(2),
"[notwithstanding Subsection (1 )(c), a person may be eligible for relief
on a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial
or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective
assistance of counsel."
In this case, due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the claims as referred
to supra have not been raised and therefore entitled the Petitioner to argue these
claims in his Habeas Corpus Writ.
Finally, the Petitioner's Habeas Corpus claim 23, i.e., failure of the previous
counsel for the Petitioner to hire a mitigation specialist, is a new claim not raised on
appeal. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the abovementioned claims.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR CLAIM 31 IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER, BY NOT
SPECIFICALLY RESPONDING TO THE STATE'S MOTION
ON THIS CLAIM, WARRANTED SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Utah law does not require a response for a request of summary judgment.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) states that:
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"when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response . . . must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be
entered against him." (Emphasis added.)
As the rule states, the court must still determine whether summary judgment
is appropriate. Thus, the mere non-response of Respondent's motion for summary
judgment is inadequate grounds for the granting of summary judgment.
In addition, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires the moving party in
a summary judgment motion to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The Utah Supreme Court held that one instance of a material fact is whether an
attorney's conduct measured up to the standard of care required of attorneys in their
professional duties (Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982).
The lower court, in reference to claim 31, adopted the argument of the State
that these claims were not opposed and the Court should therefore grant summary
judgment.
It is correct that current counsel did not specifically respond to the State's
argument against claim 31. It is also correct that a response was not needed. This
Court, in Adams v. State, held that "We clarify that the court should rely not only on
the petitioner's memorandum in opposition [to a motion for summary judgment] but
also on the initial petition itself..." Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62 at paragraph 18.
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Although the Court was discussing an "interest of justice" exception to the statute of
limitations when examining and balancing the meritoriousness of a claim and the
reason for its late filing, the principle is the same. It is also consistent with the
Court's reluctance for summary disposition when allowable claims exist. The lower
court, then, should not have disallowed claim 31, since it was raised in the Second
Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus. This acted as opposition to the State's motion,
and thus the State should have been precluded from summary judgment as to this
claim.
Also, claim 31, relating to the ABA guidelines for death penalty cases, is
directly on point with the Jackson case. This claim argues that Petitioner's
constitutional rights are being violated because his post-conviction counsel did not
satisfy the American Bar Association Guidelines ("ABA guidelines") for attorneys
representing capital post-conviction petitioners. In Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 LEd.2d 471 (U.S. 2003), the Supreme Court of the United
States stated that the ABA guidelines on the standards for capital defense work
serve as "guides to determining what is reasonable.'" Id. Thus, the ABA guidelines
list the minimum requirements that the defense counsel should meet in death penalty
cases. Since the Petitioner's former counsel did not meet the ABA guidelines, he
did not meet even the minimum requirements for handling such cases.
Again, because this claim involves whether an attorney acted in conformity
with professional standards in representing a client, a genuine issue of material fact
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exists. Thus, Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was satisfied in both the
memorandum and the habeas petition, and the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment on these claims.
In conclusion, not only did claim 31 spell out the facts that form the basis of
the Petitioner's claim to relief, but the habeas petition itself discussed the relevant
facts. That should be sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that can be
developed and fleshed out in an evidentiary hearing. The trial court erred by
disregarding the facts in the claim and in the habeas corpus petition.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY FINDING THAT DR.
GOLDING'S DENIAL OF "SITUATIONAL COMPETENCE" AS A
VALID DIAGNOSIS DID NOT AMOUNT TO NEW EVIDENCE
WHEN IT WAS THE THEORY DR. GOLDING ADVANCED TO
FIND LAFFERTY COMPETENT

Although Utah Code. Ann. § 78-35a-104(e)(iii) requires the newfound
evidence to be more than mere impeachment evidence, a recent Utah Supreme
Court case has helped interpret and refine the Code. In State v. Pinder, 2005 UT
15, fl66 n.11 (2005), the Court stated, albeit in dictum, "that newly discovered
impeachment evidence can justify the granting of a new trial in certain situations"
(Emphasis added). Thus, the law is not black and white on this issue; it comes down
to the circumstances of the case.
Here, Dr. Stephen Golding, one of the forensic psychologists who evaluated
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Lafferty as part of the competency determination, testified that Lafferty could be
found "situationally competent." In other words, Lafferty was competent in some
situations, but not competent in others. This testimony is a direct contradiction to
what Dr. Golding testified to in State v. Brian Mitchell, case no. 031901884. In
Mitchell, Dr. Golding specifically stated that situational competence is not a valid
diagnosis or theory. Petitioner will further develop these facts in an evidentiary
hearing, but the inconsistent statement itself is sufficient to demonstrate new
evidence since it is directly contradictory to prior evidence.
In addition, §78-35a-104(e)(i) states that the court is required to vacate the
conviction or sentence where:
"newly discovered material evidence exists. . .[that] (i) neither the
petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of [the evidence] at the time of
trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously
filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence
could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence..."
In other words, new evidence exists when the petitioner or his attorney was
unaware of it and it could not have been discovered with due diligence.
Because Mitchell took place long after Lafferty (I or II), the evidence regarding
Dr. Golding's changed testimony was not available at the time of the Lafferty cases.
Neither party had access to this evidence until Dr. Golding made his contradictory
statements in his testimony in Mitchell. Had the parties had access to this evidence
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at the time of the Lafferty cases, the impeachment could have been exposed at that
time. Hence, the evidence was not available at the time of trial and is thus new
evidence.
This new evidence would be extremely helpful to Petitioner's case because
Dr. Golding was a critical witness for the State. As mentioned in Pinder, this new
evidence could be used as impeachment to discredit Dr. Golding's testimony
regarding Lafferty's competence since the "situational competence theory" was what
Dr. Golding used to find Lafferty competent. Had Dr. Golding's contradictory
statements been available at the time of the Lafferty cases, Dr. Golding could have
been discredited as a witness and Petitioner's competence may still be in doubt.
However, this is new evidence that would be significant in raising a reasonable doubt
as to Lafferty's competence, thus raising a genuine issue of material fact.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE STATE'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY FINDING THAT
THE INEFFECTIVE TRIAL COUNSEL ISSUE ON CLAIMS 12
(PARTIAL), 20 (PARTIAL), 22, 23,11 (PARTIAL), 24, 25, 26,
AND FOR APPELLATE COUNSEL FOR CLAIMS 27 AND 29,
WERE NOT SATISFIED UNDER THE FEDERAL STANDARD
OF STRICKLAND

A.

Claim 12 (Partial): Improper Jury

Petitioner is entitled to have a fair and impartial jury hear his case See State
v. Wach, 2001 UT 35,1J36, 24 P.3d 947 ("Both the United States Constitution and
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the Utah Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a fair and impartial jury".).
Furthermore, as stated in State v. Andrews, 576 P.2d 857, 859 (1978), "it is the
general rule that who wishes to challenge a judge's allowance of juror separation
must demonstrate either actual prejudice or a substantial likelihood that some
prejudice did result from the refusal to sequester." United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d
670 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hill, 496 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1974); State v.
Jones, 218 Kan. 720, 545 P.2d 323 (1976).
Here, prior counsel did not move to sequester the jury when one of the jurors
disclosed that he had been given an instruction by his religious teachers. The juror
felt that he agreed with the Petitioner's views on religion and Constitutional areas
being discussed in the trial. The juror received a "blessing" from a fellow church
member and was told that Petitioner was evil and that he should not be deceived by
Petitioner. After that, "the juror felt compelled that he should go forward and quietly
find the Petitioner guilty and sentence him to death." Second Am. Pet. at 10. This
"out of court" instruction was clearly improper and obviously prejudicial. It is not
known if the result would have been different; all that is known is that if the jury had
been sequestered, this juror, having some sympathy with the Petitioner's views on
religion, could have been the one juror, as in Dan Lafferty's case, who voted against
the death penalty.
In such a high profile case as Lafferty, which drew media from around the
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world, surely the jury should have been sequestered to prevent prejudice. Not only
that, but in this high-profile case, the death penalty was at stake, and thus trial
counsel should have been even more cautious to avoid prejudice to the Petitioner.
However, trial counsel never raised the issue.
Furthermore, the instructions and verdict forms were faulty. They allowed
jurors to find only that death was the appropriate penalty, or that they were
reasonably satisfied they could not do so. The verdict forms and instructions did not
give jurors the affirmative option of indicating that one or more jurors had decided
that Petitioner deserved a life sentence. These instructions and verdict forms in
effect directed the jury to focus on death. An affirmative option, such as a life
sentence, ought to have been offered.
Also, while engaging in the process of jury selection, the trial court
systematically precluded from the jury those members of the community who were
prone, though not entirely predisposed, to impose a life sentence rather than a death
sentence. Therefore, the trial court improperly death qualified the jury without any
objection from trial counsel. Any jury selection process which systematically
excludes from the jury services a specific segment of the population based solely on
their views of capital punishment violates a fundamental principle which ensures that
a criminal defendant has a right to a trial by an impartial jury. Therefore, Petitioner
was prejudiced by a death qualification of the jurors serving in this case and trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to object or move for a sequester.
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Where Lafferty's defense counsel allowed a jury where every member of the
jury was in favor of the death penalty, and was not sequestered, such jury was not
impartial. It was a jury biased in favor of the death penalty against Lafferty. The
only juror who was against the death penalty was dismissed.
B.

Claims 22, 23,11 (Partial), and 24: Ineffective Mitigation

The lower court held, relative to these claims, that each and every claim fell
within the ambit of summary disposition. The Petitioner will address each claim in
turn, and review the ineffective assistance of counsel argument. Trial counsel bears
the responsibility of conducting a "substantial investigation into each of the plausible
lines of defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68. Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court in the recent case of Wiggins v. Smith, (539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct.
2527,1561 LEd.2d471 (U.S. 2003), held that the absence of a thorough mitigation
investigation is per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Under these claims, trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to hire a mitigation expert who could have found
additional mitigating factors for the Petitioner. Under Strickland, trial "counsel has
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary." Id. at 691.
Any diligent counsel would have investigated exculpatory evidence and any
facts of evidence tampering. Failure to do so would render a deficient performance
that would fall below the objective standards of a reasonable professional judgment.
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Failure to discover exculpatory evidence or facts of evidence tampering would
prejudice the defendant at the trial and at sentencing. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871
P.2d 516 (Utah 1994). Here, trial counsel failed to hire a mitigation investigator who
could have provided crucial mitigating factors to spare the Petitioner's life in the
sentencing stage.
Trial counsel hired ineffective investigators, or in the alternative, failed to hire
effective investigators to go back and interview witnesses and to discover if any of
the evidence had been tampered with or to effectively find exculpatory evidence that
would have assisted the Petitioner in his case. Trial counsel also failed to hire or
provide a mitigation specialist to ascertain and develop mitigating circumstances to
place before the jury at the penalty phase in order to persuade the jury that there
was mitigating evidence that could give them reason to find, as they had for his codefendant Dan Lafferty, that he should serve life in prison rather than face the death
penalty.
The only mitigating evidence that was provided to the jury at the penalty phase
of the case was a short series of prison officials who indicated that the Petitioner was
a relatively trouble-free inmate and that his write-ups were of a non-violent nature,
a few pictures from a yearbook, and some photographs of the Petitioner with his
family. Some of the documents that should have been, but were not introduced in
mitigation were: educational records from high school and BYU, mental health
records and psychological test results, National Guard military records showing an
30

honorable discharge, Utah County Jail records, Utah Department of Corrections
records, items from Petitioner's journal, as well as witnesses and family members
who may have been willing to step forward on his behalf to discuss childhood issues,
family background, physical, verbal, and emotional abuse, childhood illnesses,
medical issues, and injuries. Petitioner's educational records and employment
records show particularly Petitioner's good adaptability and getting along with other
people around him and provide mitigating factors for the penalty phase.
The clear paucity of these records provided a woefully incomplete picture and
history of exactly who Ronald Watson Lafferty was. The holes and gaps in this
history were, unfortunately, filled in by the State, with the State's heavy emphasis on
exacting the death penalty. There was no favorable (or at best, inadvertent)
evidence for Mr. Lafferty; that was not the state's job. It was Mr. Lafferty's
attorneys' jobs, and it was not complete. Not by a green mile. Petitioner's brother
Dan received only a life sentence, whereas Petitioner received the death penalty.
Considering that co-defendant Dan actually confessed to the killings, it is likely that
had a mitigation expert been hired for the Petitioner, he would have received the
same or lesser punishment as Dan.
C.

Claim 25 and 29: ABA Guidelines and Rule 8

As mentioned supra, the ABA provides guidelines for counsel who are working
death penalty cases. Specifically, the 1989 ABA guidelines required that two
qualified trial attorneys should be assigned to represent a Defendant, as did the Utah
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Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, for
example, requires that counsel be "proficient in the trial of capital cases." Utah
R.Crim. P. 8(b). Because the trial counsel did not meet the requirements, and did
not provide proper mitigating factors, among the other errors listed supra, Petitioner
suffered from ineffective assistance of counsel. This is contrary to the lower court's
holding, on p. 39, that "It is not enough to assert that trial counsel did not meet
statutory criteria. Petitioner must demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective."
It seems to be accepted by the lower court, at least to a degree, that 'trial
counsel did not meet statutory criteria.' In fact, it is clear that trial counsel did not
meet the criteria necessary to qualify to defend capital cases. It should also be clear
that there is a reason behind having qualified attorneys represent death penalty
client, and that reason is if the attorneys are not qualified, there will be ineffective
assistance of counsel. Contrary to the lower court's conclusion, that Petitioner did
not show trial counsel to be ineffective, Petitioner did just that. To reiterate, the lack
of mitigating factors, i.e., the very reasons put forth as to why the Petitioner was a
worthy enough person not to be executed, were all but non-existent. That alone
should be sufficient. Other factors and ineffectiveness abide, supra.
D.

Claim 26: Closing Argument

Trial counsel failed to object to improper closing arguments that prejudiced the
Petitioner. The prosecutor improperly stated that the punishment for the death of a
15-month old girl should be greater that the punishment of the death of an adult.
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Even if trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's closing argument by itself
does not rise to the Strickland standard which the Petitioner claims it is, then the
cumulative evidence of the misconduct does rise to the Strickland level. Moreover,
the court stated in Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626 that "to satisfy the first prong of
the Strickland test, Carter must rebut the strong presumption that 'under the
circumstances, the challenged action' might be considered sound trial strategy." Id.
at 689. Failure to object to the damaging prosecutor's closing argument cannot
possibly be considered a sound trial strategy but clearly is a serious omission. Such
omission, if preserved on appeal, could have resulted in reversal. Therefore, the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment on claim 26.
E.

Claim 27: Failure to Appeal Change of Venue

In accordance with State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989), four factors
must be considered when making a change of venue request "(1) the standing of the
victim and the accused in the community; (2) the size of the community; (3) the
nature and gravity of the offense; and (4) the nature and extent of publicity." Id.
Surely the Petitioner's case met all four requirements in where the Petitioner
had little standing in the community, the community was small, Petitioner had a
negative reputation as the killer of a mother and the child which was an offense of
an extreme nature and the pretrial publicity was enormous. See also State v.
Widdison, 28 P.3d 1278 (Utah 2001). As the court stated in Lafferty and Widdison,
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"the ultimate test of whether a failure to change venue constitutes an abuse of
discretion is whether the defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury." See Id.
See also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1250 (Utah 1988). In the Petitioner's
case, the counsel failed to request a change of venue and failure to preserve the
issue of change of venue on appeal significantly prejudiced the Petitioner by having
a tainted jury pool.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CLAIM 44
WARRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHEN IT ARGUES
INEFFECTIVE WAIVER OF A CONFLICT OF INTEREST WITH
HIS TRIAL COUNSEL, WHO HAD ALSO PREVIOUSLY
REPRESENTED HIS CO-DEFENDANT DAN LAFFERTY ON
THE SAME MATTER

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an
accused the right to conflict-free counsel. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261,271
(1981) ("Where a constitutional right to counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases
hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of
interest."). Furthermore, a Utah Supreme Court case noted that "the assistance of
counsel is among those constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction
can never be treated as harmless error" (State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697,699, (1980)).
Hence, conflict cases are dealt with the utmost care and attention and harmless error
is no defense.
Additionally, pursuant to Rule 1.9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct,
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[A] lawyer who had formerly represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially
factually related matter in which that person's interests are materially
adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client
consents after consultation; or
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the
disadvantage of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with
respect to a client or when the information has become generally
known.
Note that there is no "passage of time exception." Lafferty's Sixth Amendment
right to conflict-free counsel was violated here because prior counsel for Lafferty had
also already represented Dan Lafferty, who is a co-defendant on the same set of
facts. The former counsel of Ron Lafferty, Mr. Esplin, represented him in the same
matter as co-defendant Dan Lafferty. The interests of the co-defendants were
adverse because they were both being charged as defendants in the same matter,
under the identical set of facts. Hence, Petitioner's trial counsel had an actual
conflict in his representation because counsel represented a co-defendant with
contrary interests.
In addition, Rule 1.9 makes it is clear there was a violation in this case. Using
the language from the Rule, Ron Lafferty's prior counsel represented another person
(Dan Lafferty) in the same matter (criminal homicide charges) in which that person's
(Ron Lafferty's) interest are materially adverse to the interests of the former client
(Dan Lafferty). By virtue of being co-defendants in the same case the defendants
needed their own defense and thus, their own lawyer representing their needs. Ergo,
35

the Petitioner's prior counsel violated Rule 1.9 by representing both Ron and Dan for
the same set of facts.
Furthermore, the issue of co-defendants' guilt in committing the crime was
also materially adverse. The co-defendants were the only witnesses to the homicide
charges and upon being charged as co-defendants, there created a naturally
adverse relationship in their defense. As the Smith case pointed out, "members of
the same association may not represent defendants with conflicting interests, as
there is a strong likelihood that both have been privy to the confidences of both
defendants." (State v. Smith, 621 P.2d 697, 699, (1980)). Thus, it is important that
members of the same law firm or association do not get involved in representing
conflicting interests.
Here, not only was it the same association representing the two clients, but
it was the same lawyer. That is a clear violation of the conflict of interest rule. By
representing both Ron and Dan, prior counsel had access to confidential information
of both co-defendants and his trial strategy could incorporate those facts in a manner
detrimental to the Petitioner. Moreover, Ron Lafferty did not get a fresh start with
a new lawyer because his counsel had already been through a trial regarding the
exact same set of facts. That is akin to a jury member getting a pre-trial bias from
media reports. Because Ron's and Dan's interests were materially adverse, there
was an actual conflict of interest.
Moreover, the State did not show at what time on the time-line of
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representation Mr. Esplin withdrew from representing Dan Lafferty and if he
withdrew at all. Therefore, the State's allegation that Dan's representation was
concluded by the time the counsel was representing Ronald Lafferty is not supported
by evidence. The State's arguments about the conclusion of the representation on
the co-defendant does not mean that there was not a conflict still remaining and
Petitioner has an absolute right to conflict-free counsel. The merefinalization of one
case does not remove the possible conflict in the companion case. This is
especially so when there are still appellate and post-conviction remedies available
as were available to Dan Lafferty at the time. See Memorandum in Opposition to
Summary Judgment at p. 21.
In making its ruling, the trial court relied in its decision on Gardner v. Holden,
888 P.2d 608 (1994), where the Utah Supreme Court noted that
"The charges against [co-defendant] Hainsworth were resolved
separately from the charges against [defendant] Gardner, and by the
time [attorney] Brass was appointed to represent Gardner, the charges
against Hainsworth were concluded, and a conflict, potential or
otherwise, no longer existed between the two defendants." (Id. at 620).
Lafferty's facts differ from Gardner in important ways. Most importantly, the
co-defendant in Gardner played a much lesser role in the crime than did Dan
Lafferty. In Gardner, the co-defendant Hainsworth merely handed a gun to the
defendant Gardner.

Gardner was the one who committed the homicides.

Hainsworth was not even present when the homicides occurred. Dan Lafferty, on the
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other hand, played a much more prominent role in the facts of his case. Dan
confessed to killing Erica and both parties were present during the commission of
the crime. The State, when prosecuting Ron, claimed he was the actual perpetrator,
and maintains that position in the current pleadings. An adversarial position existed
and continues to exist between Ron and Dan Lafferty. Therefore, an impermissible
conflict of interest existed at the time counsel represented both defendants and
exists to this day.
CONCLUSION:
In dismissing Lafferty's petition, the trial court erred as a matter of law. In
order to grant a motion for summary judgment, the court must find that there was no
genuine issue of material fact. Because summary judgment is an extreme measure,
a strict reading of Rule 56 of the Utah R. Civ. Proc. is required. While the nonmoving party is entitled to a reading of the case in its favor, the lower court granted
summary judgment on each and every motion by the State.
The lower court erred in granting each of the motions for summary judgment.
The Petitioner, at trial, did not receive sufficient and satisfactory representation as
contemplated by the guarantees of the United States Constitution in the Sixth
Amendment. Strickland was satisfied because of trial counsel's failure to object to
inflammatory comments by the Prosecutor at closing argument and for its failure to
hire an effective mitigation expert, among other deficiencies as described supra. In
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addition, Dr. Golding's testimony in Mitchell was new evidence because it was not
available in the first trial. Last, Lafferty's counsel clearly had a conflict of interest
when he represented both Ron and Dan Lafferty in the same matter for which they
were co-defendants.
Based upon the foregoing, Lafferty respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the lower court's granting of the State's motion to dismiss and for partial
summary judgment.
DATED this _2-2.

day of
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Following a jury trial in May 1985, Petitioner was convicted of
two counts of first degree murder, two counts of aggravated burglary,
and two counts of conspiracy to commit first degree murder Pursuant
to statute, a sentencing hearing was convened after which the jury
returned a verdict of death on each of the first degree murder
convictions Petitioner subsequently appealed his conviction and death
sentence to the Utah Supreme Court On January 11, 1988, the Court
issued its decision rejecting all of Petitioner's challenges See State v
Lafferty, 749 P 2d 1239 (Utah 1988) (Lafferty I) Petitioner did not
seek state collateral review of his conviction and sentence, but opted
instead to file a petition for wnt of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah This petition was denied by the
federal district court and Petitioner appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit The Tenth Circuit Court reversed the
district court and granted Petitioner's writ of habeas corpus, thereby
vacating his conviction and sentence It concluded that the state trial
court had relied upon an incorrect legal standard in evaluating
Petitioner's competency See Lafferty v Cook, 949 F 2d 1546 (10th
Cir 1991)
Respondent thereafter chose to retry Petitioner for the offenses
originally charged against him In April 1996, Petitioner was again
1

convicted of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of

has new evidence of perjury or inconsistent testimony by Dr Stephen

aggravated burglary, and two counts of conspiracy to commit first

Golding, who was one of the forensic psychologists that evaluated

degree murder Following a sentencing hearing, the jury returned

Petitioner as part of the competency determination According to

verdicts of death on each of the first degree murder convictions

Petitioner during his competency hearings Dr Golding specifically

Petitioner then appealed his conviction and death sentence to the Utah

stated that Petitioner could be found "situationally competent," that is,

Supreme C ourt The Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction

competent in some situations, but not competent in others However,

and sentence, see State v Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, 20 P 3d 342 {Lafferty

m recent competency hearings held m the case of State v Brian

II) The United States Supreme Court denied review See Lafferty v

Mitchell, case no 031901884 (3rd District Court, Salt Lake County,

Utah, 534 US 1018(2001)

State of Utah), Petitioner claims that Dr Golding testified that

On October 10,2002, Petitioner filed his Preliminary Petition
for Habeas Corpus and/or Post-Conviction Relief m this court On

situational competence is not a viable diagnosis
Additionally, Petitioner also raises forty-seven separate claims

October 29, 2004, Petitioner filed his Second Amended Wnt of

challenging the legality of his conviction and the sentence of death

Habeas Corpus, Parts 1 and 2, raising numerous claims challenging his

imposed upon him These claims include (1) error by the trial court in

conviction and death sentence In response, on February 23, 2005,

denying the motion for change of venue, (2) errors committed during

Respondent filed the motion now at issue Petitioner filed his

the jury selection process, (3) errors concerning the penalty phase jury

opposition to the motion on May 16, 2005 On June 20, 2005,

instructions and verdict forms, (4) errors committed by the trial court

Respondent filed its reply On October 6,2005, the court received oral

with respect to the admission of evidence, (5) challenges to Utah's

argument on the motion

capital decision-making process, (6) error committed by the trial court
in finding that Petitioner was competent to proceed, (7) error

SUMMARY OF THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
Petitioner s second amended petition first raises a claim for
relief based upon newly discovered evidence Petitioner asserts that he
2

committed by the trial court in failing to sequester the jury, and (8)
cumulative error In addition, Petitioner raises several claims of
ineffective assistance of both trial counsel and appellate counsel
3

These ineffectiveness claims generally challenge the qualifications of

disposition request Based upon these claims, Petitioner requests the

both trial and appellate counsel Moreover, there is also an

court to immediately release him from custody and order monetary

ineffectiveness claim challenging the qualifications of post-conviction

relief and redress in the amount of thirty-five million dollars

counsel

Respondent argues that summary judgment is appropriate on

Based upon the claims he raises, Petitioner asks that I grant

all of Petitioner's claims According to Respondent, many of

him sufficient funds to pay for counsel and to hire necessary and

Petitioner's claims are procedurally barred pursuant to the Post-

appropriate experts and investigators to prepare for an evidentiary

Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) because they either were previously

hearing on these issues and that I thereafter conduct a heanng to allow

raised and rejected on direct appeal or they are claims that could have

him to present evidence in support of his contentions Ultimately, he

been raised on direct appeal, but were not With respect to the other

desires that I "[ajllow a Writ of Habeas corpus to have the Petitioner

claims, Respondent contends that Petitioner has failed to plead or

brought before the Court so he might be discharged from his illegal

establish the existence of sufficient facts to support the claims and to

and unconstitutional confinement and restraint, and/or relieved of his

grant him sufficient funds to pay for counsel and hire the necessary

illegal and unconstitutional sentence of death " Second Am Pet at 25

and appropriate experts and investigators

In addition to the foregoing claims, Petitioner requested
LEGAL ANALYSIS

counsel to attach a Second Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus Part 2,
apparently written by Mr Lafferty himself, m which he raises the

Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings,

following claims (1) evidence was planted at the rnal proceedings by

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

the prosecution, (2) his second trial violated his protection against

together with the affidavits, if any, show that tliere is no genuine issue

double jeopardy, (3) after the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated

as to any matenal fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

Petitioner's first conviction and death sentence, Respondent failed to

judgment as a matter of law " Utah R Civ P 56(c) The Utah

arrest, re-charge, or properly arraign him on the current charges, and

Supreme Court has held that,

(4) his counsel erroneously advised him not to file a 120-day

[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment
5

4

procedure to judge the credibility of the averments of
parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence Neither
is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve
disputed issues of fact Its purpose is to eliminate the
time, trouble[,] and expense of trial when upon any
view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled
against, he would not be entitled to prevail

him" Utah R Civ P 56(e)
In considering a motion for summary judgment in the context
of a petition for post-conviction relief, the court is obligated to bear in
mind that a "petition for post-conviction relief

collaterally attacks a

Holbrook Co v Adams, 542 P 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975) Indeed, any

conviction and/or a sentence It is not a substitute for direct appellate

showing in support of summary judgment "must preclude all

review " Gardnerv Holden, 888 P 2d 608, 613 (Utah 1994) Thus,

reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, produce

"[i]ssues raised and disposed of on direct appeal of a conviction or a

evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor "

sentence cannot properly be raised again in a [post-conviction petition]

Bullock v Deseret Dodge Truck Ctr, 354 P 2d 559, 561 (Utah 1960)

and should be dismissed as an abuse of the writ without a ruling on the

See also Burmngham v Ott, 525 P 2d 620, 621 (Utah 1974) (same)

merits "Id

"Only when it so appears, is the court justified in refusing such a party

addition, "issues that could and should have been raised on direct

the opportunity of presenting his evidence and attempting to persuade

appeal, but were not, may not be raised for the first time in a [post-

the fact trier to his views " Holbrook, 542 P 2d at 193 However, if

conviction] proceeding," Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96, ^6, 44 P 3d

the party moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of

626 {Carter I), unless the petitioner can demonstrate that "the failure

See also Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-106(l)(b) In

"informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying

to raise [these issues] was due to ineffective assistance of counsel"

the portions of the pleadings or supporting documents which it

Utah Code Ann § 78-3 5a-106(2) Finally, when claims of newly

believes demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue of material fact,"

discovered evidence are raised, relief can be granted only if the

TS 1 Partnership v Allred, 877 P 2d 156, 158 (Utah Ct App 1994),

petitioner, or his counsel, was not, and could not have been, aware of

then the opposing party cannot simply "rest upon the mere allegations

the evidence at the time of tnal or sentencing and it can be shown that

or denials of his pleading, but his response

the new evidence is not merely cumulative, is not simply impeachment

must set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for tnal If he does not so

evidence, and that, when all the other evidence is taken into

respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against

consideration, no reasonable tner of fact could have found the

6

7

Under the first prong of the test, an attorney's performance is

petitioner guilty of first degree murder or returned a verdict in favor of
the death penalty See Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-104(l)(e)(i)-(iv)
With respect to Petitioner's claims that allege ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, in order to prevail he must demonstrate that

deficient if he has "made errors so serious that [he] was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a] defendant by the Sixth
Amendment" Id at 687 The seriousness of any errors is judged by

there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each prong of

whether counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing

the test set forth in Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668(1984) (1)

professional norms Id at 688 In this context, the "reasonableness of

that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and (2) that

counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the

the deficient performance prejudiced the defense Id at 686 See also

defendant's own statements or actions Counsel's actions are usually

Bundy v Deland, 763 P 2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988) (to prevail on a claim

based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the

of ineffective assistance of counsel, "a defendant must show, first, that

defendant and on information supplied by the defendant" Id at 691

his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable

But see Rompilla v Beard, 125 S Ct 2456, 2466-68 (2005) (holding

manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of

that even if a defendant suggests that no mitigating evidence is

reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's

available, trial counsel is required to review material he knows the

performance prejudiced the defendant "), State v Geary, 707 P 2d 645,

prosecutor will rely on as evidence in aggravation)
In challenging counsel's effectiveness, a petitioner "must

646 (Utah 1985) (to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
must prove "(1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in

identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have

some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial would

been the result of reasonable professional judgment The court must

probably have been different but for counsel's error ") However, as

then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified

the Supreme Court noted in Strickland, "counsel is strongly presumed

acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally

to have rendered adequate assistance," Strickland, 466 U S at 690,

competent assistance " Id at 690 In making this determination,

696, and there is also a strong presumption that the outcome of the

fairness requires "that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting

particular proceeding is reliable

effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's
9

8

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of

perspective at the time " Id at 689 Moreover, the assessment of

the proceeding would have been different A reasonable probability is

counsel's performance cannot be based upon "what is prudent or

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence m the outcome '" Id

appropriate, but only [upon] what is constitutionally compelled "

at 694

United States v Cromc, 466 U S 648, 665 n 38 (1984) In addition,
the Supreme Court has specifically noted that,
[judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be
highly deferential
Because of the difficulties
inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge
a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fells within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,
that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
"might be considered sound trial strategy "

The United States Supreme Court has also held that the
effective assistance of appellate counsel is a right guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Evitts v Lucey,
469 US 387,396(1985) Whether an appellate counsel's
performance is ineffective is judged by the same standard that applies
to judging the ineffectiveness of trial counsel See Smith v Bobbins,
528 U S 259, 285 (2000) ("[T]he proper standard for evaluating

Strickland, 466 U S at 689
[petitioner's] claim that appellate counsel was ineffective in neglecting
Concerning the second prong of the test, even if an attorney's
to file a merits brief is that enunciated in Strickland v Washington ")
representation is found to be unreasonable under prevailing
See alsoBruner v Carver, 920 P 2d 1153, 1157 (Utah 1996) ("The
professional norms, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will
standard forjudging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the
nevertheless fail if the errors committed by counsel had no effect on
same as the standard forjudging ineffective assistance of trial
the outcome of the criminal proceeding W a t 691 Thus,
counsel") This standard requires Petitioner to "first show that his
[it] is not enough for the defendant to show that the
errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of
the proceeding Virtually every act or omission of
counsel would meet that test and not every error that
conceivably could have influenced the outcome
undermines the reliability of the result of the
proceeding
Id at 693 A petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable

10

counsel was objectively unreasonable in failing to find arguable issues
to appeal-that is, that counsel unreasonably failed to discover
1
This showing is greater than simply demonstrating "that the errors had
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding," but less than
demonstrating "that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered
the outcome in the case " Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668, 693
(1984)

11

nonfnvolous issues and to file a merits brief raising them " Robbins,

added) According to the court in Cook, "[b]y omitting an issue under

528 U S at 285 If Petitioner "succeeds in such a showing, he then has

these circumstances, counsel's performance is objectively

the burden of demonstrating prejudice That is, he must show a

unreasonable because the omitted issue is obvious from the trial

reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's unreasonable failure

record Additionally, the omission prejudices the defendant because

to file a merits brief, he would have prevailed on his appeal" Id

had counsel raised the issue, the defendant would have obtained a

In considering the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate

reversal on appeal" Id The Utah Supreme Court, however, did not

counsel in the context of a post-conviction petition, the Utah Supreme

adopt this language Rather, the Carter I Court adopted language from

Court, in Carter I, cited to a Tenth Circuit case which held that

the Banks decision which defined "dead-bang winner" "as an 'issue

[w]hen a
petitioner alleges that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise an issue on appeal, we
examine the merits of the omitted issue Failure to raise
an issue that is without merit "does not constitute
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel"
because the Sixth Amendment does not require an
attorney to raise every nonfnvolous issue on appeal
Thus, counsel frequently will "winnow out" weaker
claims in order to focus effectively on those more likely
to prevail However, an "appellate advocate may
deliver deficient performance and prejudice a defendant
by omitting a 'dead-bang winner,' even though counsel
may have presented strong but unsuccessful claims on
appeal"

which is obvious from the trial record and one which probably would
have resulted in reversal on appeal'" Carter I, 2001 UT 96 at 148
(emphasis added) (quoting Banks, 54 F 3d at 1515 n 13) The fact that
the Carter /Court adopted the "probably would have resulted"
language instead of the "would have resulted" language is important
because the "probably would have resulted" language is consistent
with the United States Supreme Court's holding noted above that it is
the Strickland standard that applies to claims of ineffective assistance

Banks v Reynolds, 54 F 3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir 1995) (quoting
of appellate counsel See Robbins, 528 U S at 285 Indeed, in a recent
United States v Cook, 45 F 3d 388, 393, 395 (10th Cir 1995)) See
decision the Tenth Circuit held that
also Carter I, 2001 UT 96 at 148
[t]o the extent [the "dead-bang winner"] language can
be read as requiring the defendant to establish that the
omitted claim would have resulted in his obtaining
relief on appeal, rather than there being only a
reasonable probability the omitted claim would have
resulted in relief, this language conflicts with
Strickland The en banc court, therefore, expressly

The Tenth Circuit initially defined a claim as a "dead-bang
winner" if it "was obvious from the trial record

and

would have

resulted in a reversal on appeal " Cook, 45 F 3d at 395 (emphasis

12

disavows the use of the "dead-bang winner" language to
imply requiring a showing more onerous than a
reasonable probability that the omitted claim would
have resulted in a reversal on appeal

13

appeal
1) Claims 4, 14, and 18 (partial) addressing the issue of
burden-shifting at the penalty phase, see Lafferty II, 2001 UT 19 at

Nedl v Gibson, 278 F 3d 1044, 1057 n 5 (10th Cir 2001)
11127-28,
The standard forjudging the effectiveness of appellate counsel
2) Claim 7 challenging me removal of juror 220, see id at
embodied in the phrase "dead-bang winner" is identical to the standard
1158-64,
enunciated in Strickland Therefore, in order for a petitioner to avoid
3) Claim 8 challenging the trial court's decision to admit the
summary judgment on any claims that allege ineffective assistance of
crime scene videotape, see id at 1179-84,
appellate counsel, he must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of
4) Claim 9 challenging the trial court's decision to admit the
material fact with respect to each prong of the "dead-bang winner"
standard (1) that appellate counsel failed to raise an issue which was
obvious from the trial record and (2) that the issue is one which
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal

videotape of Petitioner's media interview, see id at H98-107,
5) Claim 10 challenging the trial court's decision to deny
Petitioner's proposed mercy and sympathy instruction, see id at
11108-112,
ANALYSIS AND RULING2
I. Claims Previously Raised and Rejected on Direct Appeal
All of the following claims were raised and rejected on direct

6) Claim 21 addressing the double jeopardy issue, see id at
11142-149,
7) Claim 32 (partial) addressing the issue of prosecutorial
discretion in charging capital murder, see id at HI40-41,

:

Throughout his second amended petition, Petitioner refers to both state
and federal constitutional provisions in asserting his claims During oral
argument, he specifically requested that the court provide an independent
analysis of his claims under both state and federal law However, Petitioner
does not proffer any explanation as to how the court's analysis under the
federal constitution should differ under the state constitution Therefore,
consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's approach, this court will not
"embark on an independent analysis under the Utah Constitution when the
parties had neither argued for nor briefed a separate analysis " State v
Trane, 2002 UT 97,^21, 57 P 3d 1052
14

8) Claim 43 challenging the trial court's finding that Petitioner
was competent to proceed to trial, see id at H45-51, and
9) Claim 45 challenging the trial court's denial of Petitioner's
motion for a new trial, see id at H52-57
Unless "there has been an intervening change of controlling
15

authority,

new evidence has become available, or

[the Utah

106( 1 )(b) Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing

Supreme Court's] prior decision was clearly erroneous and would

these claims

work a manifest injustice," Gildea v Guardian Title Co of Utah, 2001

II. Claims That Could Have Been Raised on Direct Appeal But
Were Not.

UT 75,1110, 31 P 3d 543, "when a legal 'decision [is] made on an issue
With respect to all of the following claims, sufficient facts were
during one stage of a case,' that decision 'is binding m successive
available to Petitioner at the time of his direct appeal that he could
stages of the same litigation '" Jensen v IHC Hosps, lnc, 2003 UT
have raised these claims before the Utah Supreme Court, but he chose
51, ^[67,82 P 3d 1076 (quoting Thurston v Box Elder County, 892
not to do so
P2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995) See also AMS Salt Indus v Magnesium
1) Claim 1 challenging the constitutionality of certain parts of
Corp of Am , 942 P 2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997) ("One branch of the
the Utah capital sentencing statute,
doctrine stands for the general rule that 'one district court judge cannot
2) Claims 2, 3,15,16,18 (partial), and 19 challenging the
overrule another district court judge of equal authority '" (quoting
penalty phase instructions and verdict forms,
Mascaro v Davis, 741 P 2d 938, 946 (Utah 1987)) Petitioner has not
3) Claim 5 challenging the process of death qualification
demonstrated that any of the foregoing exceptions apply in this case
during jury selection,
Because the foregoing claims raised by Petitioner duplicate
claims that were raised and rejected on direct appeal,3 it follows that

4) Claim 6 challenging the trial court's denial of Petitioner's
motion for change of venue,

these claims are procedurally barred pursuant to Section 78-35a5) Claim 11 (partial) challenging the trial court's decision
preventing Petitioner from admitting a number of mitigating
1

Respondent also argues that claim 23, addressing the issue of trial
counsel's ineffectiveness for failure to hire a mitigation expert, claim 38,
which asserts that Utah's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional because it
creates a presumption of death, and claim 41, which asserts that the death
penalty as applied to Petitioner is unconstitutional because it violates human
dignity and serves no penological interest, also were raised on direct appeal
and rejected and thus are procedurally barred However, it does not appear
to the court that the issues raised in these claims were specifically presented
on appeal They therefore are not procedurally barred on the grounds
Respondent asserts

circumstances at the penalty phase,
6) Claim 12 (partial) challenging the tnal court's decision not
to sequester the jury,
7) Claim 13 challenging the reasonable doubt instruction given

17
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at both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial,
8) Claim 17 asserting that insufficient evidence was presented

14) Claims 34 and 41 challenging the constitutionality of the
death penalty,

at the penalty phase to support the aggravating circumstance that the

15) Claim 42 asserting that the cumulative effect of the

homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or

numerous errors committed during Petitioner's trial violated his rights

exceptionally depraved manner,

to due process and a fair trial, and

9) Claim 18 (partial) asserting that jurors were naturally

16) Claim 46 challenging the constitutionality of Utah's

disposed to imposing a death sentence at the penalty phase because

insanity defense statute and asserting that the tnal court improperly

they had already found the existence of at least one aggravating factor

relied on the 1995 version of the statute rather than the 1984 version,

at the guilt phase,

which was in effect at the time the homicides were committed

10) Claim 20 (partial) addressing the issue that, after the Tenth

Petitioner argues in his opposition memorandum that the

Circuit Court of Appeals vacated Petitioner's conviction and sentence,

foregoing claims were not raised on appeal because appellate counsel

he was not arrested on a warrant, but simply transferred from the Utah

was ineffective Indeed, according to Petitioner, the fact that these

State Prison to the Utah County Jail,

claims were not raised is clear evidence that appellate counsel was not

11) Claim 30 asserting that Petitioner's constitutional rights
were violated when the prosecution argued that Petitioner murdered
one and perhaps both of the homicide victims after already having

performing effectively Therefore, Petitioner argues, these claims are
not procedurally barred and should be considered by the court
In my view, however, claiming that the foregomg issues were

argued at Petitioner's co-defendant's trial that the co-defendant had

not raised on appeal because appellate counsel was ineffective

committed both murders,

amounts to a new claim that was not previously raisedin Petitioner's

12) Claims 32 (partial) and 47 challenging the constitutionality
of Section 76-5-202,

second amended pejjlioji,_and raising new claims in a memorandum

'

opposing summary judgment is improper See Holmes Development,

13) Claims 33, 35, 37, and 38 challenging the constitutionality
of Utah's death penalty scheme,

LLC v Cook, 2002 UT 38, p i , 48 P 3d 895 ("A plaintiff cannot
amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories of recovery in

18
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a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary

chose not to do so Moreover, Petitioner alleges no facts

judgment because such amendment fails to satisfy Utah's pleading

demonstrating that the failure to raise these claims was the result of

requirements ") Nevertheless, even if the court did not view the

ineffective assistance of counsel It follows that these claims are

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim as a new post-

procedurally barred pursuant to Section 78-35a-106(l)(c) and Section

conviction claim, Petitioner still is not entitled to the relief he seeks.

78-35a-106(2) Respondent, therefore, is entitled to summary

In order to avoid summary judgment with respect to whether appellate

judgment dismissing these claims

counsel was ineffective in failing to raise these claims, he must show
that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether
appellate counsel failed to raise an issue which was obvious from the
trial record and which probably would have resulted in reversal on
appeal See Carter I, 2001 UT 96 at 1J48
Petitioner has not alleged any facts in support of his ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim otiier than simply to state that the
failure to raise these claims on appeal demonstrates that appellate
counsel was ineffective However, merely raising these claims in his
petition without an adequate factual record to support them does not
demonstrate that these issues were obvious from the trial record and
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal That is the burden
which Petitioner must meet but which he failed to meet
From my view of the record, sufficient facts were available to
Petitioner at the time of his direct appeal that he could have raised all
of the foregoing claims before the Utah Supreme Court Apparently he
21
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III. Claims for Which Respondent Has Requested Summary
Judgment and No Objection Was Raised in Petitioner's
Opposition Memorandum.
Petitioner did not respond to Respondent's request that the

claims Indeed, it was for this reason that Respondent filed its motion
for summary judgment
By not opposing Respondent's request for summaryjudgment

court grant summary judgment on each of the following claims raised

oi attempting in any way to cure the pleading deficiencies related to

in the second amended petition

these claims, Petitioner has failed to show that any genuine issue exists

1) Claim 28 asserting that appellate counsel was ineffective

with respect to the issues they raise Respondent therefore is entitled

because he failed to appeal the trial court's denial of Petitioner's

to summary judgment dismissing claims 28 and 31

request to argue as a mitigating circumstance the fact that his co-

IV. Newly Discovered Evidence Claim.

defendant only received a sentence of life in prison, and
2) Claim 31 asserting that Petitioner's constitutional rights are
being violated because his post-conviction counsel do not satisfy the

Petitioner's initial claim for relief is based upon his assertion
that he has new evidence of perjury or inconsistent testimony by Dr
Stephen Golding, one of the forensic psychologists that evaluated

American Bar Association Guidelines (ABA Guidelines) for attorneys

Petitioner as part of the competency determination During the

representing capital post-conviction petitioners

competency hearings, Dr Golding apparently testified that Petitioner

Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a

could be found "situationally competent," that is, competent in some

petitioner to set forth "in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that

situations, but not competent in others However, Petitioner contends

form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief" UtahR Civ P

that during the recent competency hearings held in the case of State v

65C(c)(3) Moreover, "the petitioner shall [also] attach to the petition

Brian Mitchell, case no 031901884 (3rd District Court, Salt Lake

affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the

County, State of Utah), Dr Golding took a position contrary to his

allegations" UtahR Civ P 65C(d)(l) Even a generous reading of

testimony in Petitioner's competency proceedings, specifically stating

the foregoing claims set forth in Petitioner's second amended petition

that situational competence is not a valid diagnosis or theory

cannot overcome his failure to provide sufficient facts which, if proven
and believed, would warrant a grant of relief on these post-conviction
??

It is absolutely clear that neither Petitioner nor his counsel
could have known about the evidence of Dr Golding's claimed change
23

of heart concerning situational competence at the time of Petitioner's

104(e)(m), Petitioner's claim fails as a matter of law Respondent is

trial and sentencing or discovered it through the exercise of reasonable

entitled to summary judgment dismissing this claim

diligence as it first occurred in the relatively recent Mitchell

V. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Claims.

proceedings However, whether Dr Golding in fact subsequently took

1. Claim 12 (Partial).

a contradictory position from that which he took during Petitioner's

In claim 12 (partial), Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was

competency proceedings, and therefore, whether newly discovered

ineffective because he failed to request that the jury be sequestered In

evidence actually exists, is impossible for the court to judge because

support of this claim Petitioner alleges that during trial one of the

Petitioner has failed to provide the court with transcripts "f TV J

jurors spoke with fellow church members about the case and indicated

Golding's testimony, either from Petitioner's competency hearings or

that he was having trouble with the decisions he had to make He was

the competency hearings in the Mitchell case Furthermore, even

given a "blessing" and apparently told that Petitioner was evil and that

assuming that Dr Golding actually made contradictory statements

he should not be deceived by Petitioner Following this event,

concerning "situational competence," Petitioner never expressly states

Petitioner asserts that "the juror felt compelled that he should go

for what purpose he would use this newly discovered evidence

forward and quietly find the Petitioner guilty and sentence him to

Indeed, based upon the information Petitioner does provide, the court

death" Second Am Pet at 10 However, the juror subsequently

can apprehend no purpose for its use other than as impeachment

revealed his discussions with church members to counsel and the trial

evidence against Dr Golding

court and the juror was removed from the jury panel At its heart,

However, because Petitioner cannot prevail on this postconviction proceeding unless the newly discovered evidence is more

The court is aware that the Utah Supreme Court has recently stated, albeit
as dictum,' that newly discovered impeachment evidence can justify the
granting of a new trial in certain situations " State v Pinder, 2005 UT 15,
1)66 n 11 (2005) (emphasis added) However, at the same time the Supreme
Court declined "to address the issue of whether the Post Conviction

Remedies Act's disallowance of post conviction relief on the basis of newly
discovered impeachment evidence is consistent with our case law predating
that act and what effect, if any, such an inconsistency may have " Id In any
event, the use of Petitioner's alleged newly discovered evidence as
impeachment evidence is not, in my view, the type of impeachment evidence
that would justify the granting of a new trial as Dr Golding was only one of
a number of mental health evaluators who testified about Petitioner's mental
condition and it appears that he was an important, but not a key witness
However, without a transcript of the hearing it is impossible to fully evaluate
the extent of his importance
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than merely impeachment evidence,4 see Utah Code Ann § 78-35a4

Petitioner's argument is that because trial counsel failed to request that

sympathetic juror' He has not shown, however, that the jury that

the jury be sequestered, Petitioner was denied his constitutional right

deliberated his fate was not impartial The constitution requires no

to the jury that had been selected and thereby lost "the advantage of

more Petitioner has not shown that there is any genuine issue with

perhaps one juror who would have voted for life without parole,

respect to whether trial counsel's performance fell "outside the wide

thereby sparing the Petitioner's life " Id

range of professionally competent assistance " Strickland, 466 U S at

In response to this claim, Respondent correctly argues that
Petitioner is constitutionally entitled to have a fair and impartial jury

690 Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing claim 12
(partial)

hear his case and decide his punishment See State v Wach, 2001 UT

2. Claim 20 (Partial).

35,1J36, 24 P 3d 948 ("Both the United States Constitution and the

In claim 20 (partial), Petitioner argues that his federal habeas

Utah Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a fair and impartial

corpus counsel was ineffective because, after the Tenth Circuit vacated

jury ") However, Respondent also correctly argues that Petitioner is

Petitioner's conviction and sentence, counsel failed to file the Order of

"not entitled to a jury of any particular composition " Taylor v

Release he had prepared, thereby resulting in Petitioner being

Louisiana, 419 U S 522,538(1975) See also State v Chatwin,2002

transferred from the Utah State Prison to the Utah County Jail without

UT App 363, f 19, 58 P 3d 867 ("[T]he Constitution does not guarantee

being arrested on a warrant Petitioner contends that this failure

either the State or a defendant a jury comprised of any specific gender

resulted in an unconstitutional seizure which has continued to the

balance or composition "), State v Tillman, 750 P 2d 546, 575 (Utah

present day Respondent argues that to the extent Petitioner is

1987) (same)

claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, his claim necessarily fails

In this case Petitioner does not argue that he was denied an
impartial jury, only that he was deprived of one of the originally

because he is not constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of
federal habeas corpus counsel Moreover, the Tenth Circuit indicated

impaneled jurors, one who may potentially have been a more
5
It seems clear to this court that had the juror at issue been retained on the
jury and the death penalty still imposed, given the facts asserted in the
Second Amended Petition, Petitioner likely today would be arguing that
retention of that juror was improper
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that Respondent was free to retry Petitioner and, when Respondent

witnesses and to discover whether evidence had been tampered with or

chose that option, Petitioner was not entitled to release from custody

whether exculpatory evidence existed that would have been helpful to

As Respondent correctly argues, there is no federal

Petitioner Respondent argues that Petitioner has failed to identify (1)

constitutional right to habeas corpus counsel See Johnson v Avery,

any facts suggesting the possibility of evidence tampenng, (2) any

393 U S 483,488 (1969) ("It has not been held that there is any

facts tnal counsel had a constitutional duty to discover, or (3) any facts

general obligation of the courts, state or federal, to appoint counsel for

that would have made a more favorable outcome at either phase of the

prisoners who indicate, without more, that they wish to seek post-

trial reasonably likely

conviction relief ") Moreover, because "ineffective assistance of

There is no question that trial counsel bears the responsibility

counsel claims spring from the right to counsel contained in the sixth

of conducting a "substantial investigation into each of the plausible

amendment, it follows that there is no constitutional underpinning for

lines of defense" Strickland, 466 U S at 681 Nevertheless, in order

the claimed right to effective assistance [of]

habeas [corpus

counsel] " Blair v Armontrout, 916 F 2d 1310, 1332 (8th Cir 1990)
See also Wainwright v Torna, 455 U S 586, 587-88 (1982) (where

to avoid summary judgment, Petitioner must do more than simply "rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

there is no constitutional right to counsel, there can be no deprivation

tnal If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropnate,

of effective assistance) Therefore, Petitioner cannot show that any

shall be entered against him " Utah R Civ P 56(e) Indeed, Rule

genuine issue exists with respect to whether his federal habeas corpus

65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires Petitioner to set

counsel was ineffective m not filing the Order of Release that had been

forth "in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of

prepared Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing

[his] claim to relief" Utah R Civ P 65C(c)(3)(emphasis added)

claim 20 (partial)

This includes "attaching] to the petition

affidavits, copies of

3. Claim 22.

records and other evidence in support of the allegations " Utah R Civ

In claim 22, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was

P 65C(d)(l) However, as repeatedly pointed out by Respondent,

ineffective because he failed to hire effective investigators to interview

Petitioner's pleadings merely assert, without any factual support
29
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whatsoever, that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to

unnecessary" Strickland, 466 U S at 691 However, the Strickland

adequately investigate the case Petitioner has failed to set forth any

court has clearly held that there is no "checklist for judicial evaluation

facts he contends should have alerted tnal counsel that additional

of attorney performance

investigation was warranted or any facts which a more extended

for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of the vanety of

investigation would have uncovered Without these facts, Petitioner

circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate

cannot show that there is any genuine issue with respect to whether

decisions regarding how best to represent a cnmmal defendant" Id at

tnal counsel performed deficiently or, even if he did, that the deficient

688-89 Indeed, the adoption of hard and fast rules that a defense

performance was prejudicial Respondent is entitled to summary

attorney must follow in order to effectively represent a capital

judgment dismissing claim 22

defendant "would interfere with the 'constitutionally protected

[and] [n]o particular set of detailed rules

4. Claim 23.

independence of counsel' at the heart of Strickland " Wiggins v

In claim 23, Petitioner argues that his tnal counsel was

Smith, 52,9 US 510, 533 (2003) (quoting Strickland, 466 U S at 689)

ineffective because he failed to hire a mitigation expert to ascertain
and develop mitigating evidence Respondent argues that Petitioner
has failed to "allege[] specific facts about how the failure affected him

While it may be true that mitigation specialists are often
helpful in assisting trial counsel to perform their required mitigation

other than to point out that his brother Dan received a life sentence "

investigation, such specialists are not the only manner in which a

Resp'tMem in Supp at 10

mitigation workup may be accomplished Because tnal counsel is

The Utah Supreme Court has held that, although "[d]efense

constitutionally permitted the discretion to perform a mitigation

attorneys need not present all evidence uncovered by a mitigation

investigation in the manner he believes will best represent the interests

workup,

of his client, it follows that counsel also must be allowed trie discretion

they absolutely must perform one " State v Taylor, 947

P 2d 681, 687-88 (Utah 1997) In conducting a mitigation workup,

to determine whether he will retain the services of a mitigation

tnal "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make

specialist Because the hmng of a mitigation specialist is

a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

discretionary, in order for Petitioner to avoid summary judgment on

his claim, he must allege specific facts demonstrating that there was a

might have been different Respondent argues, on the other hand, that,

particularized need for a mitigation specialist such that trial counsel's

with the exception of Petitioner's "unremarkable" National Guard

decision not to hire one constituted deficient performance and, if so,

records, trial counsel overlooked no relevant mitigating evidence As a

why counsel's failure was prejudicial Petitioner has provided the

result, Respondent contends that Petitioner cannot show that trial

court with no such facts Therefore, he has not shown that any genuine

counsel provided ineffective assistance with respect to the

issue exists with respect to whether trial counsel was ineffective in

investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence

opting not to hire a mitigation specialist Respondent is entitled to
summary judgment dismissing claim 23

As previously noted, the Utah Supreme Court has held that trial
counsel in a capital case must perform a mitigation investigation In

5. Claims 11 (Partial) and 24.

conductmg a mitigation workup, trial "counsel has a duty to make

In claim 11, Petitioner makes the general claim that his trial

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes

counsel was ineffective because he "did not do an appropriate analysis

particular investigations unnecessary " Strickland, 466 U S at 691

or investigation into mitigating factors " Second Am Pet at 9 More

However, as noted in Wiggins, "Strickland does not require counsel to

specifically, m claim 24, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was

investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no matter

ineffective because he failed to present the following available

how unlikely the effort would be to assist the defendant at sentencing

mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial educational

Nor does Strickland require defense counsel to present mitigating

records, mental health records, psychological test results, National

evidence at sentencing m every case " Wiggins, 539 U S at 533 See

Guard records, Utah County Jail records, and evidence of childhood

also Taylor, 947 P 2d at 687 ("Defense attorneys need not present all

issues, family background, physical, verbal, and emotional abuse, and

evidence uncovered by a mitigation workup ") The standard is simply

childhood illnesses and injuries that could have been testified about by

that "'strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are

family members and that were found in Petitioner's journal entries

reasonable' only to the extent that 'reasonable professional judgments

According to Petitioner, had trial counsel discovered and presented

support the limitations on investigation '" Id (quoting Strickland, 466

these mitigating circumstances, the outcome of the penalty phase

US at690-91)
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Petitioner fails to provide any convincing argument that trial

minor, that Petitioner suffered from a mental illness and could not

counsel performed deficiently in conducting a mitigation workup and

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to

presenting mitigating evidence However, he has submitted a social

the requirements of law, that Petitioner was influenced by a

history of his life that he contends contains mitigating evidence that

dysfunctional family and was terrorized by his father, that Petitioner

could, and should, have been investigated and presented by trial

was remorseful for the murders, that Petitioner exhibited good

counsel during the penalty phase of the trial As Respondent details,

behavior while incarcerated, that Dan, not Petitioner, was the actual

however, with the exception of Petitioner's National Guard records, all

murderer, and, finally, that death was not the appropriate punishment

areas of mitigating evidence Petitioner claims was not investigated or

for Petitioner based upon the circumstances of the case See id at 46-

presented, was in fact laid before the sentencing authority during the

51 The only conclusion that can be drawn from this detailed analysis

guilt or innocence phase of the trial This included evidence of

is that Petitioner's proffered social history contains no relevant

childhood issues, physical, verbal, and emotional abuse directed

mitigating evidence that trial counsel should have mvestigated and

toward Petitioner by his father, illnesses and injuries suffered by

presented, but failed to do so
Petitioner can only avoid summary judgment on this claim by

Petitioner, Petitioner's performance in school, mental health records
and psychological test results, entries from Petitioner's journal,

specifically identifying some relevant mitigating evidence that trial

Petitioner's character, Dan Lafferty's influence on Petitioner, and*

counsel should have investigated and presented but did not

Petitioner's conduct while incarcerated in the Utah County Jail and the

Unfortunately, Petitioner fails to allege any such facts in his opposition

Utah State Prison See Resp't Mem in Supp at 27-46

memorandum6 Without these facts, Petitioner has not demonstrated

In addition, Respondent also details the areas of mitigating
evidence argued by trial counsel during the penalty phase These
included Petitioner's lack of a criminal history, that Petitioner acted
under the domination of his brother, Dan, that Petitioner was merely an
accomplice in the homicides and that his participation was relatively

that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether trial counsel was
6

The court agrees that trial counsel's failure to present Petitioner's National
Guard records is inconsequential and cannot support any finding that tnal
counsel's performance was deficient or, even if it was, that Petitioner was
prejudiced by this failure As noted by Respondent, "[e]ven [Petitioner's
current mitigation specialist admits that [Petitioner's 'time spenft] in the
National Guard is rather unremarkable as part of his social history '" Resp't
Mem in Supp at 51 (quoting Pet'r Social History at 13)
1C

ineffective in investigating and presenting mitigating evidence
Petitioner also argued during oral argument that even if most of
the mitigating evidence trial counsel relied upon was presented during

at 689)
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has specifically held that
the sentencing authonty at the penalty phase of a capital trial is entitled

the guilt or innocence phase of the trial, counsel was nevertheless

to consider all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented

obligated to reintroduce that evidence to the sentencing authority at the

dunng the guilt or innocence phase See Lqfferty II, 2001 UT 19 at

penalty phase Petitioner contends that counsel's failure to do so

TJ127 ("Additionally, just as aggravating factors from the guilt phase of

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel Agam, Petitioner has

the trial may be considered at the penalty phase, so may any mitigating

provided no legal authority suggesting that in order for trial counsel to

evidence or factors presented in the case-in-chief ") It follows from

perform effectively, he must reintroduce at the penalty phase all

this holding that tnal counsel does not act deficiently in choosing not

mitigating evidence that may have been presented during the guilt or

to reintroduce at the penalty phase of a tnal all of the mitigating

innocence phase Indeed, Petitioner cannot point to any legal authority

evidence introduced dunng the guilt or innocence phase In addition,

for this position

it is clear in the present case that trial counsel repeatedly referred to

As noted previously, the United States Supreme Court has

mitigating evidence presented in the guilt or innocence phase in

expressly held that no "checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney

making his argument against a death sentence during the penalty

performance

phase This included mitigating evidence related to physical, verbal,

[and] [n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's

conduct can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances

and emotional abuse and illnesses and injuries suffered by Petitioner,

faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding

Petitioner's performance in school, his mental health records and

how best to represent a criminal defendant" Id at 688-89 Indeed, the

psychological test results, entries from Petitioner's journal, Petitioner's

adoption of hard and fast rules that a defense attorney must follow in

character, his co-defendant's on Petitioner, and Petitioner's conduct

order to effectively represent a capital defendant "would interfere with

while incarcerated in the Utah County Jail and the Utah State Prison

the 'constitutionally protected independence of counsel' at the heart of
Strickland " Wiggins, 539 U S at 533 (quoting Strickland, 466 U S

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent is entitled to summary
judgment dismissing claims 11 (partial) and 24
37
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6. Claim 25.

be grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively

In claim 25, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective

represented the defendant at trial or on appeal " Utah R Cnm P 8(f)

assistance of counsel because tnal counsel was not qualified under

Thus, neither the language of the Utah Constitution nor the sole fact

Utah law or the ABA Guidelines to be appointed to represent a capital

that an attorney may not have satisfied the requirements set forth in

defendant Respondent argues that Petitioner had no constitutional

Rule 8 will support a finding that Petitioner's tnal counsel was

right to trial counsel who satisfied certain qualifications and, therefore,

ineffective

even if counsel did not satisfy the specific requirements enumerated in

The same is also true with respect to the federal constitution

Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or the ABA

In the same way that Strickland does not set forth a ngid checklist or

Guidelines, this cannot serve as a basis for asserting an ineffective

set of rules that tnal counsel must satisfy in order to provide effective

assistance of counsel claim
There is no specific language in the Utah Constitution requiring

representation, see Strickland, 466 U S at 688-89, Strickland also does
not set forth specific qualifications that tnal counsel must meet in

counsel in capital cases to satisfy certain qualifications in order to

order to effectively represent a capital defendant It is not enough to

provide effective representation Rule 8, however, does specifically

assert that tnal counsel did not meet statutory cntena Petitioner must

state that when an indigent defendant is charged with a capital offense,

demonstrate that tnal counsel was ineffective Petitioner cannot show

the tnal court must appoint two or more attorneys to represent the

that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether tnal counsel

defendant and that the tnal court must make a finding that counsel are

provided ineffective assistance because he was not "qualified" to

"proficient in the tnal of capital cases" UtahR Cnm P 8(b) The

represent Petitioner under Utah law or the ABA Guidelines

rule then mandates that in making this finding, the tnal court must

Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing claim 25

ensure that the experience of appointed counsel satisfy certain
minimum requirements set forth in subsections (b)(1) through (b)(4)
However, Rule 8 also states that "[m]ere noncompliance with this rule
or failure to follow the guidelines set forth in this rule shall not of itself

7. Claim 26.
In claim 26, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective because he failed to object to the prosecutor's statement
dunng closing argument at the penalty phase that the punishment for a

fifteen-month-old girl should be greater than the punishment for the
death of an adult As a result of this failure, Petitioner argues that
when he raised the issue of the prosecutor's improper statements on
appeal, he was required to rely on a more burdensome plain error
analysis Respondent contends that Petitioner cannot prevail on his

likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable
result," id at ^]90, but also that the statements were obviously
improper See State v Emmett, 839 P 2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992) (plain
error requires a defendant to "show that the prosecutor's remarks were
obviously improper ")
However, as Respondent has argued, even if tnal counsel had

claim because the very factors Petitioner would have been required to
prove in order to succeed on his prosecutorial misconduct claim on
appeal were expressly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court
During closing argument at the penalty phase of Petitioner's
trial, the prosecutor commented to the sentencing authority that
"if you determine that the defendant deserves life
without parole before we even consider [the child
victim] lying dead in her crib, before we ever consider
that the second person he killed was a 15-month-old
infant, then there's only one punishment left that is
meaningful, and that is death "
Lafferty II, 2001 UT 19 at ^91 Because tnal counsel did not make a

made a contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's statement, and
thus avoided having to demonstrate obvious impropriety, the Supreme
Court specifically held that the statement was neither inflammatory nor
prejudicial See Lafferty II, 2001 UT 19 at ffl92-93 Petitioner cannot
show that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether tnal counsel
was ineffective in not objecting to statements made by the prosecutor
during closing arguments at the penalty phase Respondent is entitled
to summary judgment dismissing claim 26
VI. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Claims.

contemporaneous objection to this statement, Petitioner contends that

1. Claim 27.

when he raised the issue of prosecutorial misconduct based upon the
prosecutor's statements, he was forced to demonstrate to the Utah
Supreme Court not only that the prosecutor's comments "callfed] to
the attention of the jurors matters they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict and

[that] the error [was]

substantial and prejudicial such that there [was] a reasonable

In claim 27, Petitioner argues that his appellate counsel was
ineffective because he failed to appeal the change of venue issue A
similar claim was raised and rejected in Petitioner's first direct appeal,
Laffertv I, 749 P 2d at 1240, but was not raised after Petitioner's retrial
Had the change of venue issue been raised on appeal, the
41
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standard of review would have been abuse of discretion State v

claimed ineffectiveness in omitting the venue issue In order to avoid

Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^38, 28 P 3d 1278 See also State v Stubbs,

summary judgment, Petitioner has the burden of pointing to genuine

2005 UT 65, ^(13, 535 Utah Adv Rep 47 In determining whether an

issues of material fact showing that the venue issue was a "dead-bang

abuse of discretion has occurred, the Utah Supreme Court

winner," or more specifically, that the venue issue was (1) obvious

distinguishes situations where a jury has already reached a verdict and

from the trial record and (2) probably would have resulted in reversal

those where the jury has not yet been impaneled Here, where the jury

on appeal However counsel has not pointed to any specific evidence

had already reached a veidict before appeal, the Supreme Court would

showing that any juror was biased Petitioner therefore does not meet

have "examine[d] whether defendant was ultimately tried by a fair and

his burden and Respondent is entitled to summary judgment

impartial jury " Id (citing Lafferty I, 749 P 2d at 1240) Contrary to

dismissing claim 27

Petitioner s argument, the standard set forth in State v James, 167

2. Claim 29.

P 2d 549 (Utah 1989) is not the proper standard, although the factors

In claim 29, Petitioner argues that he received ineffective

listed may be useful m assessing whether a defendant has been tried by

assistance of appellate counsel because counsel was not qualified to

a fair and impartial jury See Stubbs, 2005 UT 65 at f 17 ("[T]he

handle a death penalty appeal under the then-existing Utah rules of

evaluative criteria established in James can, and often should, play a

criminal procedure or the ABA Guidelines Respondent argues that

role in assessing the ultimate question asked by Widdison whether the

Petitioner had no constitutional right to tnal counsel who satisfied

defendant in fact was tried by a fair and impartial jury " ) 7

certain qualifications and, therefore, even if counsel did not satisfy

Here, I am unaware of any disputed material facts sufficient to
overcome summary judgment on the issue of appellate counsel's

specific qualifications enumerated in Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure or the ABA Guidelines this cannot serve as a basis
for asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

''State v James focuses on the community attitudes concerning the alleged
offense and articulates four factors that may be relevant, namely (1) the
standing of the victim and the accused in the community, (2) the size of the
community, (3) the nature and gravity of the offense, and (4) the nature and
extent of publicity, but these factors are not controlling See State v James,
767 P 2d 549, 552 (Utah 1989)
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This is a corollary claim to claim 25 discussed above with
respect to trial counsel As noted there, no specific language in the
Utah Constitution requires appellate counsel in capital cases to satisfy
A1

certain qualifications in order to provide effective representation Rule

counsel must satisfy in order to provide effective representation, see

8 provides that when an indigent defendant has been sentenced to

Strickland, 466 U S at 688-89, Su ickland also does not set forth

death, the trial court must appoint one or more attorneys to represent

specific qualifications that counsel must meet in order to effectively

the defendant on appeal and that the trial court must make a finding

represent a capital defendant on appeal Petitioner cannot show that

that counsel is "proficient in the appeal of capital cases " Utah R

any genuine issue exists with respect to whether appellate counsel

Cnm P 8(d) The rule then mandates that in making this finding, the

provided ineffective assistance because he was not "qualified" to

trial court must ensure that the experience of appointed counsel satisfy

represent Petitioner on appeal under Utah law or the ABA Guidelines

certain minimum requirements set forth in subsections (d)(1) and

Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing claim 29

(d)(2) However, Rule 8 also states that "[m]ere noncompliance with

VII. Claims Related to the Constitutionality of Utah's Death
Penalty Scheme.

this rule or failure to follow the guidelines set forth in this rule shall
1. Claim 36.
not of itself be grounds for establishing that appointed counsel
In claim 36, Petitioner argues mat as a result of Utah's death
ineffectively represented the defendant at trial or on appeal " Utah R
penalty scheme, his punishment has been cruel and unusual in
Cnm P 8(f) Thus, neither the language of the Utah Constitution nor
the sole fact that an attorney may not have satisfied the requirements
set forth in Rule 8 will support afindingthat Petitioner's appellate

violation of his constitutional rights because he has been on death row
for approximately 20 years with limited access to prison programs,
health care, and interaction with others Respondent argues that the

counsel was ineffective because he did not satisfy certain

PCRA only "permits post-conviction relief for constitutional defects in

qualifications set forth in Utah law

how a conviction is obtained or a sentence is imposed " Resp't Mem

The same is also true with respect to die federal constitution
Because the "standard forjudging ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel is the same as the standard forjudging ineffective assistance of
trial counsel," Brunei, 920 P 2d at 1157, in the same way that

in Supp at 57 Because Petitioner's complaint about his conditions of
incarceration have no bearing whatsoever on how his conviction was
obtained or how his sentence was imposed, his claim fails as a matter
of law

Strickland does not set forth a rigid checklist or set of rules that
45
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As argued by Respondent, the PCRA specifically sets forth the

argues, by recent legislation in Utah abolishing death by firing squad

exclusive grounds for relief that a post-conviction petitioner may rely

and mandating lethal intravenous injection as the sole method of

upon m raising a claim related to his sentence These are that "the

execution See Utah Code Ann §77-18-5 5 Respondent contends

sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or

that at the time Petitioner was sentenced to death, death byfiringsquad

Utah Constitution

was permitted but only if that method of execution was selected by the

manner

, the sentence was imposed in an unlawful

, the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel

, or

newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to
vacate the

sentence " Utah Code Ann § 78-35a 104(l)(a), (d)-(e)

defendant Because, pursuant to United States Supreme Court
precedent, a defendant cannot select a method of execution and then
challenge its constitutionality, Petitioner's claim fails as a matter of

In his claim, Petitioner is only challenging his sentence of death to the

law Petitioner responds that at the time he was sentenced to death, he

extent that it has resulted, in his view, in certain untoward

was being represented by ineffective counsel and he was not

consequences for him while waiting to be executed, namely, that life

competent As a result, Petitioner contends that his selection of death

on death row limits his access to prison programs, health care, and

by firing squad could not have been made knowingly and voluntarily

interaction with others Thus, Petitioner is basically arguing that but

and, therefore, he is entitled to challenge the constitutionality of death

for his sentence of death, he would not be on death cow where, he

by firing squad

contends, his conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual

Petitioner cites to no state or federal case law holding that

punishment In challenging his sentence, Petitioner has raised none of

death by firing squad is unconstitutional On the contrary, although of

die foregoing grounds for relief required by the PCRA His claim

ancient origin, the United States Supreme Court held in the case of

necessarily fails as a matter of law and Respondent is entitled to

Wilkerson v Utah, 99 U S 130 (1879) that "[c]ruel and unusual

summary judgment dismissing claim 36

punishments are forbidden by the Constitution, but

the punishment

2. Claim 39.

of shooting as a mode of executing the death penalty for the crime of

In claim 39, Petitioner argues that death by firing squad

murder in the first degree is not included m that category, within the

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment This is borne out, he

meaning of the eighth amendment" Id at 134-35 See also Andrews
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v Shulsen, 802 F 2d 1256,1275 n 16 (10th Cir 1986) (holding that

declared to be cruel and unusual by enacting Section 77-18-5 5 Such

death by firing squad does not violate the Eighth Amendment),

an obvious inconsistency clearly undermines the validity of

Andrews v Shulsen, 600 F Supp 408,431 (D Utah 1984) (citing the

Petitioner's argument See Griffin v Oceanic Contractors, 458 U S

holding in Wilkerson that"

564, 575 (1982) ("It is true that interpretations of a statute which

execution by shooting was not cruel and

would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative

unusual")
Petitioner contends that the recent enactment of Section 77-18-

interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available ")

5 5 demonstrates that "the State's own action through the legislative

Petitioner has not shown that any genuine issue exists with respect to

and executive branch, have indicated that death by firing squad is cruel

whether death by firing squad constitutes cruel and unusual

and unusual," Second Am Pet at 21 Yet nowhere in Section 77-18-

punishment8 Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing

5 5 is death by firing squad expressly declared to be unconstitutional

claim 39

Moreover, simply because the new legislation abolishes death by firmg

3. Claim 40.

squad, this does not warrant the conclusion that this method of

In claim 40, Petitioner argues that in light of the United States

execution was, or currently is, unconstitutional under either the state or

Supreme Court's recent ruling that mentally retarded defendants

federal constitutions Indeed, Section 77-18-5 5 implies just the
opposite
The new legislation provides that "[i]f a court holds that
execution by lethal injection is unconstitutional as applied, the method
of execution for that defendant shall be a fmng squad " Utah Code
Ann § 77 18-5 5(4)(b) If Petitioner's argument is correct, then in the
event lethal injection is found to be unconstitutional in a particular
case, Section 77-18-5 5 allows the state to resort to a method of
execution that, according to Petitioner, the legislature has impliedly

* In his opposition memorandum in response to Respondent's motion for
summary judgment, Petitioner asserts that at the time he was sentenced to
death, he was being represented by ineffective counsel and he was not
competent He contends, therefore, that his choice to be executed by firing
squad was not knowingly and voluntarily made This, he asserts, allows him
to challenge the constitutionality of death by firing squad The claim that
Petitioner's choice to be executed by firing squad was not knowingly and
voluntarily made as a result of mental incompetence and ineffective
assistance of counsel is, in the court's view, a new claim that was not
previously raised in Petitioners second amended petition However, raising
new claims in a memorandum opposing summary judgment is improper
See Holmes Development LLC v Cook, 2002 UT 38, p 1 , 48 P 3d 895 ("A
plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories of
recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment because such amendment fails to satisfy Utah's pleading
requirements ') Therefore, the court will not consider Petitioner's new
claims
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cannot be subject to the death penalty, his execution would constitute

to satisfy the above standard Moreover, even if these deficits were

cruel and unusual punishment because he has never had the chance to

relevant, Petitioner never demonstrates how they warrant concluding

raise the issue whether he is mentally retarded Respondent argues that

that his intellectual and adaptive functioning was subaverage
Finally, and perhaps most telling, there is no indication from

Petitioner has not alleged sufficient facts demonstrating that he is
mentally retarded Therefore, he cannot prevail on his claim
Consistent with the holding of Atkins v Virginia, 536 U S 304

Petitioner that any subaverage intellectual or adaptive functioning he
may have experienced manifested itself pnor to age 22 Indeed,

(2002), the Utah Code exempts from the death penalty any defendant

although Petitioner may have endured a traumatic childhood in a

the trial court determines to be mentally retarded See Utah Code Ann

dysfunctional family, his social history clearly indicates that prior to

§ 77-15a-101 (I) According to this exemption statute, a defendant is

1963,9 "he was a good and easy child to raise, suffering from no

mentally retarded if

abnormalities 'He seemed to progress through the normal stages of

(1) the defendant has significant subaverage
general intellectual functioning that results in and exists
concurrently with significant deficiencies in adaptive
functioning that exist primarily in the areas of reasoning
or impulse control, or in both of these areas, and
(2) the subaverage general intellectual
functioning and the significant deficiencies in adaptive
functioning under Subsection (1) are both manifested
prior to age 22
Utah Code Ann § 77-15a-102(l)-(2) Petitioner contends that he is
mentally retarded, but he fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating
that he satisfies the foregoing standard for a finding of mental
retardation Although he does assert that his social history shows that
in his life he "had a diminished capacity to communicate, to make

growth and development with no complications '" Pet'r Social
History at 4-5 (quoting P Heinbecker's report of 11/28/84) "In 1960,
[he] graduated from Payson High School According to his school
record he received a 3 2 GPA, well above average

Teachers

described him as well-behaved and a well-adjusted young man " Id at
7 In his formative years, Petitioner "worked odd jobs commonly
available to high school students, including farm work, gas station
attendant, and labor work," id at 13, and spent two years in the Army
National Guard prior to his honorable discharge See id From 1960 to
1962, Petitioner served a two-year LDS mission to Florida and

conclusions from his mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, [and] to
control his impulses," Pet'rOpp Mem at 20, these alleged deficits fail
50

9

Petitioner was born on November 4, 1941 See Pet'r Social History at 4
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Georgia and, following his release, he married in 1963 See id at 7
Finally, there is no indication from his social history that prior to 1963
Petitioner needed or received any type of mental health treatment or
psychological evaluations See id at 14 Petitioner has failed to allege

affected trial counsel's performance Without this showing,
Respondent argues that Petitioner cannot prevail on his claim
There is no question that Petitioner had a constitutional right to
be represented by conflict-free counsel during his trial See Wood v

sufficient facts demonstrating that he could satisfy the statutory

Georgia, 450 U S 261, 271 (1981) ("Where a constitutional right to

definition of "mentally retarded" for exemption from the death penalty

counsel exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a

Thus, he has not shown that any genuine issue exists with respect to

correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of

whether his execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment

interest") As with any constitutional right, it is also true that the

on the ground that he never had the chance to raise the issue whether
he is mentally retarded Respondent is entitled to summary judgment

waiver of tnal counsel's conflict must be knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary See State v Johnson, 823 P 2d 484, 490-491 (Utah Ct
App 1991) ("A defendant can generally waive his or her right to

dismissing claim 40

conflict-free counsel To be valid, such a waiver must be knowing and
4. Claim 44.

In claim 44, Petitioner argues that he was denied the effective

intelligent, and made 'only after adequate warning by the [trial] court
of the potential hazards posed by the conflict of interest and of the

assistance of counsel because his mental health difficulties prevented
accused's right to other counsel'" (quoting United States v Rodriguez,
him from conscientiously waiving trial counsel's alleged conflict of
929 F 2d 747, 750 (1st Cir 1991))
interest resulting from counsel's prior representation of Petitioner's
co-defendant, Dan Lafferty He also contends that the trial court
erroneously permitted trial counsel to represent Petitioner despite the
presence of a conflict of interest Respondent argues that Petitioner
has failed to allege any facts demonstrating that his constitutional right
to conflict-free counsel was violated That is, Petitioner fails to show
that an actual conflict of interest existed and that the conflict adversely
52

assistance of counsel as a result of trial counsel's alleged conflict of

In making this claim Petitioner essentially alleges that he did
not "conscientiously" waive trial counsel's conflict Yet, unless
Petitioner is able to demonstrate that an actual conflict existed that
prejudiced him, the waiver issue is moot Thus, in order for Petitioner
to avoid summary judgment on his claim, he must show that a genuine
issue exists with respect to whether he was denied the effective
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conflicting interests that adversely affected counsel's performance

interest To do this, Petitioner must plead sufficient facts

during Petitioner's trial Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has

demonstrating that trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest and

_suggested that in situations where an attorney is appointed tn represent

that the conflict adversely affected trial counsel's performance See

co-defendants at different times on charges arising from the same

State v Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f22,984 P 2d 382

criminal episode, no conflict exists, potential or otherwise, QJFP the

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel did have an actual

charges against one co-defendant are concluded See Gardner, 888

conflict of interest during trial as evidenced by the fact that his counsel

P 2d at 620 ,0 Thus, Petitioner cannot avoid summary judgment on his

previously represented Petitioner's co-defendant, Dan, on the same

claim because he has failed to show that any genuine issue exists with

criminal allegations that Petitioner was facing Petitioner argues that

respect to whether his trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest

this created an obvious conflict because his interests and Dan's

and that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance

interests on the issue of guilt in committing the homicides were

Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing claim 44

materially adverse Thus, according to Petitioner, his trial counsel had

VIII. Claims Raised in Part Two of Petitioner's Second Amended
Petition.

an actual conflict m his representation of Petitioner because counsel

In addition to the 47 claims raised in Part 1 of Petitioner's

represented a co-defendant with contrary interests
second amended petition, Petitioner asked that his counsel attach to his
Petitioner, however, fails to refer to any decisions made or trial
Second Amended Petition a Second Amended Writ of Habeas Corpus
strategies relied upon by trial counsel that actually undermined
Part 2, apparently written by Petitioner himself, in which he raises four
Petitioner's interests in favor of his co-defendant's interests
claims (1) evidence was planted at the trial proceedings by the
Moreover, Dan was tried in 1985 and Petitioner's second trial occurred
in 1996 Merely pointing out that Petitioner's trial counsel also
represented his co-defendant on identical charges of capital homicide
in a separate trial that occurred eleven years prior to Petitioner's trial is
insufficient to show that trial counsel was actively representing
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'" Respondent also noted that counsel called Dan Lafferty as a witness,
obtained admissions from Dan that he (Dan) actually committed the
murders, and then vigorously argued during closing arguments and in the
penalty phase that Petitioner should not receive a more severe sanction than
Dan received, life in prison with the possibility of parole This action by
trial counsel does not demonstrate an alliance with his prior client, Dan, but
just the opposite
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prosecution, (2) his second trial violated his protection against double
jeopardy, (3) after the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
Petitioner's first conviction and death sentence, Respondent failed to
arrest, re-charge, or properly arraign him on the current charges, and
(4) his counsel erroneously advised him not to file a 120-day

trial counsel") In order to avoid summary judgment on the claim that
appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue of planted
evidence, Petitioner must show that there is a genuine issue of matenal
fact with respect to whether appellate counsel failed to raise an issue
which was obvious from the tnal record and which probably would
have resulted in reversal on appeal See Carter I, 2001 UT 96 at ^48

disposition request
With respect to the first claim of Part 2, although this claim
could have been raised on appeal, Petitioner argues that it is not
procedurally barred because he is alleging that appellate counsel was
ineffective m failing to raise the claim Therefore, pursuant to Section
78-35a-106(2), this is a viable claim that the court should consider
Respondent counters that summary judgment should be granted
because Petitioner's claim does nothing more than repeat his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim from claim 22
As noted above, whether an appellate counsel's performance is
ineffective is judged by the same standard that applies to judging the
ineffectiveness of trial counsel See Robbins, 528 U S at 285 ("[T]he
proper standard for evaluating [petitioner's] claim that appellate
counsel was ineffective in neglecting to file a merits brief is that
enunciated in Strickland v Washington ") See also Bruner, 920 P 2d
at 1157 ('The standard forjudging ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel is the same as the standard forjudging ineffective assistance of
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Petitioner has alleged no facts m support of his ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim other than to state that the failure
to raise the claim on appeal itself demonstrates that appellate counsel
was ineffective Clearly, this is insufficient to show that appellate
counsel's failure to raise Petitioner's claim was obvious from the tnal
record and probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal
Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment dismissing
Petitioner's first claim in Part 2
Petitioner argues in his second claim that his second trial
violated his protection against double jeopardy Respondent argues
that this claim is procedurally barred because this is a claim that
Petitioner raised on appeal and lost Pursuant to Section 78-35a106(l)(b), a post-conviction petitioner is not entitled to relief on a
claim that "was raised or addressed

on appeal" Petitioner raised

the double jeopardy issue before the Utah Supreme Court on direct
appeal and the Court rejected Petitioner's claim See Lafferty II, 2001
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UT 19 at THJI42-149 As a result, Petitioner's claim is procedurally

respect to this claim that Petitioner has failed to show that any genuine

barred T herefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment

issue exists with respect to the issue it raises Respondent is entitled to

dismissing Petitioner's second claim in Part 2

summary judgment dismissing Petitioner's third claim in Part 2

Petitioner's third claim is that after the Tenth Circuit Court of

Petitioner argues in his fourth claim that his counsel was

Appeals vacated Petitioner's first conviction and death sentence,

ineffective because he erroneously advised Petitioner not to file a 120-

Respondent failed to arrest, re-charge, or properly arraign him on the

day disposition request According to Petitioner, this advice

current charges Respondent contends that summary judgment should

prejudiced him because it "allow[ed] the press to pollute the jury pool

be granted on this claim because no authority exists "requiring] the

with negative information which led to the fact that [Petitioner] could

State to formally rearrest, recharge, and rearraign a defendant who has

not get a fair and unbiased jury" Pet Opp Mem at 22 Respondent

been convicted and is in custody, but is granted a new trial " Resp't
Mem m Reply at 22 Petitioner does not directly address this issue in

argues that counsel's decision was reasonable because it allowed him
time to prepare for both phases of Petitioner's capital trial
For the reasons set forth by Respondent, and in light of all the

his opposition memorandum
Rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a
petitioner to set forth "in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that
form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief" UtahR Civ P
65C(c)(3) Moreover, "the petitioner shall [also] attach to the petition
affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the
allegations" UtahR Civ P 65C(d)(l) Petitioner's claim cannot
overcome his failure to provide sufficient facts which, if proven and
believed, would warrant a grant of relief on this post-conviction claim
By not opposing Respondent's request for summary judgment or
attempting to cure any pleading deficiencies, the court finds with
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circumstances, the court cannot conclude that counsel's advice fell
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance
Moreover, even if trial counsel's advice did constitute deficient
performance, Petitioner provides no evidence that a biased juror was
seated to hear his case and determine his punishment Petitioner has
failed to show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different" Strickland, 466 U S at 694 Petitioner has not
shown that any genuine issue exists with respect to whether trial
counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner not to file a 120-day
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disposition request Respondent is entitled to summary judgment

SCHOFIELD, JUDGE

dismissing Petitioner's fourth claim in Part 2
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law" UtahR Civ P 56(c) Based upon a
careful consideration of all the pleadings in this case, I am of the view
that Petitioner has failed to "set forth specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial," Utah R Civ P 56(e), with respect to any
of the claims he raises

Respondent is entitled to summary judgment

dismissing each of Petitioner's claims, which results in a dismissal of
Petitioner's Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Respondent's counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order
DATED this 29th day of November, 2005
BY THE COURT

ANTHONY W
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED.

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

1.

The State's summary [judgment motion is GRANTED as to all

of petitioner's post-conviction claims.

v.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSING
PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF, AND
JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT

STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGE ANTHONY SCHOFIELD

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY,
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post-conviction relief on both petitions.
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STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

on the 31st day of January, 2006.
COMES

NOW

the

Petitioner

Ronald

Watson

Lafferty,

by

and

<;

through counsel, who hereby submits this Notice of Appeal pursuant
to

Rules

3 and

4 of

the

Utah

Rules

of Appellate

Procedure

Petitioner appeals from that certain final order of the Fourth
District Court, Honorable Anthony Schofield presiding, entitled
Order Granting Summary Judgment and Dismissing Petition for Post
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ADDENDUM B

) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim counterclaim or cross claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment
ay at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
jmmary judgment by the adverse party move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof

(a) Scope This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann §
78-35a 101 et seq Post Conviction Remedies Act

) For defending party A party against whom a claim counterclaim or cross claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment
sought may at any time move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof

(b) Commencement and venue The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the distnct
court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered The petition should be filed on forms provided by
the court The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county The
court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses

) Motion and proceedings thereon The motion memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7 The
dgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings depositions answers to interrogatories and admissions on file
gether with the affidavits if any show that there is no genuine issue as to any matenal fact and that the moving party is
ititled to a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment interlocutory in character may be rendered on the issue
liabilty alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages

(c) Contents of the petition The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the
conviction or sentence Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not be raised in
subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown The petition shall state
(c)(1) whether the petitionens incarcerated and if so the place of incarceration

) Case not fully adjudicated on motion If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for
the relief asked and a trial is necessary the court at the hearing of the motion by examining the pleadings and the
idence before it and by interrogating counsel shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial
>ntroversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It shall thereupon make an order
>ecifymg the facts that appear without substantial controversy including the extent to which the amount of damages or
her relief is not in controversy and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just Upon the trial of the
tton the facts so specified shall be deemed established and the trial shall be conducted accordingly

(c)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in
which the conviction was entered together with the courts case number for those proceedings if known by the
petitioner
(c)(3) in plain and concise terms all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief
(c)(4) whether the judgment of conviction the sentence or the commitment for violation of probation has been
reviewed on appeal and if so the number and title of the appellate proceeding the issues raised on appeal and the
results of the appeal

) Form of affidavits further testimony defense required Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
lowledge shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
)impetent to testify to the matters stated therein Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an
fidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
^positions answers to interrogatories or further affidavits When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
provided in this rule an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the plead ngs but the
sponse by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
>ue for trial Summary judgment if appropriate shall be entered against a party failing tofilesuch a response

(c)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any pnor post conviction or other civil
proceeding and if so the case number and title of those proceedings the issues raised in the petition and the
results of the pnor proceeding and

When affidavits are unavailable Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party
innot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party s opposition the court may refuse the
)pl cation for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or
scovery to be had or may make such other order as is just

(d) Attachments to the petition If available to the petitioner the petitioner shall attach to the petition

(c)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence the reasons why the evidence
could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the tnal the appeal or any previous
post-conviction petition

(d)(1) affidavits copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations

) Affidavits made in bad faith If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for
e purpose of delay the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the
asonable expenses which the fil ng of the affidavits caused including reasonable attorney's fees and any offending
arty or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt

(d)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's
case
(d)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post conviction or other civil proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence and
(d)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court
(e) Memorandum of authonties The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authonties in the
petition but these may be set out in a separate memorandum two copies of which shall be filed with the petition
(f) Assignment On the filing of the petition the derk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who sentenced
the petitioner If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available the derk shall assign the case in the normal
course
(g)(1) Summary dismissal of claims The assigned judge s hall review the petition and if it is apparent to the court
that any claim has been adjudicated in a pnor proceeding or if any claim in the petition appearsfrivolouson its face
the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that
the daim is frivolous on its face The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner Proceedings on the claim shall
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or condusions
of law
(g)(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and
attachments it appears that
(g)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a daim for relief as a matter of law
(g)(2)(B) the daims have no arguable basis in fact or
(g)(2)(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired pnor to the filing of the petition
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j)(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the
»quirements of this rule the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days The court
lay grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown
))(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post conviction petition in a case where the
etitioner is sentenced to death
i) Service of petitions If on review of the petition the court concludes that all or part of the petition should not be
limmanly dismissed the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk
i serve a copy of the petition attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent If the petition is a
fiallenge to a felony conviction or sentence the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General
i all other cases the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner
) Answer or other response Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of
copy of the petition upon the respondent or within such other penod of time as the court may allow the respondent
lall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the
nswer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b) Within 30 days (plus time allowed for
a
rvice by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment the petitioner may respond by
lemorandum to the motion No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court
) Hearings After pleadings are closed the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a heanng or otherwise dispose
f the case The court may also order a preheanng conference but the conference shall not be set so as to delay
ireasonably the hearing on the ments of the petition At the preheanng conference the court may
)(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues
|(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents and
l(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary hearing
) Presence of the petitioner at heanngs The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the petitioner
not represented by counsel The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video
Dnferencing The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise
s present in court dunng the proceeding The court may conduct any heanng at the correctional facility where the
»titioner is confined
I Discovery records Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon motion of a party and
determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is
;ely to be admissible at an evidentiary heanng The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain
ly relevant transcript or court records
n) Orders stay
n)(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence it shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law and
i appropnate order If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction the order shall be stayed for 5 days
/ithin the stay penod the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will
jrsue a new tnal pursue a new sentence appeal the order or take no action Thereafter the stay of the order is
werned by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure
n)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken the stay shall expire and the
>urt shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner
n)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retned or resentenced the tnal court may enter any
jpplementary orders as to arraignment tnal sentencing custody bail discharge or other matters that may be
acessary and proper
) Costs The court may assign the costs of the proceeding as allowed under Rule 54(d) to any party as it deems
spropnate If the petitioner is indigent the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that
osecuted the petitioner If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections Section 64 13 23 and
Hftons 78 7 36 through 78 7-43 govern the manner and procedure by which the tnal court shall determine the
nount if any to charge for fees and costs
) Appeal Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of
ppeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts
DVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
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ADDENDUM C

State Prison, Hank Galetka, Warden

Anc Cramer (#5460)
CRAMER & CRAMER, LX.C
Smith Hyatt Building
845 South Main Street, Suite 23
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone (801) 299-9999
Facsimile (801) 298-5161

TRIAL CONVICTION AND CASE NUMBER
Pursuant to Utah R Civ Pro Rule 65C(c)(2), the name ofthe Court in which the Petitioner was
convicted is the Fourth District Court, in and for Utah County, in the State of Utah Petitioner was
convicted on Apnl 10,1996 of two counts of capital homicide, two counts of conspiracy to commit

Grant W P Morrison (#3666)
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84113
Telephone (801) 359-7999
Facsimile (801) 359-1774

homicide and two counts of aggravated burglary Onorabout Apnl 16,1996, thejury reconvened for the
penalty phase ofthe case and returned the penalty of death on both counts of aggravated murder The
Court, pursuant to the Petitioner's election, sentenced the Defendant on May 31,19% to death by firing

Attorneys for Petitioner

squad Final Statement of Conviction, Judgment of Death and Summary of Evidence was signed by

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT

PETITIONER'S SECOND AMENDED
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PART 1

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY,
Petitioner,

Honorable Judge Steven L Hansen on February 25,1997 The case number in the aforementioned case
is case number 84-1409309
APPEAL
Pursuant to Utah R Civ Pro Rule 65C(c)(4), the judgment of conviction and sentence were
reviewed on appeal The case number on appeal was 970111 The title ofthe appellate proceeding was

v
Case No 020404472

State v Lafferty Eight points were raised on appeal, some points with sub-issues Approximately eighteen

The Honorable Anthony W Schofield

issues in total were raised on appeal The issues were presented as follows

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent
Petitioner, Ronald Watson Lafferty, petitions this Court for a Writ of Habeas Corpus/Post
Conviction Relief, pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann §78-3 5a-101 etseq and Rule 65C of

1

The tnal court committed an error oflaw m failing to follow the provisions ofUtah Code

Ann § 77-15-1 atseq in the procedure ofthe competency heanng held immediately pnor to tnal
2

the Utah R Civ Pro
INCARCERATION
Pursuant to Utah R Civ Pro Rule 65C(c)(l), the Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the

The tnal court's finding that the Defendant was competent to stand tnal is clearly

erroneous
3

The tnal court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion for New Trial based on
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Utah State Prison located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah m the custody ofthe Warden of the Utah

overwhelming evidence that the Defendant was incompetent during the trial proceedings
4

The trial court committed a reversible error in granting the State's challenges for cause

5

Utah Code Ann § 76-3-207(3) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
6

Utah Code Ann §76-3-207(3) constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under Article I

Section 9 of the Utah State Constitution
7

The trial court committed error in allowing the State to introduce a videotape containing

views of victim Erica Lafferty and her wounds as she lay in her crib
8

The tnal court erred in ruling that the law to be applied regarding aggravating and mitigating

factors was the 1995 amendment to the Utah Code Ann § 77-3-207
9

Comments of the State during closing argument exceeded the bounds allowed during

argument as that material was called to the attention ofjurors without the due justification
10

The tnal court committed error by allowing the introduction of videotape of statements

made by Ron and Dan Lafferty to the media in September of 1984
11

The tnal court committed error by refusing to give the Defendant' s requested instruction

that the jury could consider sympathy or mercy in reaching its decision dunng the penalty phase
12

Utah's death penalty statute is unconstitutional because it does not provide for a review of

proportionality of the death sentence
13

Defendant's death sentence is not proportionate when compared with the sentence ofhis

co-Defendant, or with other capital cases in the State of Utah
14

Utah's capital punishment procedure violates the due process clauses ofthe United States

Constitution and the Utah State Constitution by creating a burden upon the Defendant to overcome
evidence of conviction
15

Utah Code Ann § 76-5-202 and 76-3-207 violate the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments ofthe United States Constitution
16

Executing the Defendant violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and

unusual punishment since the Defendant has spent over fourteen years on death row
17

The Utah procedure for capital sentencing is unconstitutional under the provisions ofArticle

I Section 7 and 9 ofthe Utah State Constitution
18

The eighteenth and final issue that was raised on direct appeal is that the retnal ofthe

Defendant violated the double jeopardy clause ofthe Fifth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution
and Article I Section 12 ofthe Utah State Constitution
Although there were eighteen separate issues raised, they were divided into eight separate general
categories The results ofthe appeal were given by the Utah Supreme Court in their decision of State v
Lafferty. 20 P 3d 342 (Utah 2001)
As to issues one through three, the Utah Supreme Court denied Lafferty's claims and affirmed the
tnal court's denial of his Motion for a New Tnal
As to the fourth issue ofgranting the State's juror challenge for cause, the Utah Supreme Court
upheld the tnal court's removal of that juror
The Supreme Court also denied thefifthand sixth issues raised by Lafferty and found that the death
penalty was not unconstitutional and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under either the
Federal or State Constitutions

The Supreme Court also upheld the trial court's decision on issues seven through nine, relating to
the impact evidence admitted during the penalty phase
The Supreme Court also denied Lafferty's tenth issue The court found no error in admitting a
videotape statement made by Ron and Dan Lafferty to the media in September of 1984
The Supreme Court also upheld the trial court's refusal to grant a mercy instruction in Lafferty's

for the claim to be addressed at trial is that the contradictory statement was not made at that time, nor
during the time of the initial appeal or any previous post-conviction petition (no previous petitions have been
filed) Specifically, Dr Goldmg indicated that the Petitioner could be determined as "situationally
competent" In other words that Mr Lafferty could be competent in certain situations and not competent
m other situations Upon information and belief, Dr Golding has, in State v Mitchell, case no 031901884
involving the alleged abduction of Elizabeth Smart by Mr Mitchell, that Mr Mitchell could not be

eleventh appeal issue
The twelfth through seventeenth issues raised by Lafferty upon direct appeal, were issues involving
constitutional objections to the implementation ofthe death penalty These issues were also rejected in

situationally competent and that theory was an inaccurate theory
FACTS THAT FORM THE BASIS FOR PETITIONER'S CLAIM TO RELIEF
Pursuant to Utah R Civ Pro Rule 65C(c)(3), the Defendant points out the following facts that

whole by the Utah Supreme Court
The eighteenth and final issue raised was a claim of double jeopardy, which the Utah Supreme

form the basis of the Petitioner's claim for relief
I. JURY ISSUES

Court also rejected
PRIOR POST-CONVICTION OR OTHER CIVIL CHALLENGES

1

The Utah Code provides that the penalty phase deliberations cease and jurors are to be

Pui suant to Utah R Civ Pro Rule 65C(c)(5), the Petitioner has not brought any other post-

discharged if jurors unanimously agree to impose the death penalty, or ifthey decide they are unable to

conviction or other civil proceeding in his case A number of initial and amended Requests for Wnts of

reach this unanimous agreement, the death sentence is appropnate Thus, these statutes violated

Habeas Corpus have been filed, but they are all the instant case and there have been no other prior

Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and

proceedings

his nghts under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

Pursuant to Utah R Civ Pro Rule 65C(c)(6), Petitioner claims relief due to newly discovered

2

The instructions and verdict forms allowed jurors to find only that death was the

appropnate penalty, or that they were reasonably satisfied they could not do so The verdict forms and

evidence There is new evidence of perjury or inconsistent testimony as to mental health issues by one of

instructions did not give jurors the affirmative option ofindicating that one or more jurors had decided that

the mental health evaluators in the instant case that is in direct contradiction with what that mental health

Petitioner deserved a life sentence Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and

evaluator stated in a recent case The reason why this evidence could not have been discovered m time

Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section

Page 5 of 26

Page 6 of 26

7, 12 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution

Petitioner was prejudiced by death qualification of the jurors serving in this case Thus these statutes

The instructions and verdict forms in effect directed thejury to focus on death and presume

violated Petitioner s Fifth Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States

that a death sentence would be imposed unless a juror voted against it Thus, these statutes violated

Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution

3

Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and
his nghts under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution

6

The court violated the Defendant s nghts to a fair tnal by denying Petitioner's Motion for

Change of Venue Petitioner's case was, at the time of the incident perhaps the most widely covered

Furthermore because thejury enters the sentencing phase already having found the

criminal case in LItah County history Petitioner requested that due to that extensive publicity and the fact

existence of at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, there is a natural disposition toward

that his brother and co-defendant had been convicted in the Fourth District Court of Utah, as well as the

imposing the death penalty unless and until Petitioner would be able to overcome the presumption ofdeath

Petitioner having been convicted in hisfirsttnal that the case be moved to a venue where coverage was

through introduction of mitigating circumstances Therefore, the Utah death penalty scheme improperly

not so great and there would not be as great a chance ofthere being a jury pool that was if not potentially,

shiftstheburdenofprooffromtheStateto the Petitioner Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth,

but irreversibly tainted The court' s denial ofthat request violated the Petitioner's nght to a tnal by jury

Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his nghts under

under Article III Section 2 ofthe United States Constitution as well as the Sixth Amendment ofthe same

Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution

Constitution and Article I Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution

4

5

While engaging in the process ofjury selection, the tnal court systematically precluded from

7

Petitioner claims the tnal court committed enor in granting the State's challenge of juror

the jury those members ofthe community who were prone, thought not entirely predisposed, to impose a

number 220 for cause despite her clear indication that she could impose the death penalty if she felt the

life sentence rather than a death sentence Therefore, the tnal court improperly death qualified thejury

aggravating factors were sufficient This action ofthe court violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and

The jurors who sentenced the Petitioner were selected through a death qualification procedure Empirical

Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section

evidence demonstrates that death qualified junes are less neutral and more likely to convict and impose the

7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution

death penalty than a jury which is not composed of persons who have passed through the death

8

The tnal court erred in allowing victim impact evidence in the tnal during the penalty phase

qualification process Any jury selection process which systematically excludes from thejury services a

by allowing the viewing ofa video ofthe Brenda and Enca Lafferty' s dead bodies This is in enor because

specific segment ofthe population based solely on their views ofcapital punishment violates a fundamental

it improperly shifts the focusfroman evaluation of aggravating and mitigating factors to that of an effort to

pnnciple which ensures that a cnminal defendant has a nght to a tnal by an impartial jury Therefore

inflame and impassion thejury and have them decide on emotional issues as opposed to proper mitigating

and aggravating factors Thus these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7,12,24 and

Petitioner claims that the trial court committed error by allowing the introduction of a

videotape made by the Petitioner to the media in September of 1984 dunng the penalty phase to show lack
of remorse when remorse was not raised as a mitigating factor, again in violation of Petitioner's
Constitutional rights due to the fact that under the 1984 statutory scheme, this type of evidence would not
have been allowed Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7,12,24 and

Petitioner indicates that dunng the penalty phase of mitigation, the Petitioner should have

been allowed to request an instruction that sympathy or mercy could be used to reach its determination
under the mitigating factors allowed Thus, the denial thereofviolated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section
7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution
11

The tnal court erred in failing to order the sequestration ofthejury as well as tnal counsel

in question had gone home and indicated to his ecclesiastical ambassadors, also known as home teachers,
that he was struggling with the case He felt that he agreed with the Petitioner's views on religion and
Constitutional areas being discussed in the tnal, to which the home teachers responded by giving him a
"blessing" wherein they indicated in that blessing that he was not to be deceived by the Petitioner and that
the Petitioner was an evil man Therefore, the juror felt compelled that he should go forward and quietly
find the Petitioner guilty and sentence him to death The indicated juror disclosed this information to the
court and counsel and the juror was excused Ifthejury had been sequestered, the Petitioner would have

25 of the Utah State Constitution
10

12

being ineffective in failing to request sequestration which caused one ofthejurors to be excused The juror

25 of the Utah State Constitution
9

25 of the Utah State Constitution

The Petitioner indicates that due to the nature ofthe case being a capital case, that the trial

court must have a need for heightened reliability for its decisions dunng the penalty phase, due to the fact
that a number of mitigating factors were not allowed to be presented due to the tnal court and due to the

had the advantage of perhaps one juror who would have voted for life without parole, thereby sparing the
Petitioner' s life Due to tnal counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to request a sequestered jury before, but
even more so after the incident at hand, as well as the tnal court failing to, on its own accord, require that
the j ury be sequestered either pnor to or definitely after this incident, therefore denied Petitioner the nght
to thejury that had been selected in violation ofPetitioner' s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 7,12,24 and 25 ofthe
Utah State Constitution
13

Thejury instruction regarding reasonable doubt, both in the guilty phase and the penalty

fact that trial counsel did not do an appropriate analysis or investigation into mitigating factors The

phase, was worded in such a way that it left out an important factor and has been rejected by the Utah

heightened reliability ofthis case is not met in violation ofDefendant's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth

Supreme Court The effect ofthe defective instructions both in the guilty phase and the penalty phase was

Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 7 12 24 and

the failure to convey the concept of reasonable doubt correctly to thejurors The instructions taken as a
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whole did not cure this defect This error affected the fundamental structure of the trial and of the penalty

definition and use of mitigating circumstances and erroneously defined the role of statutory mitigating

phase and is not subject to a harmless error analysis Thus violating Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and

circumstances in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section

Constitution and Article I Section 7,9,11,12 and 24 of the Utah State Constitution, as well as Utah Code

7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution

Ann § 76-3-207 The penalty phase instructions informed thejury that mitigation may include the statutory

The Utah death penalty statutes unconstitutionally shift the burden of proofto the Petitioner

circumstances listed in the statute The statute states that thejury shall include those enumerated mitigating

to prove that his life should be spared in violation of Article I Section 7,11,12 and 24 of the Utah State

circumstances The penalty phase instructions also failed to inform thejury that the mitigating circumstances

Constitution and the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Untied States Constitution

did not have to be found unanimously as well as focusing thejury' s attention on the facts ofthe crime rather

14

15

The penalty phase instructions violated the tnal court's obligation to charge properly the

jurors on all aspects ofthe capital sentencing process, limited the jury's consideration of mitigating factors

than the balance of aggravation and mitigation under all the circumstances
17

Insufficient evidence of an aggravating circumstance was not supported by sufficient

and prevented a reliable individualized sentencing determination in violation of the Sixth, Eighth and

evidence in the Petitioner's case Dunng the sentencing hearing, the prosecution relied upon an aggravating

Fourteenth Amendments ofthe United States Constitutions and Article I Section 7,9 11,12 and 24 of

factor which provided that the homicide was committed in a specially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or

the Utah State Constitution The penalty phase instructions informed the jury that "the sole issue to be

exceptionally depraved manner any of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, senous physical

determined in this proceeding is the sentence or penalty to be imposed It is improper for you to again

abuse, or senous bodily injury ofthe victim before death The aggravating circumstance cannot apply in

debate or reconsider the question ofthe Defendant's guilt or innocence " The effect ofthis instruction was

the absence of a showing by the prosecution that the victim was conscious at the time of the alleged

to prevent the jury from considenng any residual or lingering doubt it may have had regarding Petitioner's

heinous, atrocious, or cruel acts This fact must be established by the prosecution beyond a reasonable

guilt, a fact which clearly would have impacted the jury's decision as to the appropriateness ofthe death

doubt The prosecution must have also established that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the Defendant

penalty in this case The instruction created an unacceptable probability that the jury would consider that

intended to cause wholly unnecessary suffenng to the victim, not merely that the Petitioner or the co-

it was prohibited from considering the degree as well as the fact ofthe Defendant's guilt and, therefore,

defendant was inept of an efficient murder In this case, the State's medical examiner testified he could not

improperly restncted its consideration ofmitigating circumstances and the appropnateness ofthe sentence

be sure how long the victims were alive but that the victim's likely died withinfifteenseconds of the throat

of death

wounds being inflicted

16

Instruction number seven of the penalty phase did not adequately guide the jury in the

No evidence whatsoever was presented that either the Petitioner or the co-

defendant intended to cause wholly unnecessary suffenng to the victim, or that the pnmary purposes ofthe

attempts to kill the victims was to cause unnecessary suffering and torture the victims rather than kill them

every aggravating circumstance Therefore, both the trial court and the ineffective assistance oftrial counsel

In fact, the evidence is to the opposite Even taking the evidence presented at trial and during sentencing

as well as appellate counsel to bring this before the Utah Supreme Court is in direct violation ofthe

as true, the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish an intent to torture either victim The

Defendant's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under the United States

evidence simply established that an inefficient perpetrator or perpetrators committed the homicide ofthe

Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 ofthe Utah State Constitution

victims Trial counsel could and should have presented expert testimony at the penalty phase that the victim

n. INEFFECTTVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT

did not suffer torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury Thus, violating Petitioner's Fifth,
20

Petitioner was originally tried in 1986 for the same crimes as in the case at bar Upon

Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under
post-conviction appeal to the 10ih Circuit Court of Appeals, that Court vacated the sentence and conviction
Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 ofthe Utah State Constitution
due to errors committed by the trial court Petitioner's attorney at the time had drafted an Order ofRelease
18

The penalty phase instructions and verdict forms did not give the jurors the affirmative
to be signed by the United States District Court Judge That document was neverfiledand the Petitioner

option of indicating that one or more jurors had decided that the Petitioner deserved a life sentence The
was never arrested on a warrant, merely transferred from the Utah State Prison down to the Utah County
instructions and verdict forms in effect directed the jury to focus on death and presume that a death
Jail without having been arrested on a warrant in violation ofhis rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and
sentence would be imposed unless one juror voted against it Furthermore, because the jury enters the
Fourteenth Amendments ofthe United States Constitution as well as Article I Sections 12,13,14 and 21
sentencing phase already having found the existence ofat least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable

ofthe Utah State Constitution That seizure has continued from the ruhng by the 10th Circuit Court of

doubt, there is a natural disposition towards imposing the death penalty, unless and until the Petitioner was
Appeals in December of 1991 to the present day
able to overcome the presumption of death through the introduction of mitigating circumstances or
21

Petitioner's original sentence and conviction were vacated by the 10th Circuit Court of

evidence, which is in violation ofPetitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under
Appeals due to errors made by the court regarding Petitioner's competency to stand trial in thefirstcase
the United States Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7,12,24 and 25 ofthe Utah State

The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals also indicated in that holding that the State was free to retry the

Constitution
Petitioner However, there are limits to retrying a Defendant found under both the Fifth Amendment ofthe
19

Because the jury was not required to submit a special verdict formfindingeach and every
United States Constitution and Article I Section 12 ofthe Utah State Constitution In violation of those

aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, or to specify which non-statutory aggravating factors
Constitutional guarantees, Petitioner was retried when there was prosecutorial misconduct in the deliberate
it had found, there is no way for a reviewing court to determine whether the jury was unanimous in finding
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withholding of exculpatory evidence as to Petitioner's lack of mental health, as well as the Court' s error
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Department of Correction records itemsfromPetitioner's journal as well as witnesses and family members

when the Petitioner has a right to have his trial heard by a particular tribunal Therefore, due to the bad faith

who may have, at the time, been wilhngto step forward on his behalf and discuss childhood issues, family

ofthe State in thefirstcase in the deliberate withholding of exculpatory information, the Court may not

background physical, verbal and emotional abuse, childhood illnesses and injuries that would give perhaps

proceed to try the Defendant for the second time on the same offense

even one juror a reason tofindthe mitigating factors outweighed the aggravating factors Thus, violating

22

Trial counsel hired ineffective, or in the alternative, failed to hire effective investigators to

go back and interview witnesses and to discovery if any ofthe evidence had been tampered with or to
effectively find exculpatory evidence that would have assisted the Petitioner in his case Therefore, the

Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and
his rights under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 ofthe Utah State Constitution
25

Trial counsel was not qualified under the Utah or the ABA standards as laid out by the

Petitioner's right to effective assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment ofthe United States

Utah Supreme Court or American Bar Association at the time ofthe trial The 1989 ABA guidelines

Constitution as well as Article I Section 12 ofthe Utah State Constitution

required that two qualified trial attorneys should be assigned to represent a Defendant, as did the Utah

Trial counsel both failed to hire or provide a mitigation specialist to ascertain and develop

Rules of Criminal Procedure On information and belief, neither trial attorney was qualified under the Utah

mitigating circumstances to place before thejury at the penalty phase in order to persuade the jury that

or ABA guidelines to handle such a case at the time Therefore, the Petitioner's right to effective assistance

there was mitigating evidence that could give them reason to, as they had for his brother and co-defendant,

of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution as well as Article I Section

find that he should serve life in prison without parole as opposed to enforcing the death penalty Therefore,

12 ofthe Utah State Constitution

23

the Petitioner's right to effective assistance ofcounsel under both the Sixth Amendment ofthe United States
Constitution as well as Article I Section 12 ofthe Utah State Constitution

26

Counsel failed to object to the improper closing argument ofthe prosecutor when the

prosecutor improperly stated that the punishment for the death ofa 15 month old girl should be greater than

The only mitigating evidence that was provided to thejury at the penalty phase ofthe case

the punishment for the death of an adult This is an improper argument and trial counsel failed to

was a short series of prison officials who indicated that the Petitioner was a relatively trouble-free inmate

contemporaneously object Therefore, Petitioner was substantively denied his due process rights because

and that his write ups were ofa non-violent nature, a few picturesfroma year book and some photographs

ofthe inability to bring that argument outside ofa plain error analysis upon appeal and the Petitioner's right

ofthe Defendant with his family Some ofthe documents that could have been, but were not introduced

to effective assistance ofcounsel under both the Sixth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution as well

in mitigation were educational recordsfromhigh school and BYU, mental health records, psychological test

as Article I Section 12 ofthe Utah State Constitution

24

results. National Guard military records showing an honorable discharge, Utah County Jail records, Utah

27

Appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to bring forward to the Utah Supreme Cour

other areas of trial court error The appellate counsel failed to appeal the court's decision to deny the
change ofvenue The appellate counsel in the initial appeal should have brought this to the attention of the

as Article I Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution
30

The prosecution violated the Petitioner's due process rights in that it argued at the tnal of

Utah Supreme Court The Supreme Court cannot address any issue that is not brought properly before

the co-defendant that he was the primary instigator and actor who committed the murders, and in the

it Appellate counsel failed to include this issue in the initial appeal violating the rights to effective assistance

alternative at Petitioner's tnal argued that Petitioner was in fact the murderer of at least one, if not both, of

ofcounsel under the United States Constitution Sixth Amendment protections, as well as Article I Section

the victims, therefore, violating his due process nghts Thus, the State violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth,

12 of the Utah State Constitution This case, as already pointed out, had a great deal of public backlash

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article

when the co-defendant was not given the death penalty Therefore, it was impossible for Petitioner to

I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution

receive a fair trial in Utah County and this issue should have been appealed Therefore, the Petitioner' s

31

Post-conviction appellate counsel has been unable to meet the ABA guidelines for post-

right to effective assistance ofcounsel under both the Sixth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution

conviction counsel as outlined in the guidelines due to the following facts (1) limits on time due to the limited

as well as Article I Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution

time that counsel has had to investigate a case that is over twenty years old and has gone through two tnals

28

Appellate counsel also failed to appeal the court's decision to forbid the Defendant

and two appeals to the Utah Supreme Court as well as an appeal to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals The

from bringing, in the penalty phase, an argument that the co-defendant only received life m prison without

paper trail, although almost complete, still is missing in some small areas for a complete record (2)

parole as opposed to the death penalty in violation of the statutory mitigating factors at the time which

counsel, due to the limitations of funding, has been forced to make the choice between mitigation

allowed any other mitigating evidence Clearly, this was mitigating evidence that although the court did not

investigation and a pnvate investigator to interview all witnesses, law enforcement personnel, prosecution,

allow it, the penalty phase should have been appealed, but was not appealed Therefore, the Petitioner's

staff, defense staffand jurors The limited funding available to counsel for those experts has made it a legal

right to effective assistance ofcounsel under both the Sixth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution

and factual impossibility to fulfill the obligation as laid out in the ABA guidelines Therefore, the Petitioner

as well as Article I Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution

has again been denied his nghts under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments ofthe United

29

Appellate counsel was also not qualified to handle a death penalty appeal under the then

States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 7,12,24 and 25 ofthe Utah State Constitution
m . DEATH PENALTY ISSUES

existing Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure or American Bar Association guidelines for the appointment and
performance of counsel in death penalty cases established in 1989

Therefore, the Petitioner's right to

32

The statutory provisions ofUtah Code Ann §76-5-202, Utah's death penalty statute, are

effective assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution as well

unconstitutional on their face and as applied in the case of the Petitioner The Petitioner's rights to a fair

Page 17 of 26

Page 18 of 26

tnal, due process oflaw andfreedomfrom cruel and unusual punishment are violated by the provisions of

1990 The only other nations outside ofthe United States that apply the death penalty are China, Congo,

Utah's death penalty statute The statutory provisions fail to narrow those who are eligible to receive the

Iran, Nigena, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Belarus and Uzbekistan No Democratic country in the

death penalty and are so broadly drawn as to include most, if not all, homicides The large number of

world but the United States practices this form ofpunishment, therefore it violates the democratic pnnciples

aggravating factors for which the death penalty could be imposed give the effect ofbroad and unlimited

of the both Federal and State Constitutions Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth

categories for allowing the imposition ofthe death penalty This gives prosecutors overly broad discretion

and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under Article I

as to when the death penalty will be sought resulting in an uneven and unequal application of the penalty

Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution

within this state Whether or not a defendant, and in this case the Petitioner, is subject to the death penalty

35

The Utah death penalty scheme as set out is unconstitutional due to the fact that the State

is dependent upon the situs of the homicide and the belief and practice of the local county or district

is in an unequal and unfair advantage economically to that ofthe Petitioner The Petitioner is indigent and

attorney as opposed to any meaningful statutory guidelines Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth,

has but limited resources to resist a death penalty prosecution, wherein the State has unlimited access to

Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under

funds, resources, manpower, and investigatory ability Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth,

Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article

33

The Utah death penalty scheme is also unconstitutional in that it places the State in the

position acting criminally, in that the punishment for a capital homicide is to kill the convicted For example,

I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution
36

The Utah death penalty scheme as instituted causes cruel and unusual punishment in that

under the statutory scheme for rape, defendants who are convicted of rape or sexual assault are not,

the Petitioner has been subjected to approximately twenty years on death row with extremely limited access

themselves, raped or sexually assaulted Defendants who are convicted oftheft are not stolen from Those

to programs available to other inmates, health care, interaction with other inmates, and being essentially

who are convicted of assault are not assaulted In fact, there is no violent crime, or non-violent crime,

locked down 95% of the time in his cell If the Petitioner were not under a death penalty sentence, but

where the punishment is to inflict the same crime upon a defendant if convicted Thus, these statutes

merely life without parole, he would at least have the ability to have more internal privileges than the

violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States

Petitioner has being confined to death row Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth

Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution

and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his rights under Article I

34

The death penalty is in violation ofthe a vil rights ofPetitioner The death penalty has been

abolished dejure or defacto by 106 nations, thirty countries of which have abolished it since the year

Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution
37

The Utah death penalty scheme as was in effect at the time of this conviction cruel and

unusual because it is not a deterrent for homicide crimes No evidence exists that the death penalty is an

raise this type of issue or defense and, therefore, to apply the death penalty to the Petitioner would be a

effective deterrent against homicide crimes In fact, for those states that do not have the death penalty as

violation ofhis constitutional nghts as set out above and be defacto cruel and unusual Thus, these statutes

an option, the per capita number of homicides is lower than that in states that do have death penalty options

violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States

for homicides Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution

nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article I Section 7,12 24 and 25 ofthe
Utah State Constitution
38

41

The death penalty, as applied to the Petitioner, is a violation ofthe Eighth Amendment of

the United States Constitution and Article I Section 9 ofthe Utah State Constitution in that the punishment

The death penalty scheme is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in this case because

is excessive in that it violates human dignity and the State has no penological justification for inflicting this

it creates a presumption that death is the appropnate penalty in violation of Article I Section 7,9,11,12

punishment The State must have at least one oftwo social purposes, retribution and deterrence of capital

and 24 ofthe Utah State Constitution and the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

crimes by perspective offenders No evidence can be shown that the execution of the Petitioner is a

States Constitution

deterrence ofcapital crime, nor can it be shown that it is an appropnate retnbution due to the fact that the

39

The State of Utah has acknowledged and recently changed the death penalty statute to

allow only lethal injections to be performed on those convicted of murder and sentenced to death
Therefore, the State ofUtah m and of itselfhas shown that death byfiringsquad is cruel and unusual, both

co-defendant who has admitted to committing both murders, is serving life without parole Therefore,
retnbution is disproportionate and violates both State and Federal Constitutional schemes
42

In the appellate decision of the Utah Supreme Court, the court acknowledged the presence

under the Federal and State Constitutions and have so ratified that in the statutory set out ofthe acceptable

ofharmless errors and engaged in harmless error analysis The cumulative effect ofthese numerous errors,

punishments Therefore, by the State's own action through the legislative and executive branch, have

however, establishes prejudice efficient to deny the Petitioner his nghts to a fair tnal and due process of

indicated that death byfiringsquad is cruel and unusual Thus these statutes violated Petitioner's Fifth

law Thus, violating Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United

Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under

States Constitution and his rights under Article I Section 7,12,24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution

Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution
40

The Supreme Court of the United States has recently found it to be unconstitutional to

IV. MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES
43

Dunng the competency heanng held on March 8,1996, evidence was submitted that the

execute those on death row who are mentally retarded, finding it to be cruel and unusual punishment

Petitioner felt he received revelations some from God some from evil spints or beings known by or

Petitioner has never had the opportunity, nor has any previous counsel raised or had the opportunity to

identified by the Petitioner as "travelers' These travelers were identified by the Petitioner as consisting of
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homosexual spirit beings/entities with the power to inhabit bodies of living persons including courtroom
personnel jurors witnesses and his attorneys Petitioner at that time also indicated that he believed himself
to be a good traveler trapped inside his spint body, since he could not remember any ofthe "key words"
which would allow him to travel to other bodies Petitioner at that time also had visual hallucinations ofthe
word "Moroni" written in large letters on the wall ofthejail Petitioner at that time also indicated that he
used devices known as'reflector shields' and "spintual auras' to repel abrasive powers For these reasons
and others, a number of medical mental health experts felt that the Petitioner was at that point not
competent 1 o stand trial However the court ruled against the Petitioner and ordered that he be ordered
to stand tnal This was a clear violation ofPetitioner' s due process nghts under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution as well as his nghts to due process under Article I Section 7 of the Utah
State Constitution
44

Petitioner was not competent to waive the conflict of tnal counsel who had also

represented his brother and co-defendant, nor should the court have allowed tnal counsel to continue due
to the mental health issues of the Petitioner at the time Incorporating the same facts as laid out in the
previous secti on, the Petitioner was unable to conscientiously waive any conflict and the court was in error
in allowing trial counsel to go forward with such a conflict Therefore, the Petitioner's nght to effective
assistance of counsel under both the Sixth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution as well as Article
I Section 12 ofthe Utah State Constitution were violated as well as the Court' s actions violated Petitioner's
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts
under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution
45

The tnal court erred in denying Petitioner's Motion for New Tnal by ignonng the evidence

that Petitioner was incompetent during the trial proceedings Dunng and after the tnal counsel indicated
to the court that Petitioner s conduct had become marked by multiple verbal outbursts extreme agitation
and the Petitioner had complained of a buzzi ng noise in his ears which was so loud that it made it difficult
to hear the witnesses Petitioner requested that counsel bnng a dog into the courtroom to see if the dog
could hear the noise because Petitioner felt the dog would be able to hear the frequency of the noise as did
he A physician was called and testified that the Petitioner's mental condition had detenorated and
although Petitioner may have had a factual understanding about what was happening at the tnal, he did not
have a rational understanding and could not assist counsel dunng the tnal But in all of this and other
evidence, the tnal court wrongfully denied Petitioner his request for a new tnal and in so doing violated the
Petitioner's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and
his nghts under Article I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution
46

Utah's insanity defense as enumerated in 1996 violated the Defendant' s nghts under the

Eighth Amendment ofthe United States Constitution and Article I Section 9 ofthe Utah State Constitution
Petitioner introduced evidence of insanity and diminished capacity dunng the tnal The tnal court used the
1995 section ofthe Code to determine the standard However, the appropnate statute that the Petitioner
should have been tried under was the statute as it read in 1984 when the cnme was committed and the tnal
court erred by using the wrong statutory scheme Thus, these statutes violated Petitioner' s Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment nghts under the United States Constitution and his nghts under Article
I Section 7, 12, 24 and 25 of the Utah State Constitution
47

The aggravating circumstances set forth in the statute are vague and overbroad on thei

face The aggravating circumstances are to be narrowing constructions as announced by the Utah Supreme

Court, but they do not adequately channel the juries discretion to protect against arbitrary application of

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of October, 2004

the death penalty in that any and all conceivable murders would fit under those statutory definitions

CRAMER & CRAMER, L.L.C.

Therefore, the Petitioner' s rights were violated as to his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights under the United States Constitution and hi s rights under Article I Section 7,12,24 and 25 of the

ric Cramer
Attorney for Petitioner

Utah State Constitution
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Therefore, Petitioner Ronald Watson Lafferty prays this court will
1

Allow a Wnt of Habeas Corpus to have the Petitioner brought before the Court so he
Grant W P Morrison
Attorney for Petitioner

might be dischargedfromhis illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint, and/or relieved of his
illegal and unconstitutional sentence of death
2
in this Petition
3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Conduct a hearing at which proofmay be offered in support ofthe allegations contained

Grant Petitioner, who is indigent, sufficient funds to secure an investigator to continue

I hereby certify that on this 29th day of October, 2004,1 served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Petitioner's Second Amended Wnt of Habeas Corpus upon the following parties via U S
mail
Chnstopher Ballard
Thomas Brunker
Attorney General's Office
P O Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

investigating the facts alleged above
4

Grant Petitioner, who is indigent, sufficient funds to secure any other expert assistance

necessary to prove the facts alleged m this Petition
5

Grant such other and further relief as the court deems appropriate

6

Grant the required relief to amend this Petition should discovery of additional facts lead to

Ronald Lafferty
Inmate #17286
c/o Utah State Prison
P O Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

additional claims
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Anc Cramer (#5460)
CRAMER & CRAMER, L.L.C
Smith Hyatt Building
845 South Main Street Suite 23
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone (801) 299-9999
Facsimile (801) 298-5161

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY,
Defendant/ Appellant,

Grant W P Mornson (#3666)
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.
352 East 900 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone (801) 359-7999
Facsimile (801) 359-1774
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY,
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Case No Q^OjO^T?

THE STATE OF UTAH, ITS
AGENCIES, CORPORATIONS,
AND APPENDAGES ET AL ,
INCLUDING THE MORMON
CHURCH, ALIAS- THE CHURCH
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
SAINTS, THE CORPORATION OF
THE FIRST PRESIDENCY, THE
CORPORATION OF THE
PRESIDING BISHOPRIC, ETC

2-

Petition For Habeas Relief
And Redress (Habeas Corpus)

Plaintiff/ Appellee

PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

PETITIONER'S SECOND AMENDED
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PART 2

Petitioner,
v
Case No 020404472
STATE OF UTAH,
The Honorable Anthony W Schofield
Respondent

Petitioner demands that counsel attach this document to the Second Amended Wnt of Habeas
Corpus

APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, FROM BOGUS CONVICTIONS OF CAPITAL HOMICIDE AND
THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY BASED ONLY UPON THE
UNFOUNDED LIES AND THE CONJECTURE OF THE STATE AND ITS COERCED
AND TAMPERED WITH WITNESSES AND MANUFACTURED PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE, BEFORE JUDGE STEVEN L HANSEN

MARK SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General
KRIS C. LEONARD
R. PAUL VAN DAM
CflARLENE BARLOW
160 East 300 South, 6* Floor
P O Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

RONALD LAFFERTY
P O Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

Counsel for Appellee

Attorney Pro Se

Petition for relief and redress due to the fact that petitioner's sentence and convictions have been

Michael D Esphn and requesting his release from custody, also informing him that

vacated!

the state had seventy-two hours in which to recharge him, which time has already
passed1
Facts of the Case
9

1

Petitioner has not been released from custody but was, in spite of orders from a

Petitioner was wrongfully charged and convicted on two counts of capital
higher court, simply transferred without proper authorization by U S P
homicide, two counts of aggravated burglary, and two counts of conspiring to
Transportation officers Jones and Zadunavich to the Utah County Jail on July 8,
commit capital homicide
1992

2

Evidence was planted at the trial proceedings by the office of the prosecution
10

Petitioner has yet to be arrested or re-charged, or properly arraigned'

11

On or about Sept 17, 1992, officer/deputy Lisa Schunng at the Utah County Jail,

which they themselves did either purchase, find, manufacture, or otherwise obtain
for the conviction of the petitioner
made a copy of an order to release petitioner and delivered it to the desk of Lt
3

All remedies were exhausted on appeal in the Supreme Court of the State of Utah

4

On or about December 9, 1991, the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th

John Carlson of the Utah County Jail, as per his (Lt Carlson's) request
(Response to request Grievance form #5405 ) When confronted by petitioner, Lt
Circuit vacated both the sentence and conviction of petitioner
Carlson stated that he "could not find" the order on his desk Deputy Schunng
No 90-4010 10th Cir
also offered to look in petitioner's file and make him a copy of his current charges
5

The state of Utah petitioned the U S Supreme Court for a rehearing An order
She later reported to petitioner that there were no charges to be found anywhere
was filed on January 3, 1992 denying Utah's petition for a rehearing
She seemed a bit dismayed by it all and felt that she had been "set up" by someone

6

On or about May 20, 1992, The U S Supreme Court a2am upheld the Tenth
12

Petitioner remains in custody is spite of his requests, grievances, and please, and

Circuit Court of Appeal's decision to vacate and denied petition for wnt of
this last bogus, after-the-fact, double jeopardy, retrial by reversible error only
certiorari by Gerald Cook, Warden of the Utah State Prison
compounds the problem1 As a result of his unlawful, illegal, and unconstitutional
7

Notification of denial (decision) was received by the office of Aldnch, Nelson,
detainment, petitioner request the following
Weight and Esphn, 43 East 200 North, P O Box "L", Provo Utah 84603-0200
Relief and Redress Requested
on Friday, May 29 1991
1

8

My immediate release from custody as per order by Mr J Thomas Greene, United

Petitioner has contacted said office by telephone requesting advise from Mr
States District Judge (Copy enclosed )

2

Monetary relief and redress in the amount of $35 000 000 00 (thirty-five million

Attached Documents -

dollars) plus expenses in punitive damages for approximately twenty years

Grievance form 5405 (Utah County Jail)

wrongful incarceration, loss of property loss of family, defamation of character,

Amendments to "Facts of the case" in petition for habeas relief and redress

lost wages, violation of separation of powers (Church and State), refusal of

2B

Witnesses were tampered with by way of a plea bargin in which they were
coerced by the prosecution to perjure themselves in exchange for a deal Total
abuse of the judicial process.

8B

The only advise given petitioner by Mr Esphn, was not to file a 120 day
disposition which he, (petitioner), was already in the process of filing He later
added to that advise bv saying, "hold still while the state screws >ou [again] " Just
another chick with a little dick' Michelle Esphn aka "Boy" Esphn'
Copy of portions of 10* circuit court of appeals decision with notations made by
Mr Lafferty

rightful mail services, (including the use of a pen to submit and mail legal
documents) double jeopardy, denial of speedy trial etc, etc, etc
Terms of Payment
$5,000,000 00 (five million dollars) in cash, tax free, upon release, payments on balance to
be negotiated

Signed (Ron Lafferty)

i K ^ i ^ X

Copies Sent To
Aldnch, Nelson, Weight & Esphn
43 East 200 North
P O Box "L"
Provo, Utah 84603
United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit
C404US Courthouse
Denver, Colorado 50294
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capital Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
The Church of Jesus Chnst of Latter-day Saints (The Mormons)
50 East North Temple
Salt Lake City Utah 84111

Notations on last page Sentence and conviction vacated. Vacate - to annul, to set aside
to cancel or rescrd To render an act void, as the vacate an entry of record, or a
judgement As applied to a judgement or decree it is not synonymous with "suspend"
which means to stay enforcement of judgement or decree
Black's Law dictionary - sixth edition pg 1548, copynght © 1990 by West Publishing
Co 610 Opperman Drive, P O Box 64526 St Paul, MN 55164-0526
Copy of 10th Circuit decision denying reheanng 1/3/91
Copy of U S Distnct Court for Utah Order to release petitioner from custody
Copy of 120-Day Disposition and Inmate Money Transfer
Copy of Request for Disposition of Pending Charges
Copy of portions of Justice Zimmerman's opinion in the Utah Supreme Court decision
from 1988
Copy of receipt of payment to Utah State Pnson business Office
Copy of two newspaper clippings and notation A "retrial" is ipso facto double jeopardy
by it's own name, and who's fault it was should give great leverage to whose fault it
wasn't, aside from the numerous other constitutional violations, blatant and inexcusable'
Article VI (2), Amendment V, U S Constitution, Article I § 3 Utah Constitution 16*
American Junsprudence #256 (16 256) Volume 16 Section 256
Copy (2) of two newspaper clippings with minor notations

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
regular active service.

A p o l l was t a k e n and t h e c o u r t was e v e n l y

RONALD WATSON LAFFERTY,
d i v i d e d on t h e g u e s t i o n of r e h e a r i n g en b a n c .

Accordingly,

the

Petitioner-Appellant,
s u g g e s t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g en b a n c i s d e n i e d .
No. 9 0 - 4 0 1 0

35(a).

GERALD COOK, Warden of the Utah State
Prison,

See

F e d . R. App.

C i r c u i t J u d g e s Moore, A n d e r s o n , T a c h a , B a l d o c k ,

v o t e d t o g r a n t r e h e a r i n g en b a n c .

Respondent-Appellee.
Entered for t h e
ORDER
Filed:

January 3,

19.91

B e f o r e V.cKVY, C h i e f J u d g e , KOtA/MAY, LOG?.H, SEYKOUR, HOOPTc,
ANDERSOM, TACHA, EALDOCK, BRORBY and EBEL, C i r c u i t J u d g e s .

The c o u r t h a s f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n

the petition for

a n d s u g g e s t - . . e n f o r r o h c a r i . K : en botr.c f:.l-id
G e r a l d CooJc, Warden of t h e Utah S t a t e

rehearing

b \ t h e respond-*:-.t.

Prison.

Upon c o n s i d e r a t i o n -whereof, t h e p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g
d e n i e d b y t h e p a n e l t h ^ t rt:nd<»rcd t h e d e c i s i o n .
voted to grant

Judge

rehearing.

P u r s u a n t t o R u l e 3 5 ( b ) , F e d e r a l R u l e s of A p p e l l a t e
the suggestion
members of

is

Brorby

f o r r e h e a r i n g en b a n c was t r a n s m i t t e d t o

Procedure,
the

t h e p a n e l and t o a l l j u d g e s of t h e c o u r t who a r e

///)

in

rio\

Court
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and Brorby
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PETITIONER'S CLAIM CONCERNING MENTAL RETARDATION
FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH THE COURT MAY GRANT
RELIEF (claim 40)

Additional Material, Undisputed Facts

17

B

Argument

51

XVI PETITIONER'S ALLEGATION THAT HE LACKED THE MENTAL
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CONCLUSION
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6 In 1983, the LDS Church excommunicated petitioner for violating the law, refusing to

MATERIAL, UNDISPUTED FACTS1
1 Petitioner was an active member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the
LDS Church) and the product of a strictly religious family State v Lafferty, 2001 UT 19 f3, 20

support his children, failing to sustain the church leaders, and teaching and advocating doctrine
contrary to the LDS church's Id at \5 and n 2
7 The following year, petitioner's wife Diana filed for and obtained a divorce and moved

P 3d 342, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001)
2 Shortly after returning from his LDS mission, petitioner married Diana Sayer They had

with their six children to Florida Id at \6
8 Defendant felt his excommunication was unjust and was distraught over the dissolution of

six children Id
3 Those who knew petitioner prior to 1982 described him as a strong family man

his marriage Id
9 Petitioner and his brothers met Robert Crossfield when they opened their religious and

Petitioner wis also a prominent member of his community, serving for a time on the city council in
Highland, Utah Id
4 Between 1982 and 1983, petitioner spent increasingly large amounts of time with his

political discussions to others According to Mr Crossfield, God instructed him to teach the Lafferty
brothers how to receive revelation and to organize themselves into the "School of the Prophets "

brother Dan Lafferty Dan had been m constant trouble for failing to pay taxes and disobeying the

The brothers claimed that they began to receive communications from God and would meet as a

licensing regulations that governed his chiropractic practice Id at ^4

group to discuss these "revelations " Id at ^|7
10 Allen, the youngest Lafferty brother, and the husband and father to the murder victims,

5 Petitioner began to meet regularly with Dan, as well as with his brothers Tim, Mark, and
Watson, to discuss politics and religion Petitioner became increasingly converted to Dan's

had no direct involvement with the School of the Prophets Dan testified, "I don't think Allen

philosophies on government intervention Those who knew petitioner well remarked that he seemed

necessarily showed an interest He wasn't called We were all called by revelation, and he wasn't

to have changed drastically in both his beliefs and his personality Petitioner strayed further and

called " Id at f7 n 3
11 Petitioner told his brothers that he had received a revelation that his ex-wife Diana had

further from mainstream society Id at ^ 4 - 5

been the wife of the devil in a previous world Petitioner believed their union angered the devil
According to petitioner, the devil's jealousy led him to cause petitioner trouble in this world Id at
18
For purposes of this motion only, the State does not dispute the facts recited in this section
and the individual argument sections However, the State does not concede the ultimate veracity of
all the facts recited

12 In the spring of 1984, petitioner claimed to have received the "removal revelation "
\ccording to petitioner, God ordered the "removal" of Allen's wife, Brenda, their fifteen-month-old
laughter, Erica, Richard Stowe, and Chloe Low Id
13 Prior to receiving the "removal revelation," petitioner had expressed negative feelings
ibout the four named persons to family members and friends Petitioner believed that all four in
ome way either had helped his wife obtain a divorce or played a part in his excommunication from
he LDS Church Id at ^9
14 Petitioner thought that Brenda had encouraged Diana to divorce him On several
tccasions before the removal revelation, petitioner called Brenda a "bitch " Petitioner told Allen

revelations The School of the Prophets disbanded as a result of the disagreement Petitioner and
Dan continued m their belief that the revelations needed to be fulfilled Id at \\Q
19 On the morning of 24 July 1984, petitioner, Dan, and their friends Charles Carnes and
Ricky Knapp planned to go to Salt Lake City for the day Before leaving, petitioner told the group
that he felt impressed that they should go to his brother Mark's house to pick up a rifle Id at \\1
20 Mark asked what they planned to do with the gun because petitioner had quit hunting
years earlier

Petitioner replied that he was going hunting for "[a]ny fucking thing that gets in my

way " Id
21 From Mark's home, the men headed to Allen's apartment, apparently to look for another

hat Brenda "had better stop talking to Diana," that "people weren't safe in meddling in his affairs

rifle On the way, petitioner and Dan began discussing whether they should fulfill the "removal

inymore," and that "he felt justified in taking action of some sort against people who crossed him "

revelation" that day Id
22 At Allen's apartment, petitioner left the car and knocked on the door When no one

d and n 5
15 After the removal revelation, petitioner explained that fifteen-month-old Erica needed to
>e removed because "she would grow up to be a bitch just like her mother" Id

answered, petitioner returned to the car and drove away, heading toward Salt Lake City Id at % 12
23 Before they had traveled far, Dan said that he felt impressed to turn around and return to

16 Chloe Low, Diana's friend, helped and encouraged Diana to leave petitioner Id

Allen's apartment

17 Richard Stowe, petitioner's and Diana's ecclesiastical leader, served on the church

Lafferty answered the door Id

ouncil that excommunicated petitioner He also counseled Diana during the divorce proceedings
jid helped her obtain financial aid from the LDS Church Id
18 Petitioner claimed to have received another revelation on 13 March 1984 commanding

When they arrived, Dan went to the door and knocked This time, Brenda

24 Dan pushed past Brenda into the apartment and remained inside alone with Brenda for a
few minutes The men in the car heard the two fighting inside the apartment Petitioner left the car
and entered the apartment Id at ^[13

hat he and the School of the Prophets "consecrate" an "instrument" for removing the four named

25 Mr Carnes testified that, once petitioner entered the apartment, he could hear petitioner

lersons Only Dan and Watson agreed The others involved with the School of the Prophets felt

calling Brenda a ' bitch" and a "liar," and that he could hear Brenda being beaten Mr Cames heard

hat this and the removal revelation were not of God and disassociated themselves from the
3

4

Brenda screaming, "Don't hurt my baby Please don't hurt my baby " He could also hear the baby

other personal effects belonging to petitioner and Dan They then proceeded to Mr Cames' brother's

rying, "Mommy, mommy, mommy " The apartment then became quiet Id

house in Cheyenne, Wyoming, where they were arrested on 30 July 1984 Id at ^[16

26 A few minutes later, petitioner and Dan exited from the rear of the apartment and
eturned to the car, their clothes covered in blood Id
27 The men next drove to the Low home On the way, petitioner commented that Chloe
^ow's small size would make her an easy target Id at ^14
28 When they reached the Low home and determined that no one was there, the men broke

32 On 17 August 1984 FBI agents arrested petitioner and Dan in Reno, Nevada Id
33 When Allen Lafferty arrived home from work on the evening of 24 July 1984 he found
his wife and fifteen month-old daughter dead Id at ^17
34 Brenda was m the kitchen lying in a pool of blood She had suffered a severe beating
and had contusions and bruises on her face, head, shoulders, arms, thigh, knees, and back Evidence

nto the home and took numerous items As they left, petitioner began talking about going on to

established that a vacuum cord had been tightly and repeatedly wrapped around her neck A six-

lichard Stowe's home Id

inch long incision had sliced through her trachea, both jugular veins, and both carotid arteries and

29 The men accidentally missed the turnoff to the Stowe home Petitioner and Dan decided
o abandon trying to fulfill the rest of the revelation They stopped at a service station and then
leaded toward Wendover Id a t f l 5
30 Mr Carnes testified that, on the way, petitioner pulled a knife out of his boot, started to

left a cut on her spinal column Blood was smeared on the walls, drapes, door, and light switches
There was evidence throughout the apartment of a major struggle Id
35 Fifteen month-old Erica lay in a puddle of her own blood and propped against the back
of her crib with her head slumped over Erica's throat was cut from ear to ear The incision sliced

)ang it on his knee, and said, "I killed her I killed her I killed the bitch I can't believe I killed

through both her carotid arteries, both jugular veins, and her esophagus and cut her cervical spinal

ler " He then handed the knife to Dan, and said, "Thank you, Brother, for doing the baby because I

column Only bone and a little tissue attached her head to her body Id at ^18

lon't think I had it in me " Dan replied, "It was no problem " Id at ^15
31 In Wendover, the four men rented a small kitchenette apartment where they cleaned up,
ite, and spent the night

The next night, Mr Knapp and Mr Carnes, afraid of what the Lafferty

>rothers said that they had done, quietly left the apartment and drove away in the car While
raveling along Interstate 80, they found the knife in the car They rolled the knife in a towel and
hrew it out the window Later in Twin Falls, Idaho, they disposed of a bag of bloody clothing and

36 Both Brenda and Erica were alive when their throats were slit Id
37 The State charged petitioner with capital murder and related crimes A jury convicted
him and sentenced him to death on the capital murder charges The Utah Supreme Court affirmed
State v Lafferty, 749 P 2d 1239 (Utah 1988)
38 Petitioner, did not seek collateral relief lnthe Statecouxts^mstead, he proceeded directly
to federal collateral review The United States District for the District of Utah denied relief

petitioner can demonstrate that his tnal and appellate counsel were ineffective in failing to raise
Cook, 949 F 2d 1546 (10th Cir 1991) The Tenth Circuit ordered petitioner's convictions and

those claims UTAH CODE ANN 78-35a-106(l)(c) and (2) (West 2004)
As to the remaining claims, Utah R Civ P 65C(c)(3) requires petitioner to plead "all of the

sentences vacated, however, it elaborated that "[t]he state is of course free to retry Lafferty " Id at

facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim[s] to relief" As detailed in the argument sections

1557
39 The State chose to retry petitioner A second jury convicted petitioner and sentenced

sufficient to entitle him to post-conviction relief Therefore, the Court should dismiss these claims

him to death The Utah Supreme Court again affirmed,-^ate-vUL4#ec^^
The UintedJStatejJsupreme Court denied

review^ggfezj»x^jto^534IJ^ljl

below, petitioner supports none of these claims with facts that, if proven and believed, would be

8 (2001)

for failure to state a claim for relief UtahR Civ P 12(b)(6)
Also as detailed below, the record and controlling law demonstrate that some of petitioner's

ARGUMENT

claims fail as a matter of law As to those claims, the Court must grant summary judgment See

Introduction
Several of petitioner's claims repeat claims that he raised and lost on direct appeal

Utah R Civ P 56(c), Utah R Civ P 12(b) (when a party files a 12(b)(6) motion and relies on

Petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing these previously litigated claims See UTAH CODE

matters outside the pleadings, the Court may treat the motion as one for summary judgment)

ANN §78-35a-106(l)(b) (West 2004) ("A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon

I.

any ground that was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal") Therefore, the State is entitled to

The Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") bars collateral relief on claims that petitioner

summary judgment on these claims See id, Utah R Civ P 56(c) ("the judgment sought shall be
rendered if

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

the moving party is entitled to

THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS
PETITIONER ALREADY RAISED AND LOST ON DIRECT APPEAL (claims
4,7-10,14,18(partial), 21,23,32(partial), 38,41,43,45)

pursued, but lost on direct appeal UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a-106(l)(b) (West 2004) Attempts to
rehtigate previously failed claims abuse the post-conviction process See e g Carter v Galetka,

a judgment as a matter of law")
In some instances, petitioner raises claims that he could have, but did not raise at tnal or on

2001 UT 96ffl[6-9,4 4 P 3d 626 (affirming the dismissal of sixteen claims, some with multiple

direct appeal The State is also entitled to summary judgment on these substantive claims because

subclaims, under the "abuse of the writ" procedural bar because they had been previously addressed

petitioner is likewise procedurally barred from pursuing them See UTAH CODE ANN § 78 35a-

on direct appeal) Petitioner also may not rehtigate claims lost on direct appeal merely by relabeling

106(l)(c) ("A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that could have

them ineffective assistance of counsel claims See Gaidner v Holden, 888 P 2d 608, 615-16 (Utah)

been but was not raised at trial or on appeal") (West 2004)/ The Court may grant relief only if

(petitioner cannot avoid the procedural bar to a previously litigated substantive claim by recasting it
in post-conviction proceedings as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim), cert denied, 516 U S
8

7

828 (1995) The Court must grant summary judgment on previously litigated claims without

circumstance already proven, this claim also repeats a claim that petitioner raised and lost on direct

addressing their merits Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96, \ 6

appeal Id
Petitioner challenges his death sentence on the basis that his brother and co-defendant

Petitioner claims that 1) Utah law unconstitutionally shifted the burden to him at the penalty
phase because the State has already proven at least one aggravator by the time the penalty phase

received a life sentence even though he committed the murders (claim 41) Although petitioner uses

begins (claims 4, 14, and 18(partial)), 2) the Court erroneously removed juror 220 for cause (claim

different labels for this claim than those used on direct appeal, the Utah Supreme Court already

7), 3) the Court erroneously admitted at the penalty phase a videotape of the crime scene showing

resolved its substance against him On direct appeal, petitioner contended that his sentence was

the victims' bodies (claim 8), 4) the Court erroneously admitted a videotape of petitioner's media

unconstitutionally disproportionate to his brother's sentence and to his level of culpability based on

interview (claim 9), 5) the Court erroneously denied petitioner's request for a penalty-phase

the same factual allegations The Utah Supreme Court rejected that argument Id at ^ 116-17, 122-

sympathy instruction (claim 10), 6) petitioner's retrial violated double jeopardy (claim 21), 7) the

23 Because the supreme court has resolved the claim's substance against petitioner, he may not

large numbei of aggravators gives prosecutors unlimited discretion in choosing whether to charge

rehtigate the claims in this proceeding
Petitioner also alleges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to hire a mitigation

capital murder (claim 32 partial), 9) the Court erroneously found petitioner competent to stand trial
(claim 43), and 10) the Court erroneously denied petitioner's motion for a new trial (claim 45)

specialist (claim 23) He alleges no specific facts about how the failure affected him other than to

These claims repeat claims that petitioner raised and lost on direct appeal See State v Lafferty, 20

point out that his brother Dan received a life sentence To the extent petitioner repeats his direct

P 3d 342, 2001 UT 19, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001)

2

Petitioner also claims that Utah's death penalty statutes unconstitutionally create a
presumption of death (claim 38) Petitioner provides no specifics To the extent petitioner claims
that the presumption arises because the penalty phase begins with at least one aggravating

2
In addition, petitioner supports his claim concerning juror 220 by distorting the record to
the point of misrepresentation Petitioner contends that juror 220 gave the Court a "clear indication
that she could impose the death penalty if she felt the aggravating factors were sufficient" Juror 220
answered "yes" to that question in her pre-voir dire questionnaire During voir dire, however, juror
220 stated that she could only impose the death penalty if petitioner had killed someone in her own
family Id at ^ 5 8 - 6 4 He did not Consequently, juror 220 unequivocally denounced her ability to

appeal claim that he should have received the same sentence his brother received, he already lost the
claim on direct appeal Id
II.

THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS
THAT PETITIONER COULD HAVE, BUT DID NOT RAISE ON DIRECT
APPEAL (claims 1-3, 5-6, ll(partial), 12(partial), 13,15-17,18(partial) 19,
20(partial), 30,32(partial), 33-35,37-38,42, 46-47)
The PCRA also bars collateral relief based on claims that petitioner could have, but did not

raise on direct appeal See UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a-l 06(1 )(c) (West 2004) The claims identified
in the heading all depend on facts available to petitioner during his direct appeal Petitioner could

lave, but did not raise them on direct appeal Therefore, the Court may not grant relief on them and
.hould grant summary judgment m the State's favor
II.

3

THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT "NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE"
JUSTIFIES POST-CONVICTION RELIEF4

discovered evidence in "mere[] impeachment" The claim fails as a matter of law, and the Court
should grant summary judgment in the State's favor5
IV.

Petitioner complains that his counsel should have moved to sequester the jury For factual

Petitioner contends that he has learned of new evidence related to Stephen Goldmg, Ph D ,
hat justifies post-conviction relief Dr Goldmg was one of four evaluators who found petitioner

PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HIS COUNSEL HAD A CONSTITUTIONAL
DUTY TO MOVE TO SEQUESTER THE JURY FAILS AS A MATTER OF
LAW (claim 12)

support, he alleges that, dunng the tnal, a juror expressed to religious teachers that he agreed with

ompetent to stand trial State v Lafferty, 2001 UT 19 ff23-26, 20 P 3d 342, cert denied, 534 U S

petitioner's religious and constitutional views The leaders gave the juror a blessing, instructing the

018 (2001) According to petitioner, Dr Goldmg "indicated that the Petitioner could be determined

juror that petitioner was evil and admonishing the juror not to be deceived by petitioner According

s 'situationally competent'" Petitioner asserts on "information and belief that Dr Goldmg

to petitioner, the juror felt compelled to find petitioner guilty and sentence him to death
Petitioner admits that the juror disclosed this episode and that the tnal court excused the

ecently testified in an unrelated case that the defendant in that case "could not be situationally
ompetent and that theory was inaccurate " Amended Petition at 5-6
The PCRA prohibits post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence when the

juror Nevertheless, petitioner contends that he had a constitutional right to counsel who would have
moved to sequester the jury According to petitioner, "[i]f the jury had been sequestered, the

lew evidence is "mere[] impeachment evidence" evidence UTAH CODE ANN § 78 35a-104(e)(in)
West 2004) Petitioner appears to allege that Dr Goldmg recently offered testimony in an unrelated
ase that contradicts the testimony he offered in petitioner's case At most, petitioner's newly

3

On these claims, petitioner may obtain post-conviction relief only if he can demonstrate
neffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise them at trial or on direct appeal UTAH CODE
>LNN §78-35a 106(21 (West 20041 As to most of the claims, petitioner has not alle^d that r.oi)ny».l
kias-meffbctrvertet-aione pled all the facts necessary to support such a claim The State separately
ddresses those as to which petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective
4

Petitioner has not numbered the claim It appears on pages five and six of his amended

etition

5
Petitioner's vague and unsupported allegations make it impossible to determine whether the
recent testimony actually contradicted the testimony offered in petitioner's case Petitioner has not
attached the testimony from the unrelated case Dr Goldmg may have testified only that the
"situational competency" theory did not fit the facts of that case, and not that it was an invalid theory
in all circumstances

In addition, the State, by focusing on the "mere[] impeachment" element of a newly
discovered evidence claim, does not concede that petitioner's allegations satisfy the other elements
For example, the Court may grant post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence only
when the new evidence, "viewed with all the other evidence,
demonstrates that no reasonable
trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received "
UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a-104(e)(iv) (West 2004) Because petitioner has not included the
testimony, it is impossible to determine whether the new evidence would have so undermined Dr
Golding's testimony that a reasonable fact-finder would have rejected his conclusions as well as
those of the other three mental health evaluators who found petitioner competent

11

12

Petitioner would have had the advantage of perhaps one juror who would have voted for life without

resulted in trial by a biased jury He alleges only that failing to sequester the jury resulted in the loss

)arole, thereby sparing the petitioner's life " Second Am Pet at 10

of a juror he considered sympathetic to him Counsel's failure to move to sequester the jury

To prevail on a claim that trial counsel's performance denied petitioner his Sixth Amendment

deprived petitioner of no right, therefore, the claim fails as a matter of law See Strickland v

ight to the effective assistance of counsel, petitioner must prove two elements First, petitioner must

Washington, 466 U S at 695 (petitioner is not entitled to the luck of a lawless sentencer or to

stabhsh constitutionally deficient performance He must prove that specific acts or omissions fell

consideration of individual juror idiosyncrasies)6

>elow an objective standard of reasonableness Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668,687 88,690

V.

1984), Parsons v Barnes, 871 P 2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert denied, 513 U S 966 (1994) He must

PETITIONER'S SUGGESTION OF AN INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
CLAIM FOR FAILING TO FILE A RELEASE ORDER IN FEDERAL
COURT IS FRIVOLOUS (claim 20)

>vercome a strong presumption that trial counsel rendered constitutionally adequate assistance

In claim 20, petitioner alleges that his federal habeas corpus counsel prepared a release order,

Strickland v Washington, 466 U S at 690, State v Taylor, 947 P 2d 681, 685 (Utah 1997), cert

but never filed it with the federal court To the extent petitioner intends this allegation to be a claim

iemed, 525 U S 833 (1998), Parsons v Barnes, 871 P 2d at 522

that the failure to file the order violated his constitutional rights, the claim is frivolous

Second, petitioner must prove prejudice Petitioner must prove that any constitutionally

First, petitioner had a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel during the

leficient performance undermines confidence in the outcome of his trial Strickland v Washington,

criminal proceedings U S Const Amend VI, Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668,687-88,690

^66 U S at 695, Parsons v Barnes, 871 P 2d at 522

(1984) Petitioner cites to no authonty, and State's counsel is aware of none, demonstrating that he

Petitioner must prove the claimed ineffective assistance to a "demonstrable reality", he
annot rely on mere speculation or mere repetition of the legal standard Parsons v Barnes, 871
> 2d at 526, Fernandez v Cook, 870 P 2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)
Petitioner only had the right to trial by an impartial jury U S Const Amend 6, Utah Const
S.rt I, § 7, State v Wach, 2001 UT 35 \16, 24 P 3d 948, State v Baker, 935 P 2d 503, 509 (Utah
997) Cf State v Menzies, 889 P 2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) ("so long as the jury that sits is
mpartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does
lot mean the [Constitution] was violated") (quoting Ross v Oklahoma, 487 U S 81, 88 (1988), cert

had the right to the effective assistance of federal habeas corpus counsel Cf e g Coleman v

6
Alternatively, petitioner fails to state a claim for relief To the contrary, petitioner asks the
Court to assess counsel's conduct with the benefit of hindsight Strickland forbids such an
assessment Strickland v Washington, 466 U S at 689 (the Court must evaluate counsel's conduct
from counsel s perspective at the time, making every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of
hindsight) Petitioner identifies no facts demonstrating that counsel should have moved for jury
sequestration before the incident on which he relies to support this claim He complains only that
the failure to request sequestration resulted in losing a juror he considers favorable Unless
petitioner can identify facts demonstrating that counsel had a constitutional obligation to ask for
sequestration before the incident about which he complains, he cannot demonstrate deficient
performance

Similarly, petitioner has not established prejudice His failure to identify facts and law
Qiinnnrtino nirv cpnupctrntinn nlcr\ failc tn r\m\7iAf> a kaeie for ^/-.n/^lii/linn tViot <•»- ol /*« «o^1 r.^ \A l,„» „

state post-conviction counsel's "ineffectiveness" for because Coleman had no Sixth Amendment

PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION AND
PRESENTATION OF MITIGATING EVIDENCE AT THE PENALTY PHASE
FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW (claim 24)

right to post conviction counsel)

Petitioner claims that his counsel failed to introduce relevant mitigation evidence at the

Thompson, 501 U S 722, 755 (1991) (Coleman could not excuse his procedural default based on

Second, it would have been inappropriate for federal habeas corpus counsel to file the release
order The Tenth Circuit plainly held that the State was "free to retry" petitioner Lafferty v Cook,
th

VII.

penalty phase of his trial He specifically alleges that the only mitigating evidence his trial counsel
presented at the penalty phase "was a short series of pnson officials who indicated that the Petitioner

949 F 2d 1546, 1557 (10 Cir 1991) When the State chose that option, petitioner was not entitled

was a relatively trouble-free inmate and that his write ups were of a non-violent nature, a few

to be released

pictures from a year book and some photographs of the Defendant with his family " Second Am

The claim is frivolous and the Court should grant summary judgment m the State's favor
VI.

PETITIONER FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM BASED ON COUNSEL'S
FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE OR UNSPECIFIED EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE TAMPERING

Pet at 15 16 Petitioner contends that his counsel should have introduced additional mitigation
evidence from various sources and attaches a "Social History" report detailing that evidence 7
Although petitioner correctly lists the evidence that his counsel introduced at the penalty

(claim 22)

phase, that evidence was not the full extent of the mitigation case that his counsel presented As

Petitioner contends that his counsel inadequately investigated exculpatory evidence or the

demonstrated in the following statement of additional undisputed facts, most of the evidence that

possibility of evidence tampering However, petitioner has not identified any facts known to

petitioner's trial counsel relied on at the penalty phase was presented during the guilt phase, and re-

counsel, or that counsel had a constitutional duty to discover, that would have triggered a

argued to the jury at penalty phase In fact, all of the additional mitigation evidence that petitioner

constitutional duty to investigate exculpatory evidence or the possibility of evidence tampering

now alleges that his trial counsel should have introduced, with the exception of petitioner's

Petitioner also has not identified what evidence his counsel would have found, let alone that they

insignificant National Guard records, was introduced and argued to the jury over the course of

would have found evidence so significant that it would have made a more favorable outcome
reasonably likely
Petitioner fails to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief, and the Court should

7
Petitioner's claim 11 alleges that his counsel failed to adequately investigate unspecified
mitigating evidence To the extent claim 11 repeats the same challenges alleged in this claim, that
portion of claim 11 fails for the reasons explained below

dismiss the claim
If petitioner's allegation in claim 11 is broader than the allegation in this claim, then the
Court should dismiss that broader portion of claim 11 for failure to state a claim Petitioner alleges
no additional facts that, if proven, would demonstrate that trial counsel ineffectively presented
mitigation evidence
16

Childhood Issues & Family Background

petitioner's trial Therefore, petitioner fails to demonstrate that his counsel overlooked any relevant

3 Petitioner was born 4 November 1941 to Watson and Claudine Jones Lafferty Petitioner

mitigation evidence
A Additional Material, Undisputed Facts

was the eldest of eight children, his siblings, listed in order by age, were Dan, Mark, Tim, Watson,

1 Petitioner now argues that his trial counsel should have introduced evidence of his

Jr , Allen, Colleen and Kathleen Social History at 1, 3

[a)] educational records from high school and BYU,
[b)] mental health records [and] psychological test results,
[c)] National Guard military records showing an honorable discharge,

4 Petitioner claimed that "Mark was dad[']s favorite child Either myself out of petty
jealousy alone would be his least favorite or my youngest sister, Kathleen " Social History at 1
5 Watson had a barber shop in Salt Lake City, but later became a chiropractor He died 10

[d)] Utah County Jail records,

September 1983 due to untreated diabetes His wife Claudine called an ambulance when Watson

[e)] Utah Department of Corrections records,

lapsed into a coma, even though Watson "left strict orders that under no circumstance should he be

[f)] items from Petitioner's journal,

taken to the hospital " Social History at 1-2

[g)] as well as witnesses and family members who may have, at the time, been
willing to step forward on his behalf and discuss
[i)]

childhood issues,

[H)] family background,
[in)] physical, verbal and emotional abuse, [and]
[iv)] childhood illnesses and injuries
Second Am Pet at 15-16
2 Petitioner provides a "Social History" prepared by his currently retained mitigation
specialist, detailing the following facts that he alleges his trial counsel should have presented

6 "Watson was described as controlling of family members and firmly rooted in the LDS
faith " He was also described "as being fundamentalist in his approach to LDS philosophy " Ron
described his father as "extremely abusive both physically, mentally, and verbally[,] especially to my
mother ' Social History at 2
7 Family members described Claudine "as having been subservient to her husband, but a
good mother " Petitioner described her as "mostly a brood mare for a cantankerous male She was
always an excellent cook and a meticulous housekeeper, nevertheless, she was my mother and I
dearly loved her " Social History at 2
8 "Watson and his sons studied "Constitutional issues of the United States government and
fundamental issues of the LDS religion " Watson also studied and accepted the teachings of the
John Birch Society "This type of activity brought attention to the family by neighbors, religious

9 Watson would not allow his children to see medical doctors so the Lafferty children had

13 Watson eventually became physically abusive with Claudine "Later in life when

3 get medical treatment surreptitiously Colleen Lafferty nearly died from a ruptured appendix and

Claudine witnessed her own sons being physically and mentally abusive to their wives and children,

Mil suffer from related complications for the rest of her life because she was not promptly treated

she wouldn't say a word " Social History at 5

Watson [Lafferty], Jr fell from the roof of the house and his father allowed him to lay unconscious
vernight, refusing to take him to the doctor " "One Sunday, Mark accidentally shot himself m the

14 "One afternoon Watson and Claudine got into an argument, because Claudine continued
to refuse his sexual advances, a problem he faced their entire marriage Following the argument,

tomach with an arrow His father told him he would have to suffer throughout the evening, because

Watson picked up a baseball bat and beat the family dog to death Over the years, other family pets

e'd broken the Sabbath " Social History at 2-3

met the same fate " Social History at 5

10 "[Petitioner] describes his family as being basically a good family, well integrated into

15 Claudine used her sons "to push their father away " She told her family that "perhaps

le community He lived with his natural parents and siblings until the age of 19 [Petitioner's]

they had once been a 'royal family during a pre-earth life '" One family member said, "'Mom

lother indicated that he was a good and easy child to raise, suffering from no abnormalities " She

Lafferty really leaned on [petitioner], it was almost as if [petitioner] were her husband and Watson

dded that '"[h]e seemed to progress through the normal stages of growth and development with no

didn't exist'" As petitioner grew older, "his mother turned to him for advise to help settle family

omphcations '" Social History at 3-4

arguments and to be the 'true' leader of the family " Social History at 5

Physical Verbal & Emotional Abuse
11 Petitioner described his father "as being difficult to get along with and quite dogmatic
/ith rather extreme medical, religious and political views, in regards to his control of his family "
etitioner described his father as "using strict and physical discipline " He also believed "his father
ad a 'possessiveness' and 'jealousy' concerning affection demonstrated toward his mother " Social

16 Petitioner enjoyed woodworking and shop in high school, but claimed that "[a]ny other
attempt at hobbies or projects at home were quickly destroyed, sold, or discouraged by the son-of-abitch who called himself my dad " Social History at 13
17 The "Conclusion" section of the Social History states "[petitioner's] father was
extremely jealous of the close relationship [petitioner] had with his mother, Claudine, and he often
abused [petitioner] both physically and verbally because of this jealousy Claudine used [petitioner]

listory at 4
12 Petitioner was raised "in a family in which strict controls, physical punishment, and

to push her husband away, [petitioner] was the shield she imposed to protect herself from

trongly or fervently held beliefs about health issues, religion, and politics were the norm " Social

[petitioner's] abuse [Petitioner's] mother often treated him as if he were the head of their family

listory at 4

H[e] was given the responsibility to teach, protect, and educate his younger brothers [Petitioner]

20

19

tnved for their acceptance and his father[']s, even when it meant becoming deeply involved in an

episode which lasted only a few minutes The stone passed without requiring surgery, and he has

nvironment of socially deviant behavior " Social History at 28

been free of any further complications " Social History at 6

18 The "Conclusion" section of the Social History also states that petitioner's mother was

22 After talking with petitioner's ex-wife, Dianna, Dr Peter Heinbecker believed that

bviously "supportive of [her son's] actions throughout their childhood and adult years " It also

petitioner had an apparent manic episode m early 1983 lasting about 45 days, just before the break-

otes that Claudine did nothing to stop the fulfillment of the "Removal Revelation" even though she

up of his marriage and following the failure of some financial projects Social History at 6
Educational Records

new of the "revelation" and her sons' involvement The History surmises that "[n]ot only was
petitioner] not shunned for these ideas [the removal revelation], he was strongly supported by

23 The Social History reports that petitioner "seemed to be well accepted by his peer group

everal of his brothers, and his mother " The History concludes that "[t]he concept of learning right

and was able to formulate strong relationships He was well accepted into school programs and

rom wrong is acquired in the early years of life, having a mother who allowed her daughter-in-law

social activities, he performed with no difficulty m the educational setting " Petitioner "played

nd granddaughter to be killed, implies that the concept of right and wrong was not valued in their

football and was the captain of the wrestling team at Payson High School" Social History at 4

ome " Social History at 29
19 The Social History also observes that "[w]ith the exception of Ron's brother, Dan, none
f the other siblings have had antisocial behavior sufficient enough to bring them to the attention of
ie legal authorities Ron's sisters are currently married And his brothers appear to be integrated
ltizens in the community " Social History at 3
Childhood Illnesses Medical Issues & Injuries
20 Petitioner's parents opposed immunizations and therefore did not immunize any of their
hildren Petitioner "experienced the typical childhood illnesses with no complications " Social
hstory at 5
21 "The only documented serious illness [petitioner] suffered was in 1979 when he was
ospitahzed for kidney stone complications While in the hospital he suffered a brief catatonic

24 Petitioner graduated from Payson High School with a 3 2 grade point average
"Teachers described him as 'well-behaved' and a 'well-adjusted young man '" Social History at 6
25 Petitioner completed twelve credit hours at BYU and "[h]is grades were significantly
lower than those he'd achieved in highschool" Social History at 6
26 Petitioner had "no significant difficulties surrounding his relationships during the dating
years " Social History at 4
Items From Petitioner s Journal
27 After Dianna filed for divorce from petitioner, he recorded in his journal "Called
Dianna and found that she had been to a lawyer and filed for divorce—devastating feeling—rough
night" Petitioner's journal also contained his feelings after delivering a "Writ of Divorcement" to
Dianna, and from 28 October 1983, the day his divorce was final Social History at 9-10

28 Petitioner's journal also records his feelings on 7 August 1983, the day of his LDS
Church disciplinary hearing Social History at 11 -12

[petitioner's] belief system into perspective and also illustrates the nature of the social support and
'social validation' of that system " Social History at 26
Utah County Jail & Utah Department Of Corrections Records

29 On 25 October 1983 petitioner recorded in his journal that he had a "strong desire to
have a couple of beers" but that he hadn't "so much as tasted a beer for over 20 years " He also
recorded, "Guess I could say the beer was for medicinal purposes " Social History at 14

34 The Social History reports that "[o]ther than a few incidences of minor traffic violations,
there is no history of any juvenile or adult criminal behavior or charges " Social History at 14
Petitioner s Marriage & Family

National Guard Military Records
30 Petitioner was a private m the Army National Guard from 9 November 1959 to 4

35 At 19, petitioner served an LDS mission from 1960-62 in Flonda and Georgia

February 1961 The Social History reports that "[Petitioner's] time spen[t] in the National Guard is

Petitioner met his wife, Dianna Sayre, in Flonda, she was a convert to the church After his mission,

rather unremarkable as part of this social history " Social History at 13

petitioner returned to Florida Social History at 7

Mental Health Records & Psychological Test Results
31 Prior to 1984, petitioner had never received any form of mental health treatment or
psychological evaluation The only counseling petitioner received prior to 1984 was through
religious leaders in connection with his excommunication Social History at 14
32 The Social History also reports that "[petitioner] denies any family history of psychiatric

36 Petitioner and Dianna were mamed 5 July 1963 in the LDS Church's Manti, Utah
temple The couple ultimately settled in Highland, Utah Social History at 7
37 Petitioner and Dianna had seven children Their second child, Cindy, died shortly after
birth Social History at 7
38 Petitioner has stated, '"As the oldest of eight children and two quarrelsome parents

problems, although he admits that his father was quite overbearing and that there is considerable

mostly due to a short sighted, short tempered and self centered and extremely jealous earthly father,

resentment toward the father from several of his siblings " Social History at 15

albeit a good provider, I experienced that stress from a tot I solemnly committed that because of the

33 The Social History states "[a]rchival evidence indicates that almost a decade before the
"Removal" revelation, many members of [petitioner's] family were involved in a series of
organizations and activities that challenged the legitimacy of the Constitution on religious and

stressful experience I would raise the perfect family and felt that that was in progress '" Social
History at 7
39 "From 1963 until the early part of 1981, Ron and his family are described as being the

political grounds [Petitioner] and several other family members were intimately involved in protest

ideal citizens, exemplifying the 'Ideal Mormon Family '" Petitioner's yearly salary was between

actions and group meetings with others outside his family that shared most or all of his political and

$30,000-35,000, which was considered upper-middle class Social History at 7

religious views It is important to reemphasize this historical information, because it places
24

23

40 "[Petitioner] considered his wife to be the ideal mate " "This marital union was viewed

45 Shortly before Chnstmas, 1982, Petitioner wanted his brothers and their families to

as being an excellent one by most people who were familiar with it, up until early 1981 " Social

picket the home of a judge who had sentenced Dan to prison for using force to escape the highway

History at 8

patrol When their wives refused, the brothers spent Chnstmas with Dan, leaving their families

41 During petitioner's twenty-year marriage, "examples of [his] positive and productive

alone most of the day Social History at 8
Events Following Petitioner s Divorce

adjustment in the community include his having been a City Councilman in Highland, Utah and
serving as a counselor in three different Bishoprics for the LDS Church [Petitioner] described

46 After his divorce, petitioner lost interest in his employment and quit showing up for

himself as bung a 'good, outstanding citizen ' The records from this time period suggest the same "

work Petitioner also became more involved in pursuing his religious and political ideas and

Social History at 8

challenging the authonty of the LDS Church, which he blamed for the loss of his wife and children

42 1 he Social History reports that petitioner became physically abusive with his wife in late
1982 on two occasions Social History at 9
Petitioner s Employment
43 F rom age 21 to 41 petitioner worked in "heavy equipment operations, particularly as an
overhead crane operator " After age 41 petitioner devoted most of his time to his constitutional and
fundamental religious issues, and worked odd jobs that provided minimal income "[Petitioner's]
former employers have indicated that prior to 1981, he was a model employee and was skilled at
operating equipment as well as supervising and managing jobs " Social History at 12-13
Petitioner s Involvement With His Brothers
44 In early 1980 and throughout 1981, petitioner became "obsessively supportive of his

Social History at 10
47 In February of 1984 petitioner marned a nineteen-year-old girl named Rebecca in a
marriage ceremony he performed himself The marriage lasted only a few months Rebecca left
petitioner "because of lack of financial support and discontent relative to [petitioner's] preoccupation
with religious and Constitutional issues " Social History at 12
Petitioner s Involvement With The School Of The Prophets & His Revelations
48 The Social History details petitioner's introduction to and involvement in the School of
the Prophets Social History at 15-17
49 The Social History contains a "revelation" received around 9 March 1984 entitled, "A
vision given to Mosiah Hancock " Mosiah Hancock is understood to be petitioner Id at 18 The

brothers," and eventually involved himself in constitutional and fundamentalist religious issues

"revelation" explains petitioner's version of LDS theology regarding the pre-mortal existence and

Petitioner became rebellious towards the LDS Church and started to alienate himself from neighbors

the war in heaven Social History at 18 22

and family "His intense desire for autonomy caused him to become highly involved with

50 The Social History also contains a "revelation" dated 9 March 1984 explaining

jattled with Satan and "cast Satan down" during the war m heaven Petitioner was then given first

that he believed petitioner "felt a certain responsibility, being the oldest, to encourage us to follow

hoice of "the lone females" (those females who had followed Satan but had not been "cast down"

the path he felt was right, as he had been taught" Vol V at 120-22,133

vith him) and he chose Dianna, who had been Satan's mate However, Dianna was second to
)etitioner's first mate, Rebecca Social History at 22-23

56 Dan recounted several events that exemplified his father's extreme views on traditional
medicine and religion Dan recalled an incident when his sister, Colleen, suffered a ruptured

51 The Social History also includes the "removal revelation," and another "revelation"
eceived 18 March 1984 explaining that the Laffertys were to take over the "School of the Prophets "

appendix, but their father refused to get medical help until it was almost too late Vol V at 126-30
57 Dan also recalled an incident where he ran into a tree sledding and suffered "a hell of a

)an and Watson, Jr supported petitioner's claim to take over leadership of the School When the

head injury " Although the collision rendered Dan unconscious, his father determined that he did

ither members of the School voted against the idea, petitioner and his brothers left the School

not require medical attention Vol V at 127
58 Dan testified that his father was probably abusive "by society's definitions" and

>ocial History at 23-25

sometimes physically disciplined his children Vol V at 123

Petitioner s Fundamentalist Travels

59 Dan agreed that his father "had a fairly deep-seated disdain for the medical profession"

52 The Social History also details petitioner's travels as a "missionary" to other
undamentahst groups throughout the United States and Canada It also details petitioner's travels

and that many believe his father died because he refused medical treatment for his diabetes Vol V

nd some of the events leading up to the 24 July 1984 murders Social History at 26-27

at 128-29

Trial Counsel s Mitigation Case

60 Dan explained that his father was strict to see that his family attended church services

53 At trial, petitioner's counsel introduced the following evidence

and other church meetings Dan agreed that "the LDS church and activity in that organization was a

Childhood Issues Family Background (Including Physical Verbal & Emotional Abuse)
54 Mark Lafferty is one of petitioner's younger brothers Mark testified that petitioner
stuck up [for his brothers and sisters] like any good brother would" and described petitioner as "a
vonderful brother," a "mother hen-type" brother Vol II at 57-58, 85, 86

point of focus with [his] family " Vol V at 130-31
61 Dan testified that Watson physically abused Claudine on "a number of occasions " Vol
Vat 124-25
62 Dr Robert Howell is a psychologist who evaluated petitioner He testified that based

55 Dan Lafferty is another of petitioner's younger brothers and petitioner's co-defendant
)an agreed that, as the oldest sibling, petitioner took a "nurturing" role in the family, Dan explained

upon his interviews with petitioner's mother, family members, and others, he was "convinced that
[petitioner's] father was mentally ill," and that "[petitioner's] brother [presumably Dan] is mentally

28

27

11" Dr Howell also opined that petitioner's sister and possibly one other brother "ha[ve] a bipolar

affectionate He also recounted that after petitioner witnessed his father hit his mother, petitioner

hsorder " Vol VII at 49, 56-57

became so angry "that he wished he could have been big enough to have kicked his father's ass "

63 Dr Howell also stated that when he told petitioner he was going to testify that petitioner
uffered from a diminished mental capacity, petitioner said, "Well, I think that's true

That's

>ecause of how cruel my father was, and that's what I've been trying to free myself from " Vol VII

According to Dr Wooten, these violent events became a "model for [petitioner]

a pattern by

which he kind of handled difficult, mistrustful situations " Vol IX at 100
68 Dr Wooten also described that petitioner and Dan seem to have been "pitted almost
against each other, the mother being the advocate of [petitioner], and the father being more the

t74
64 Dr Jess Groesbeck is a psychiatrist who evaluated petitioner In providing background

advocate of Dan because of his having gone to chiropractic school " Vol IX at 99
Illnesses And Injuries

or his testimony regarding petitioner's mental health, Dr Groesbeck testified that he believed
[petitioner] came from a family in which there was a great deal of violence and emotional

69 Dr Hembecker testified that Diana recalled petitioner suffering a manic episode

[isturbance and dysfunction " Dr Groesbeck testified that petitioner's father was violent and "had a

sometime in 1980 or 1981 Vol VII at 13 Drs Howell and Groesbeck also testified regarding the

reat problem in having anyone do better than him in the family " Dr Groesbeck believed that

same manic episode, explaining that it was purported to have lasted forty-five days Vol VII at 73,

from early life, [petitioner] had a feeling of competition with his father " Vol VII at 160,168-169

116-17,219

65 Dr Groesbeck also explained that petitioner "came into the position of kind of being the
•avior for the family and the problems " Vol VII at 169
66 Dr Richard Wooten was a psychologist who evaluated petitioner and testified for the

70 On cross-examination by defense counsel, Dr Wooten discussed petitioner's episode
He testified that he had spoken with Diana less than a month before trial, and that she had described
the episode as lasting' several days " Dr Wooten explained that some people who have talked with

>tate On cross-examination by defense counsel, Dr Wooten disagreed that petitioner's change in

Diana believe that she originally said the episode lasted "four to five days," and the forty-five day

ehgious and personal views began around 1982 Rather, Dr Wooten believed that petitioner's

figure was a misinterpretation of her account Vol IX at 93-94

jnger and negative views of women and marital relationships could be traced to his childhood

71 Dr Howell testified that petitioner had been hospitalized for kidney stones On cross-

xpenences where petitioner "observed a lot of violence even within his own primary home " Vol

examination by the State, Dr Howell explained that petitioner had suffered a toxic reaction to a

X at 99-100

painkiller during his hospitalization and that this reaction was evidence of a manic disorder Vol

67 Dr Wooten recounted specific violent events that petitioner experienced, including

VII at 73, 115-17

80 In 1992, Dr Hembecker believed petitioner was psychotic but hiding it well He

72 Dr Groesbeck also testified regarding petitioner's hospitalization for kidney stones He
explained that petitioner had suffered intense pain in the hospital, eventually became catatonic, and

believed petitioner was competent m 1994 and that medication had an effect on petitioner's

was "in a very depressed state at that time " Vol VII at 170

competency Vol VII at 11-12
81 Dr Hembecker also believed that petitioner's "judgment was impaired" on 24 July 1984

Educational Records
73 Mark Lafferty testified that petitioner was a "great wrestler" and did well in school Vol

and he would have diagnosed petitioner with "manic depressive illness" in 1984 Vol VII at 13
82 Dr Hembecker opined that petitioner was suffering from "schizo-affective disorder

II at 86
74 Dan Lafferty agreed that petitioner was a good student in high school and a good athlete

bipolar type" at the time of trial Vol VII at 14
83 He related that petitioner has delusional ideas, including believing in "travelers," "being

Vol Vat 133
75 Mac Carter, one of petitioner's childhood friends, recalled that petitioner played football

assaulted in his cell by evil spirits," seeing "some of his relatives from his earlier life," and hearing
"buzzing sounds

in high school Vol VI at 172

84 Defense counsel presented Dr Robert Howell's testimony regarding his various

76 Lynn Jacobsen, another of petitioner's childhood friends, characterized petitioner as a
"good student," "a 'B' student" He also recalled that petitioner played football, "excelled in

psychological evaluations of petitioner Vol VII at 48-74

wresting," was the wrestling team captain, and a popular student Vol VI at 182
Mental Health Records & Psychological Test Results

85 Although Dr Howell was ashamed to admit it, he acknowledged that he found petitioner
was not suffering from a mental illness m 1984 Vol VII at 52
86 When he evaluated petitioner following the hanging, it became obvious that petitioner

11 Defense counsel presented Dr Peter Heinbecker's testimony regarding his various
psychological evaluations of petitioner Dr Hembecker is a psychiatrist Vol VII at 5-48
78 Dr Hembecker found that petitioner did not have a mental illness and was competent to

when the evil spirits are around " Vol VII at 15-17

had a mental illness, specifically a delusional disorder that pre-dated the hanging incident Vol VII
at 53-54
87 Dr Howell explained that petitioner's delusions involve Satan, Lucifer, Beelzebub,

stand trial in 1984 Vol VII at 7-8
79 He found petitioner to be incompetent after the suicide attempt "because he had damaged
his ability to think and to remember " Vol VII at 9

Moroni, and Mormon, that petitioner sometimes believes Christ is talking to him, and that petitioner
hears a buzzing sound when spirits talk to him Vol VII at 55-56
88 Petitioner's neuro-psychological tests after the hanging showed that he suffered from
brain damage and a thinking disorder Vol VII at 58
32

31

94 Defense counsel also presented Dr C Jess Groesbeck's testimony regarding his various

89 While petitioner was in prison, petitioner's delusions included believing that Satan
possessed the body of a fellow inmate, causing the inmate's water and electricity to quit working

psychological evaluations of petitioner Vol VII at 159-91
95 When he first evaluated petitioner in 1984, Dr Groesbeck believed that petitioner was

Petitioner also believed that prison officials placed this inmate next to petitioner because they
realized that petitioner had spiritual powers, and from then on this inmate's water and electricity

incompetent to stand trial and suffered from a delusional disorder and a bipolar or manic depressive

worked fine Petitioner could also read this inmate's mind Petitioner also believed that he saw

affective disorder Dr Groesbeck found petitioner to be competent after a second 1984 examination

Satan masturbating in prison Vol VII at 58-59

However, Dr Groesbeck later concluded that this competency finding was incorrect Vol VII at

90 Dr Howell believed that petitioner's delusional characteristics had deteriorated but also

163, 165
96 Petitioner developed the symptoms of bipolar or manic depressive disorder beginning in

crystallized over time For example, petitioner began talking about Lucifer, "then it became Lucifer,
Satan and Beezelbub " "[Petitioner also] talked about travelers, how they could travel to another

1980 up through 1983 when the divorce occurred He would have highs and lows, "[h]e would go

body, and to the host body " Vol VII at 61-62

into mountaintops and pray for two days One time he was found by his wife in the garage in a fetal

91 Dr Howell believed that petitioner "was mentally ill at least a year prior to [24 July

position, doubled up in a catatonic, depressed state " Vol VII at 171
97 One example of petitioner's delusional thinking is when he claimed to have had a

1984]," that petitioner was mentally ill on 24 July 1984, and that petitioner "continues to be mentally
ill today " He also believed that although petitioner could form the intent to kill on 24 July 1984,

revelation, drawing on LDS theology, in which he substituted himself for Christ during the war m

petitioner's capacity to recognize the wrongfulness of his actions was diminished and remains

heaven, and also characterized Diana as Satan's wife Vol VII at 177

diminished Dr Howell agreed that mental illness impaired petitioner's judgment and ability to
conform his actions to the law at the time of the murders Vol VII at 68-69
92 Dr Howell testified that petitioner was mentally ill at the time of trial, suffering from
"[s]chizo-affective disorder of the bipolar type" Vol VII at 54, 70
93 He opined that petitioner did not have a personality disorder, rather, petitioner's

98 Dr Groesbeck testified that petitioner was mentally ill in July of 1984, but he did not
believe that petitioner's mental illness prevented him from understanding his actions Vol VII at
186
99 Dr Groesbeck agreed that petitioner's mental illness created a belief that he had a moral
duty as a prophet to carry out God's will and that his victims stood in the way Vol VII at 186

personality prior to his mental illness was well-established as being kind, tender, and considerate

100 Dr Groesbeck opined that petitioner suffered from "a schizo-affective disorder

Dr Howell also opined that "there is absolutely no evidence of malingering in [petitioner] " Vol

along with the manic depressive bipolar condition" at the time of trial He also diagnosed petitioner

nemory He believed that petitioner had "thought disorganization" and hallucinations including

because petitioner was "rather talkative, had pressured speech, garrulous" and "very grandiose "

tearing an "electrical buzzing " He also cited petitioner's homosexual fears as evidence of his

Vol VIII at 8-9, 10-11

lelusional thinking Dr Groesbeck concluded that petitioner's homosexual image of Moroni from
J3S theology "is really a tragic, alternate self-image of

how [petitioner] sees himself today "

/o\ VII at 167-68, 188-89, 190

106 In 1992, Dr Washburn believed that petitioner suffered from a severe mental disorder
with an affective component Dr Washburn was "leaning more toward a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder bi-polar type " He explained that petitioner was sent to the State Hospital for

101 On cross-examination by the State, Dr Groesbeck testified that petitioner's psychotic
eaction to medication while he was m the hospital for a kidney stone in 1979 was evidence that

treatment to restore his competency Vol VIII at 14
107 Dr Washburn "has never felt that [petitioner] malingers or has malingered " He

etitioner was becoming mentally ill On redirect, Dr Groesbeck explained that this conclusion was

believed that petitioner's suicide attempt was the product of a psychotic depressive episode, rather

ased on information from petitioner's ex-wife, Diana, that petitioner's depression remained for

than malingering Vol VIII at 17-18
108 Dr Washburn viewed petitioner's beliefs about traveling spirits as evidence of his

orty five days Vol VII at 198-200, 219
102 Also on cross-examination by the State, Dr Groesbeck testified that he believed
etitioner was genuinely trying to dnve away evil spirits by shouting "Fuck you" in court Vol VII

delusional thinking and schizo affective disorder Petitioner's description of a robot-like person that
approached him in his cell was consistent with a hallucination, and petitioner's belief that he could
use protector shields to protect himself from the travelers was evidence of his delusional system

1211
103 On redirect, Dr Groesbeck testified that petitioner also attempts to repel evil spirits in
le courtroom by writing notes Dr Groesbeck explained that petitioner's notes are "saturated with

Vol VIII at 22-23, 25
109 In Dr Washburn's opinion, petitioner suffered from a major schizo-affective disorder at

omosexual innuendoes and statements" and fit the pattern of his delusional, paranoid thinking,

the time of the crime Vol VIII at 29 Although petitioner was capable of forming an intent to kill,

;ehng, and responses Vol VII at 221-22

that intent was "a direct product of the delusion of mental illness " Vol VIII at 29

104 Defense counsel also presented the testimony of Dr Phillip Washburn, a psychiatrist,
•gardinghis various evaluations of petitioner Vol VIII at 5-65
105 Dr Washburn believed that petitioner suffered from a paranoid delusional disorder in
984 He also believed that petitioner's disorder had an affective, or mood disorder component,

110 Dr Washburn believed that petitioner still suffered from a schizo-affective disorder at
trial He did not believe that petitioner suffered from a personality disorder because personality
disorders have their onset in late adolescence or early adulthood and during this time in petitioner's
life, petitioner "did really quite well as a young person He did well in school

/as nearly around 40 years of age " Vol VIII at 30, 33
National Guard Military Records

[and his

36

35

DS] mission " According to Dr Washburn, petitioner's "major problems did not occur until he

sports

116 The trial court admitted the "removal revelation" as State's Exhibit 44 and both parties
referred to it often throughout trial See, e g, Vol I 127, Vol II 13-14,16, 25, 29, 50, 59, 64, 77,
Vol VI at 33, 63, 100, 103
Petitioner s Character

111 Petitioner's trial counsel did not introduce any evidence of petitioner's military service

117 Petitioner's brother Mark described petitioner as a "good family man" who was "very

ee Record, generally
Items From Petitioner s Journal
112 Through Dr Robert Howell, defense counsel introduced a copy of petitioner's journal

much" involved in the lives of his children Vol II at 88, 89
118 Mark also testified that petitioner was very active in the LDS Church and had served in

lat began 12 April 1983 and continued to November, 1983 The trial court received that volume of

three bishoprics He related that petitioner had served on the Highland, Utah City Council and took

etitioner's journal as Defense Exhibit 92 Vol VII at 63-64

great pride in having built his own home Vol II at 89-90

113 All of petitioner's journal entries referenced in the Social History come from this
olume of petitioner's journal Compare Vol VII at 63-64 with Social History at 9-12
114 Dr Groesbeck testified to some of the statements of petitioner's journal Dr
rroesbeck stated that after Diana filed for divorce, petitioner wrote "Devastating feeling Rough
lght Called Dianna to tell her I love her " Petitioner also wrote "I love Dianna and my kids
early She hurts so much This hurts me Unable to rest" Vol VII at 171-72
115 Petitioner's counsel introduced, and the trial court received as Defense Exhibit 93, the
Mosiah Hancock revelation" describing petitioner's version of LDS theology regarding the prelortal existence and the war in heaven The exhibit also including the "revelation" dated 9 March

119 Mark agreed that prior to the early 1980's, petitioner had been "a good brother, a good
son, a good father, a good family man, active in his church and community, and by all definitions
completely mainstream and right down the line " Vol II at 91
120 Richard Stowe testified that he and petitioner had attended the same LDS ward in
Highland Utah for approximately 10 years Vol V at 12
121 Stowe agreed that prior to 1983, petitioner "was an active, solid member of the
community" and a "fine neighbor " Vol V at 12
122 Stowe explained that petitioner worked with the scouting program in the ward and got
along "very well" with the youth In Stowe's mind, petitioner was "well respected " Vol V at 12

984 which added further details to the "Mosiah Hancock revelation" and described Dianna as

123 Stowe testified that petitioner served on the Highland City counsel Vol V at 13

ucifer's mate and Rebecca as petitioner's first mate Vol VI at 27-29, Vol VII at 64-66

124 Stowe agreed that petitioner "was pretty much mainstream until approximately 1983 "
Vol Vat 13

133 Oakland's and petitioner's families would socialize on occasion when they both lived

125 Stowe believed that a change occurred in petitioner during the early 1980's Stowe
testified that petitioner "was somewhat of an eccentric, but I liked [him] as an individual I trusted

m Colorado Springs in connection with a construction job Vol VI at 160-61
134 Oakland testified that petitioner served m the bishopric of a Colorado Springs LDS

him But things did become very entangled as he started to reach out for what he referred to as a

ward during that time Vol VI at 162

search for truth " Vol V at 18-19

135 After Oakland and petitioner returned to Salt Lake, petitioner continued to work for the

126 Stowe was one of the four individuals named in the "removal revelation " Vol II page

company and received "good reports " Vol VI at 162

15

136 During their association, Oakland did not notice anything that led him "to believe

127 Low testified that her family moved into their home approximately the same time that

[petitioner] was anything other than a normal, mainstream type of individual " Vol VI at 163

petitioner and his family moved m Vol V at 48

137 Dr Lynn Scoresby served an LDS mission with petitioner in Albany, Georgia At the

128 Petitioner served as a counselor to Low's husband in the LDS ward bishopric
Petitioner was "very diligent" m fulfilling his responsibilities Vol V at 48, 64, 66
129 Low agreed that petitioner had been a good father and a "very, very helpful" neighbor

time of trial, Dr Scoresby was a psychologist Dr Scoresby explained that petitioner "was very
personable, well-liked, a very friendly individual, liked by his peers, [and] by the people who knew

She had a great respect for petitioner and even viewed him as "a pillar of the church in that

him" in the mission field He also remembered petitioner to be "a very successful" missionary Vol

community" prior to 1982 Vol V at 65-66, 69, 71

VI at 165-67
138 Both petitioner and Dr Scoresby settled in Highland, Utah and ran into each other

130 Low agreed that a negative change occurred in petitioner's life, "he had a change in his
religious views, he had a change in his political views, and he became even more domineering in his

occasionally after their missions Dr Scoresby remembered that petitioner was still "very friendly"

home " Vol V at 67-68

and outgoing Vol VI at 167
139 Mac Carter was one of petitioner's childhood friends He and petitioner "did a lot of

131 Low was also one of the four individuals named in the "removal revelation " Vol II

things together" including hunting, fishing, camping, and attending school and church Vol VI at

page 15
132 Randy Oakland worked with petitioner at Oakland Construction Oakland remembered

171
140 Petitioner and Carter associated occasionally after their LDS missions Carter agreed

petitioner to be "an excellent worker [Petitioner] worked as a crane operator and as equipment
operator for us, and was very dependable the whole time he was there " Vol VI at 159-160

that petitioner was "pretty much just mainstream, a normal-type person" during this time Vol VI at
173
40

39

141 Carter noticed a change in petitioner when he visited with petitioner several months
prior to 24 July 1984 Carter explained that petitioner expressed concerns about the church and the
Constitution, had grown his hair long, and was unshaven Vol VI at 174-76
142 Lynn Jacobsen was petitioner's "best" childhood friend Jacobsen and petitioner
attended church, elementary school, and junior high school together They also corresponded while
serving LDS missions and saw each other occasionally when they returned from their missions Vol
VI at 180-83

the community was developing, and he represented the views of many of the citizens " Vol VI at
190
149 In describing petitioner's service on the city council, LeBaron explained that petitioner
"was always interested He did his work well He was conscientious

150 LeBaron explained that although petitioner held to his own views, he was willing to
listen to others and "would consider other viewpoints " Vol VI at 191

143 Jacobsen did not notice anything unusual or out of the ordinary with petitioner's
religious views Vol VI at 183

151 During their association, LeBaron viewed petitioner as a "very normal person " Vol
VI at 192 93

144 Jacobsen also believed that petitioner "had a very good and very close marriage " Vol
VI at 183

152 Kevin Branch was petitioner's home teaching companion in an LDS ward in Highland,
Utah Vol VI at 197

145 Jacobsen became concerned about petitioner around 1983 when petitioner began to take

153 Branch immediately liked petitioner when the two first met Branch ' was very

"a lot of issues with religious behe[f]s, that he had espoused previously " Petitioner also went from

impressed with [petitioner]

being "a clean-cut guy" to wearing a beard Jacobsen agreed that petitioner had previously been

a joy to be around him " Vol VI at 197-98

"basically a pretty normal individual " Vol VI at 184 86
146 Donald LeBaron had been the mayor of Highland, Utah and had served on the Highland
City Council with petitioner He and petitioner were friends prior to their public service together
Vol VI at 188-89
147

He was a good

councilman " Vol VI at 191

154 Branch described petitioner as an "excellent" neighbor Vol VI at 198
155 Branch found petitioner to be "very much what we might say a mainstream member of
the church, very actively involved in what we were doing " Vol VI at 198
156 In July of 1982, Branch noticed that petitioner was particularly impressed with a

LeBaron agreed that petitioner was "a strong family man " Vol VI at 190

148 LeBaron chose petitioner to serve on the city council because "[petitioner] was
regarded as a leader in the community

[Petitioner] was just a very likable, friendly, outgoing person It was

[LeBaron] knew [petitioner] was concerned about the way

priesthood lesson on the Constitution and thereafter "show[ed] increased devotion to temple
attendance, [and] other kinds of things m the church that typically reflectQ devotion [and]
dedication" Vol VI at 198-99

163 The State played an excerpt from a videotape of petitioner's news conference held m

157 When Branch met with petitioner m the summer of 1983, Branch "became aware that
here had been some major changes in [petitioner's] thinking particularly, and to some extent m his

September of 1984 in American Fork, Utah The excerpt demonstrated how "the [petitioner] acts
when he is given an opportunity to show remorse about what has happened " Penalty Phase

ersonality " Vol VI at 200

Transcript Volume I ("Pen Vol I") at 18, 26

Dan s Influence On Petitioner

164 The State also played excerpts from the crime scene videotape showing some of the

158 Mark Lafferty testified that, in approximately 1982, petitioner started visiting with Dan
D persuade him to disavow his anti-government beliefs However, these conversations resulted m

areas of the apartment that the jury did not originally see, and specifically showing "how Erica

etitioner becoming "less mainstream" and adopting some of Dan's philosophies Vol II at 96-99

Lafferty was found lying in her crib that day " Pen Vol I at 18-19,29
Trial Counsel s Penalty Phase Case

159 Dan Lafferty testified that when petitioner came to "straighten out" Dan and his other

165 In opening statement to the jury at penalty phase, trial counsel explained that "[m]ost of

rothers regarding their extreme religious and political views, petitioner "wasn't there too awfully
ang before he said, 'What you guys are doing is right, and everyone else is wrong '" Vol V at 166-

our mitigation evidence has already been presented during the other portion of the trial " Counsel

8

continued, "[w]hen we chose to present to you evidence of mental illness and so forth, we
160 Dr Groesbeck testified that petitioner's role as a savior for his family drew him into

amily problems involving Dan and his other brothers Dr Groesbeck opined that "instead of

necessarily had to show instances in [petitioner's] life that contributed to that So you already know
a good deal more about [petitioner] than a jury sitting in any other kind of case would have "

5scuing and solving the problem, the problems increased because [petitioner] became more allied

Counsel further explained that "[w]e intend to draw from that and from your exposure to those other

/ith Dan And Dan's unusual beliefs

witnesses as we argue the case toward the end " Penalty Phase Transcript Volume I ("Pen Vol I")

began to convince [petitioner] that that was the way to go "

at 21

rol VII at 170

Utah County Jail Records

161 On cross-examination by defense counsel, Dr Wooten explained that petitioner's
octnnal extremes "really erupted" and became "most evident" after petitioner began meeting with

166 At the penalty phase, defense counsel introduced evidence of petitioner's conduct while
incarcerated in the Utah County Jail Pen Vol I at 30-45

)an and his other brothers Vol IX at 103-04

167 Petitioner had a total of four disciplinary proceedings during his two years in the Utah

The State s Penalty Phase Case
162 The State presented the following evidence at the penalty phase

County Jail The disciplinary proceedings involved minor infractions, specifically, 1) swatting a
female officer on the rear end with a rolled up piece of paper, 2) making an alcoholic beverage, 3)
44

43

efusing to wear an inmate armband—the jail's armband policy was eventually discontinued, and 4)

Other Penalty Phase Evidence

ising foul and abusive language The jailer who testified about petitioner's disciplinary proceedings

172 Also at the penalty phase, counsel called an official from the Board of Pardons to

greed that four proceedings in two years was "not very many" for an inmate Pen Vol I at 33, 35-

explain the factors that determine whether an inmate will be paroled, and the Warden of the Utah

7,39

State Prison, to describe the security levels and conditions of confinement at the prison Pen Vol I
168 Defense counsel also called Lieutenant Jay Colledge at the penalty phase Lt Colledge

vas in charge of day-to-day operations and inmate care at the Utah County Jail He testified that

at 45-75
173 Petitioner's counsel also introduced one of petitioner's family photo albums,

etitioner's stay at the jail had been "remarkably uneventful" and that petitioner had not posed any

petitioner's high school yearbook photo, and, although not petitioner's actual high school yearbook,

ecurity concerns or any risk to other inmates or staff Pen Vol I at 40-41

a copy of that yearbook with tabs indicating the pages on which petitioner was mentioned Pen Vol

169 Defense counsel also called Deputy Danny Nez at the penalty phase Deputy Nez was

I at 30, 75-78
Counsel s Penalty Phase Argument

he recreation coordinator at the Utah County Jail during petitioner's incarceration there He played
asketball and a lot of scrabble games with petitioner He described petitioner as "very
ooperative," "very courteous," and "compliant" He also explained that petitioner was "one of the
etter inmates that [he] associate[d] with because [petitioner] never gave [him] any problems Pen

175 No criminal history. Petitioner had no prior criminal convictions, or even arrests
Pen Vol II at 22

'ol I at 42-45

176 Petitioner acted under duress and Dan's domination. Counsel argued that petitioner

Utah Department of Corrections Records
170 At the penalty phase, defense counsel introduced information from petitioner's Utah
tate Prison file The information included "chronological notes, and
petitioner's] daily routine

174 Trial counsel argued the following evidence in mitigation of petitioner's punishment
during the closing argument at the penalty phase

information as to

sometimes daily, sometimes weekly, notes made by staff at the Utah

tate Prison" Pen Vol I at 77-78
171 Defense counsel also introduced monthly reports of petitioner's performance on
ssigned jobs during his incarceration in the Utah State Prison as exhibits at the penalty phase Pen

acted under duress, and the domination of his brother Dan Counsel reminded the jury of the
substantial evidence they had heard dunng the guilt phase detailing petitioner's life prior to the early
1980's Counsel highlighted evidence that petitioner was a good student and friend, was on the
football team and captain of the wrestling team at Payson High School, served an honorable LDS
mission, was married in the LDS temple, raised six children, was a hard worker, served in the LDS
Church in three bishoprics, was a scout leader, was a good and helpful neighbor, served as a

177 Counsel then argued that something happened to change petitioner, specifically, "Dan
happened, mental illness happened, a combination of factors happened all at once " Counsel
reminded the jury that "[ejvery male member of this family has the same preoccupation with defying
government, with extreme religious views" and that this ideolody "was a family commitment"
Counsel argued that "Dan took it the furthest" Pen Vol II at 24
178 Counsel reminding the jury of Dan's testimony, and what counsel characterized as

did not receive the death penalty and argued that it would be unfair to punish petitioner more
severely than Dan because Dan actually did the killing Pen Vol II at 27-28
181 Petitioner's mental illness. Counsel argued that mental illness impaired petitioner's
capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and conform his conduct to the law Counsel
argued that if petitioner was mentally ill at the time of the murders, then he was not completely
responsible and should not be executed Counsel also argued that if petitioner was mentally ill at

Dan's "magnetism," "quiet menace," and "menacing lunacy " Counsel also emphasized the

trial, then he could not understand why he was being punished, and should not be executed Pen

evidence of Dan's total control over his wife and children, including controlling what his wife wore

Vol II at 28-31

and preventing his children from talking to other children Counsel then argued that "[petitioner] was
influenced by Dan, and that[,] coupled with the emotional disturbances that were at play in his life

182 As evidence of petitioner's mental illness, counsel asked the jury to consider
petitioner's detachment and failure to pay attention during trial Counsel argued that petitioner's

[petitioner's loss of his family, his wife, and his church], was more than he could fight" Although

"mental illness prevents him from appreciating the magnitude of the decision you will make or the

petitioner "made choices that resulted in those losses

potential of his own death " Pen Vol II at 29 30

influenced by Dan Lafferty "

those choices were engineered and

Pen Vol II at 25-27

179 Counsel summarized that "[petitioner] acted under the domination of Dan Lafferty and

183 Counsel also referred the jury to the lengthy expert testimony from all of petitioner's
evaluators and argued that they all either diagnosed petitioner with a mental illness or personality

under the duress of the situation that he himself was involved in, the emotional influence of his

disorder Counsel then argued that "[w]hether it's a mental illness or personality disorder, it's

failed marriage, loss of his family, loss of his church" Pen Vol II at 25-27

impairment for purposes of this hearing and for purposes of mitigation" Pen Vol II at 30

180 Petitioner was an accomplice to Dan's murders Counsel next counsel argued that

184 Petitioner's dysfunctional family. Counsel argued that petitioner "came from and

petitioner "was an accomplice in the homicides committed by another person, and his participation

was influenced by a dysfunctional family " Counsel reminded the jury that "[petitioner's] father was

was relatively minor " Counsel claimed that based on Dan's testimony, petitioner only beat Brenda

strict, abusive and extreme" and that even Dan characterized "his own father as extreme " Counsel

and actually wanted to leave her apartment before the killing Counsel emphasized that although

emphasized that petitioner's father "had extreme religious views, extreme nutritional views, [and

petitioner's knife was the murder weapon, "Dan cut two throats " Counsel claimed that while

extreme] medical views," and that he dominated his submissive wife Counsel also reminded the

petitioner acted out of anger, Dan acted out of religious fanaticism She reminded the jury that Dan

jury that petitioner's father once became so angry that he beat the family dog to death with a baseball
48

47

bat, and that he also refused to seek medical attention for petitioner's sister when her appendix burst

earth[?] [Petitioner] is the product of a dysfunctional family, and abusive father, and that's a

Counsel argued that the family's dysfunction was exacerbated because petitioner's mother "was

mitigation factor " Pen Vol II at 35

passive and indulgent [and] taught her sons, her special sons, that they were the six mighty and
strong" Pen Vol II at 31-33
185 Counsel observed that "all of the male members of [petitioner's] family" had extreme

188 Petitioner's remorse. Counsel also argued that petitioner had demonstrated remorse
for the murders She asserted that petitioner demonstrated remorse when he stated during the news
conference video that he "felt compassion for [his brother] Allen " She also asserted that petitioner

beliefs regarding government and religion "They all joined the School of the Prophets They

expressed remorse to Dr Howell at the State Hospital, and that his suicide attempt also demonstrated

essentially all put their families second to their brothers and their own particular brand of

remorse Finally, counsel related that she and petitioner had "sat in an interview room on more than

God

one occasion and cried over the needless losses in this case, over the losses of Brenda and Erica,

They refused driver's licenses, registration, payment of taxes They all sought a self-

sufficient lifestyle, and all centered their lives around religion This all began with Watson and
Claudme Lafferty, a father who was strict, unbending and extreme " Pen Vol II at 32-33
186 Counsel argued that petitioner broke away for a while from his family's extreme

over the losses of [petitioner] himself " Pen Vol II at 35-37,45
189 Petitioner's behavior while incarcerated. Counsel urged the jury to consider
petitioner's good behavior while incarcerated at the Utah County Jail and the Utah State Pnson

stances on the government and religion, "[b]ut the pull of that family influence was too strong "

Counsel argued that petitioner "does not pose a risk to the safety of staff members or to other

Pen Vol II at 32

inmates or to himself" Pen Vol II at 37-41

187 Counsel summarized "[petitioner] is the product of a dysfunctional family, the product

190 Dan, not petitioner, was the killer. As a final mitigation factor, counsel argued that

of an abusive father and an overly indulgent mother, the product of Dan Lafferty's psychopathic

"[petitioner] killed no one by his own hand, [but] Dan admitted to killing two people, and he's

thinking, the product of [petitioner's] own mental illness You cannot separate the mental illness

serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole " Counsel argued "that fairness dictates that

from [petitioner] " Counsel argued that petitioner did not choose to be abused, or become mentally

[petitioner] should not die for what Dan Lafferty did " Counsel reasoned that if they jury felt

ill Counsel then argued, "[i]s it then appropriate to punish with death the abused child, the

compelled to punish petitioner more severely than Dan, it could impose a sentence of life without the

controlled and manipulated man, the deserted husband, the excommunicated missionary, the man

possibility of parole Pen Vol II at 42

who believes travelers inhabit the bodies of weak and willing hosts, the man who believes he has a
reflector shield to repel evil influences, the man who believes he has the capability to destroy [] the

191 Death was not the appropriate penalty. In arguing the second, or "appropriateness"
prong of the Wood standard, counsel argued that death was not the appropriate penalty given

Dehavior while incarcerated Counsel also asked the jury to consider whether, based on their

jury Proffering marginal, largely cumulative additional mitigation evidence is insufficient to

onscience and value system, death was the appropriate penalty Counsel also argued that the jurors

demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel Cf Castro v Ward, 138 F 3d 810, 828-29 (10th Cir)

hemselves would have to accept responsibility for petitioner's death if they imposed the death

(proffered post conviction evidence from a different mental health expert, although more detailed

>enalty Counsel argued "[d]on't assume you can distance yourself from the act if you make the

and adding an organic brain damage diagnosis not previously provided, was insufficient to

lecision" Pen Vol II at 43-48

demonstrate a due process violation where the additional evidence was not different "in kind" from

192 In closing, counsel related her experience of waiting outside the prison the night

that which the sentencing jury heard), cert denied, 525 U S 971 (1998) Consequently, the State is

Vilham Andrews was executed She described two groups of people, one which "was silent and

entitled to summary judgment on this claim

tunned" when Andrews' death was announced, and another which "cheered, applauded and

VIII. PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO COUNSEL'S QUALIFICATIONS FAILS
AS A MATTER OF LAW (claims 25 and 29)

elebrated " She closed her argument with a plea to "vote for the humane preservation of life, rather
Petitioner complains that his trial and appellate counsel did not meet the qualifications
han the celebration of death " Pen Vol II at 48-49
established in Utah R Cnm P 8 and by the American Bar Association Guidelines for representing
B Argument
capital defendants

8

Petitioner had a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during

Petitioner cannot demonstrate that his counsel overlooked any relevant mitigating evidence
the criminal proceedings Petitioner had no constitutional right to counsel who met certain
dl of the evidence that petitioner now proffers in his Social History, with the exception of
qualifications

9

etitioner's National Guard records, was presented to the jury and argued as mitigating evidence at
The claims fail as a matter of law, and the Court should grant summary judgment in the
le penalty phase Moreover, petitioner's National Guard records were inconsequential Even
State's favor
etitioner's current mitigation specialist admits that petitioner's "time spen[t] in the National Guard
> rather unremarkable as part of this social history " Social History at 13 Therefore, petitioner
annot demonstrate that his counsel ineffectively investigated or presented mitigating evidence
ecause his counsel presented and argued all of the mitigating evidence that petitioner now proffers
ee Strickland v Washington, 466 U S at 668, 695
Even if petitioner's Social History contained some additional mitigation evidence, that

8
Petitioner makes the allegation on "information and belief" In this proceeding, Utah R
Civ P 65C requires petitioner to plead all the facts supporting his claim Utah R Civ P 8 notice
pleading does not apply, and vague references to "information and belief will not suffice
9
Utah R Cnm P 8(f) specifically disavows that the failure to comply with the rule's
qualification provisions supports a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel

dditional evidence is not materially distinguishable from the evidence that was presented to the
52
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X.

THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO
OBJECT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT (claim 26)

X.

PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO APPELLATE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO
RAISE THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S VENUE CHANGE MOTION
FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH THE COURT MAY GRANT
RELIEF (claim 27)

Petitioner complains that his counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's closing argument
Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel performed deficiently for failing to seek reversal
eference to killing a fifteen-month-old girl, which resulted in the supreme court reviewing the claim
based on the denial of petitioner's pre-trial venue change motion For support, petitioner relies on
inly for plain error
allegations about pre trial publicity
In order to succeed on a preserved prosecutorial misconduct claim, appellate counsel would
In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, petitioner must
ave had to convince the Utah Supreme Court that 1) the prosecutor called to the jury's attention
prove that appellate counsel overlooked a "dead-bang" winning argument Carter v Galetka, 2001
natters that it should not consider in reaching a verdict, and 2) absent the prosecutor's improper
UT 96,148, 44 P 3d 626 That is, petitioner must prove that his appellate counsel overlooked a
tatements, there would exist a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result See State v
claim that was obvious from the record, and that probably would have resulted in reversal Id
afferty, 2001 UT 191186-87, 20 P 3d 342, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001) To succeed on the
After trial, the only relevant inquiry remaining on a denied venue change motion was
npreserved claim, petitioner also had to convince the supreme court that the prosecutor's comments
whether petitioner was denied his right to a constitutionally impartial jury State v Widdison, 2001
/ere obviously improper See e g State v Kell, 2002 UT 106132, 61 P 3d 1019
UT 60 H37-39, 28 P 3d 1278 (refusing to reverse for the denial of a venue change where Widdison
Although the supreme court noted that petitioner's trial counsel failed to preserve the claim,
failed to prove that any juror was biased) Petitioner has not alleged that any juror was biased, let
refused to reverse because it found neither error nor prejudice the two elements petitioner would
alone pleaded facts demonstrating that a biased jury convicted and sentenced him Therefore,
ave had to satisfy even on a preserved claim State v Lafferty, 2001 UT 19 at 1186-87, 89-93
petitioner alleges no facts demonstrating that his appellate counsel overlooked a dead-bang winner,
rial counsel's failure to preserve the claim did not affect the appellate outcome, therefore,
and the Court should dismiss the claim
etitioner's claim fails as a matter of law See e g Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668, 695
XI.
onstitutionally deficient performance undermines confidence in the outcome of his trial), Carter v

PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT APPELLATE COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE
SOUGHT REVERSAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DENIED HIS
REQUEST TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF DAN LAFFERTY'S
SENTENCE FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW (claim 28)

raletka, 2001 UT 96,148,44 P 3d 626 (to prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel a post-

A Additional Material, Undisputed Facts

onviction petitioner must prove, in part, that the overlooked claim probably would have resulted in

1 Petitioner's counsel called Dan Lafferty as a witness during petitioner's case-in-chief

1984) (to prove ineffective assistance of counsel petitioner must prove, in part, that any

life sentence Vol V at 120-21 He also testified that he killed both Brenda and Erica by slitting

mitigation of petitioner's sentence, all without objection Therefore, the claim fails as a matter of

their throats Vol VI at 81-83

law, and the Court should grant summary judgment in the State's favor "

2 At the penalty phase, petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner was merely an accomplice

XII.

to murders that Dan committed Counsel reminded the jury that Dan had been convicted of

COUNSEL'S INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH THE ABA GUIDELINES IN
THIS PROCEEDING DEMONSTRATES NO DEFECT IN PETITIONER'S
CONVICTION OR DEATH SENTENCE; CONSEQUENTLY, THE CLAIM
FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW (claim 31)

murdering Brenda and Erica, had testified in petitioner's case that he had done the actual killing, and
Petitioner claims that his counsel cannot comply with the American Bar Association
had received only a life sentence Counsel then reasoned that it would be unfair to punish petitioner
Guidelines m this post-conviction case He asserts that his counsel has had a limited time to
more severely than Dan Pen Vol II at 27-28
investigate this twenty-year-old case, that the "paper trail" is almost complete, but is still "missing
3 Petitioner's counsel later argued that "[petitioner] killed no one by his own hand, [but]
some small areas for a complete record," and that the limited funding required his counsel to make
Dan admitted to killing two people, and he's serving a life sentence with the possibility of parole "
choices about what to investigate
Counsel contended "that fairness dictates that [petitioner] should not die for what Dan Lafferty did "
The PCRA permits relief from a criminal conviction or sentence based on specified defects in
Counsel reasoned that if they jury felt compelled to punish petitioner more severely than Dan, it
either UTAH CODE ANN 78-3 5a-104 (West 2004) Nothing in the PCRA or in the common law
could impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole Pen Vol II at 42
B Argument
Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel should have sought reversal because the trial
court excluded penalty-phase evidence of Dan's sentence

10

Petitioner's claim fails because it is

based on a misunderstanding of the record
Contrary to petitioner's representation, the trial court did not exclude evidence of Dan's
sentence Trial counsel introduced evidence of Dan's life sentence and argued that evidence in
10
Petitioner incorrectly asserts that Dan was sentenced to life without parole The sentence
of life without parole was not available until 27 Apnl 1992 See Laws of Utah 1992 ch 142, § 2
(amending UTAH CODE ANN § 76 3-206 to include the sentence of life in prison without parole)
When Dan Lafferty was tried and convicted, the only available sentences for aggravated murder
were life imprisonment, or death See UTAH CODE ANN §76-3-206(1985)

11
Even if the trial court had excluded evidence of Dan's sentence, petitioner still identifies
no "dead bang" winning argument that appellate counsel overlooked Evidence of Dan's sentence
could have been properly excluded as irrelevant The only constitutionally relevant sentencing
considerations were petitioner's character and the crime circumstances See e g Tuilaepa v
California, 512 U S 967,972(1994) Dan's sentence shed no light on either See State v Gardner,
789 P 2d 273, 285-86 (Utah 1989) (excluding proffered evidence of other capital cases that resulted
in life sentences and that the murder victim's friends opposed the death penalty did not require
reversal because the proffered evidence shed no light on Gardner's character or the crime
circumstances), cert denied, 494 U S 1090(1990)

Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim that Dan's life sentence made
petitioner's death sentence unconstitutionally disproportionate, holding that "case-by-case
proportionality review is not required under the United States or Utah Constitution " State v
Lafferty, 20 P 3d 342, 2001 UT 19 ^ 122-24, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001) If the supreme
court refused to grant relief based on comparing petitioner's sentence to Dan's, then it would not
have reversed the trial court for refusing to allow the sentencing jury to make the same comparison
56
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permits setting aside a criminal conviction or sentence because petitioner's counsel cannot meet
American Bar Association requirements for prosecuting a post conviction case '

XIV. PETITIONER WAIVED ANY CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO THE
FIRING SQUAD WHEN HE CHOSE THAT METHOD OF EXECUTION
(claim 39)
Petitioner contends that the Utah Legislature's decision to abolish execution by firing squad

The claim fails as a matter of law, and the Court should grant summary judgment in the
State's favor

amounts to a determination that the firing squad is cruel and unusual punishment This claim fails as

XIII. PETITIONER'S DISSATISFACTION WITH CONDITIONS ON DEATH
ROW DOES NOT JUSTIFY POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (claim 36)

a matter of law
At the time petitioner was sentenced, Utah law permitted death by firing squad only if the

Petitioner contends that his death sentence is unconstitutional because he has spent twenty
condemned selected that method UTAH CODE ANN § 77-18-5 5 (Supp 2001) A person cannot
years on death row with limited access to programs available to other inmates "If Petitioner were
not under a death penalty sentence, but merely life without parole, he would at least have the ability

select an execution method, then challenge its constitutionality Stewart v LeGrand, 526 U S 115
(1999) I3

to have more internal privileges than the Petitioner has being confined on death row " Second Am
Pet at 20
The PCRA permits post-conviction relief for constitutional defects in how a conviction is
obtained or a sentence is imposed UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a 104 (West 2004) Petitioner's
complaint that his death sentence and housing on death row limits his access to certain pnvileges has
nothing to do with either
The claim fails as a matter of law, and the Court should grant summary judgment in the
State's favor

The claim fails as a matter of law, and the Court should grant summary judgment in the
State's favor
XV.

PETITIONER'S CLAIM CONCERNING MENTAL RETARDATION FAILS
TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH THE COURT MAY GRANT RELIEF
(claim 40)
After petitioner's retrial and appeal, the United States Supreme Court decided Atkins v

Virginia, 536 U S 304 (2002) The Supreme Court held that mentally retarded persons could not be
subject to the death penalty Petitioner contends that, because the Supreme Court decided Atkins
after his criminal case ended, he was denied due process because he lost the opportunity to raise a
mental retardation defense to his death sentence

12
In addition, petitioner assumes without support that he has a right to counsel who can
comply with the American Bar Association Guidelines The State knows of nothing to support that

13
In addition, petitioner bases the claim on a factual misrepresentation The legislature
abolished the method because it draws too much media attention, not because the legislature

However, petitioner has not claimed let alone alleged facts demonstrating that he is mentally
etarded He fails to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief because he has identified no

that trial counsel actually compromised petitioner's interests for someone else's benefit United
States v Alvarez, 137 F 3d at 1252, State v Lovell, 1999 UT 40 \72 Petitioner alleges no facts
addressing either element Petitioner's lack of competence to waive a conflict is irrelevant unless he

onstitutional error that has harmed him
£VI. PETITIONER'S ALLEGATION THAT HE LACKED THE MENTAL
COMPETENCE TO WAIVE HIS ATTORNEY'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST
FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM ON WHICH THE COURT MAY GRANT
PETITIONER RELIEF (claim 44)
Petitioner contends that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest because he represented
>etitioner's brother and co-defendant Dan Lafferty Petitioner contends that he lacked sufficient
nental competence to waive the conflict

can establish that one existed in the first place
Most likely, petitioner cannot demonstrate a constitutional conflict of interest By the time
the State retried petitioner, Dan's case had been concluded See Gardner v Holden, 888 P 2d 608,
620 (Utah 1994) (no conflict where appellate counsel previously represented Gardner's co-defendant
because, "by the time [counsel] was appointed to represent Gardner, the charges against [his codefendant] were concluded, and a conflict, potential or otherwise, no longer existed between the two

Petitioner pleads insufficient facts to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief
rrespective of whether petitioner had the mental competence to waive any conflict of interest,
letitioner has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to
onflict-free counsel

defendants"), cert denied, 516 U S 828 (1995) Petitioner alleges nothing to suggest that his
counsel had any ongoing duty to Dan when counsel represented petitioner, let alone a duty that
caused counsel to impair petitioner's interests to promote Dan's
Petitioner's allegations fail to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief, therefore, the

To demonstrate a conflict of interest that infringed his constitutional rights, petitioner must
Court should dismiss the claim
stablish both 1) an actual conflict of interest, and 2) that the conflict adversely affected counsel's
•erformance See eg

Stricklandv Washington,466 U S at 692, Edens v Hannigan, 87 F 3d

109, 1114 (10th Cir 1996), State v Lovell, 1999 UT 401(22, 984 P 2d 382, 387, cert denied, 528

XVII. PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ALLEGED IN PART TWO EITHER FAIL AS A
MATTER OF LAW, OR FAIL TO STATE A CLAIM
In "part two" of his second amended petition, petitioner claims that (1) the prosecution

J S 1083 (2000), State v Taylor, 947 P 2d 681, 686 (Utah 1997), cert denied, 525 U S 833 (1998)

planted evidence "at the trial proceedings," and witnesses "were tampered with by way of a plea

o demonstrate an actual conflict of interest, petitioner must prove that trial counsel was forced to

barg[a]in," (2) his second trial violated his protection against double jeopardy, (3) he has yet to be

nake choices that advanced other interests to the detriment of petitioner's See United States v

arrested, re-charged or properly arraigned on the current charges, and (4) that his counsel

th

llvarez, 137 F 3d 1249,1252 (10 Cir 1998), State v Taylor, 947 P 2d at 686 To demonstrate that
Sixth Amendment conflict adversely affected trial counsel's performance, petitioner must prove

erroneously advised him not to file a 120-day disposition request These claims are all either
procedurally barred of fail as a matter of law
60

59

Petitioner's first claim is procedurally barred because petitioner could have raised it at trial or
>n direct appeal See UTAH CODE ANN § 78-35a-106(l)(c) (West 2004) Therefore, the State is
ntitled to summary judgment
Petitioner may obtain post-conviction relief on this claim only if he can demonstrate

petitioner not to file the request, that advice was reasonable, and petitioner cannot demonstrate that
he suffered any prejudice as a result of the advice See Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668, 68788, 690, 695 (1984) Counsel's advice was reasonable because it allowed counsel sufficient time to
prepare for trial, including investigating and preparing to present the extensive expert testimony and

neffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise it at trial or on appeal See UTAH CODE ANN §

the mitigation evidence that counsel introduced Moreover, petitioner cannot demonstrate that he

8-35a-106(2) (West 2004) However, petitioner has not alleged that his counsel was ineffective for

was prejudiced by allowing counsel sufficient time to prepare and present his case Therefore, the

ailing to raise the claim, nor has he alleged any facts to support an ineffectiveness claim

Court should grant summary judgment on this claim in the State's favor
CONCLUSION

Petitioner's second claim, alleging a violation of double jeopardy, repeats claim twenty-one
rom the first part of the petition As explained above in Point I, the State is entitled to summary

For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the State summary judgment on all of

udgment on this claim because it is procedurally barred—petitioner litigated his double jeopardy

petitioner's claims, with the exception of claims 22, 27,40, and 44, which the Court should dismiss

laim on appeal and lost See id

for failure to state a claim for relief

Petitioner's third claim, alleging that he has yet to be arrested, re-charged or properly
rraigned on the current charges, fails as a matter of law Even assuming that these allegations are

DATED this 2X~ day of February 2005
MARKL SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

^e, "an error at the preliminary stage is cured if the defendant is later convicted beyond a
sasonable doubt" See State v Quas, 837 P 2d 565, 566 (Utah Ct App 1992), see also State v
chreuder, 712 P 2d 264,272 (Utah 1985) (holding that a defect in probable cause statement does
ot invalidate subsequent conviction), United States v Crews, 445 U S 463,474 (1980) ("An illegal
rrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a
ahd conviction") (citing Gerstein v Pugh, 420 U S 103, 119 (1975) (additional citations omitted))
he State is entitled to summary judgment on this claim
Finally, petitioner's fourth claim, alleging that his counsel was ineffective for advising him

THOMASB BRUNKER
CHRISTOPHER D BALLARD
Assistant Attorneys General
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1

Petitioner was an active member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the

LDS Church) and the product of a strictly religious family State v Lqfferty, 2001 UT 19 ^3,20 P 3d
342, ceit denied 534 U S 1018(2001)

Rule 7 Utah R Civ P
Rule 56(c) Utah R Civ P
Rule 8(f) of the Utah R Cnm P
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Utah Code Ann §78-35a-106(2)

MATERIAL, UNDISPUTED FACTS

9

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph one of the State's Motion

9

2

16

six children Id

13,18

Shortly after returning from his LDS mission, petitioner married Diana Sayer They had

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph two of the State's Motion

10, 12, 13, 21

3

Those who knew petitioner prior to 1982 described him as a strong family man Petitioner

Utah Code Ann 78-35a-107(3)

13

was also a prominent member ofhis community, serving for a time on the city council in Highland, Utah

Rule 1 9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct

20

Id
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph three ofthe State's Motion However,
Petitioner can be characterized as a prominent member of the community only prior to 1982
4

Between 1982 and 1983, petitioner spent increasingly large amounts of time with his

brother Dan Lafferty Dan had been in constant trouble for failing to pay taxes and disobeying the licensing
regulations that governed his chiropractic practice Id at ^4
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph four of the State's Motion
5

Petitioner began to meet regularly with Dan, as well as with his brothers Tim, Mark, and

Watson, to discuss politics and religion Petitioner became increasingly converted to Dan's philosophies
on government intervention Those who knew petitioner well remarked that he seemed to have changed
drastically in both his beliefs and his personality Petitioner strayed further and further from mainstream

society Id at TJ4-5

n3

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph five of the State's Motion

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph ten of the State's Motion

6

11

In 1983, the LDS Church excommunicated petitioner for violating the law, refusing to

Petitioner told his brothers that he had received a revelation that his ex-wife Diana had

support his children failing to sustain the church leaders and teaching and advocating doctrjne contrary to

been the wife of the devil in a previous world Petitioner believed their union angered the devil According

the LDS church's Id at \S and n 2

to petitioner, the devil's jealousy led him to cause petitioner trouble in this world Id at ^8

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph six of the State's Motion
7

their six children to Florida Id at ^[6
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph seven of the State's Motion
8

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph eleven of the State's Motion

The following year petitioner's wife Dianafiledfor and obtained a divorce and moved with

12

In the spring of 1984, petitioner claimed to have received the "removal revelation "

According to petitioner, God ordered the "removal" of Allen's wife, Brenda, their fifteen -month-old
daughter, Erica, Richard Stowe, and Chloe Low Id

Defendant felt his excommunication was unjust and was distraught over the dissolution of

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twelve of the State's Motion

his marriage Id

13

Prior to receiving the "removal revelation," petitioner had expressed negative feelings about

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph eight of the State's Motion

the four named persons to family members and friends Petitioner believed that all four in some way either

9

had helped his wife obtain a divorce or played a part in his excommunicationfromthe LDS Church Id at

Petitioner and his brothers met Robert Crossfield when they opened their religious and

political discussions to others According to Mr Crossfield, God instructed him to teach the Lafferty

19

brothers how to receive revelation and to organize themselves into the "School of the Prophets " The

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirteen of the State's Motion

brothers claimed that they began to receive communications from God and would meet as a group to

14

discuss these "revelations " Id at f7

Petitioner thought that Brenda had encouraged Diana to divorce him On several

occasions before the removal revelation, petitioner called Brenda a "bitch " Petitioner told Allen that

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph nine of the State's Motion

Brendan "had better stop talking to Diana," that "people weren't safe in meddling in his affairs anymore,"

10

and that "he felt justified in taking action of some sort against people who crossed him " Id and n 5

Allen, the youngest Lafferty brother, and the husband and father to the murder victims, had

no direct involvement with the School of the Prophets Dan testified,' I don't think Allen necessarily

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph fourteen of the State's Motion

showed an interest He wasn't called We were all called by revelation and he wasn't called Id at \1

15

After the removal revelation, petitioner explained thatfifteen-month-oldErica needed to
3

>e removed because "she would grow up to be a bitch just like her mother" Id
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph fifteen of the State's Motion
16

Chloe Low, Diana's friend, helped and encouraged Diana to leave petitioner Id

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph sixteen of the State's Motion
17

Richard Stowe, petitioner's and Diana's ecclesiastical leader, served on the church council

hat excommunicated petitioner He also counseled Diana during the divorce proceedings and helped her
obtain financial aid from the LDS Church Id

21

From Mark's home, the men headed to Allen's apartment, apparently to look for another

rifle On the way, petitioner and Dan began discussing whether they should fulfill the "removal revelation"
that day Id
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-one of the State's Motion
22

At Allen's apartment, petitioner left the car and knocked on the door When no one

answered, petitioner returned to the car and drove away, heading toward Salt Lake City Id at f 12

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph seventeen of the State's Motion
18

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty of the State's Motion

Petitioner claimed to have received another revelation on 13 March 1984 commanding that

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-two of the State's Motion
23

Before they had traveled far, Dan said that he felt impressed to turn around and return to

tie and the School ofthe Prophets "consecrate" an "instrument" for removing the four named persons Only

Allen's apartment When they arrived, Dan went to the door and knocked This time, Brenda Lafferty

Dan and Watson agreed The others involved with the School ofthe Prophets felt that this and the removal

answered the door Id

revelation were not of God and disassociated themselvesfromthe revelations The School ofthe Prophets

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-three of the State's Motion

disbanded as a result ofthe disagreement Petitioner and Dan continued in their beliefthat the revelations

24

few minutes The men in the car heard the twofightinginside the apartment Petitioner left the car and

needed to be fulfilled Id at ]\0
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph seventeen of the State's Motion
19

Dan pushed past Brenda into the apartment and remained inside alone with Brenda for a

On the morning of 24 July 1984, petitioner, Dan, and their friends Charles Carnes and

Ricky Knapp planned to go to Salt Lake City for the day Before leaving, petitioner told the group that

entered the apartment Id at 1J13
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-four of the State's Motion
25

Mr Carnes testified that, once petitioner entered the apartment, hecould hear petitioner

he felt impressed that they should go to his brother Mark's house to pick up a rifle Id at TJ11

calling Brenda a "bitch" and a "liar," and that he could hear Brenda being beaten Mr Carnes heard

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph nineteen of the State's Motion

Brenda screaming, "Don't hurt my baby Please don't hurt my baby " He could also hear the baby crying,

20

"Mommy, mommy, mommy " The apartment then became quiet Id

Mark asked what they planned to do with the gun because petitioner had quit hunting years

earlier Petitioner replied that he was going hunting for "[a]ny fucking thing that gets in my way " Id

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-five of the State's Motion

4

26

A few minutes later, petitioner and Dan exitedfromthe rear ofthe apartment and returned

o the car, their clothes covered in blood Id

5

said that they had done, quietly left the apartment and drove away in the car While traveling along
Interstate 80, they found the knife in the car They rolled the knife in a towel and threw it out the window

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-six of the State's Motion

Later in Twin Falls, Idaho, they disposed ofa bag ofbloody clothing and other personal effects belonging

27

to petitioner and Dan They then proceeded to Mr Carnes' brother's house in Cheyenne, Wyoming,

The men next drove to the Low home On the way, petitioner commented that Chloe

.ow's small size would make her an easy target Id at TJ14

where they were arrested on 30 July 1984 Id at T|16

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-seven of the State's Motion

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-one of the State's Motion

28

32

When they reached the Low home and determined that no one was there the men broke

On 17 August 1984 FBI agents arrested petitioner and Dan in Reno, Nevada Id

nto the home and took numerous items As they left, petitioner began talking about going on to Richard

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-two of the State's Motion

>towe'shome Id

33

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-eight of the State's Motion
29

The men accidentally missed the turnoff to the Stowe home Petitioner and Dan decided

o abandon trying to fulfill the rest of the revelation They stopped at a service station and then headed
oward Wendover Id at 1J15

When Allen Lafferty arrived homefromwork on the evening of24 July 1984 he found his

wife and fifteen-month-old daughter dead Id at f 17
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-three of the State's Motion
34

Brenda was in the kitchen lying in a pool ofblood She had suffered a severe beating and

had contusions and bruises on her face, head, shoulders, arms, thigh, knees, and back Evidence

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph twenty-nine of the State's Motion

established that a vacuum cord had been tightly and repeatedly wrapped around her neck A six-inch-long

30

incision had sliced through her trachea, both jugular veins, and both carotid arteries and left a cut on her

Mr Carnes testified that, on the way, petitioner pulled a knife out of his boot, started to

>ang it on his knee, and said, "I killed her I killed her I killed the bitch I can't believe I killed her " He

spinal column Blood was smeared on the walls, drapes, door, and light switches There was evidence

hen handed the knife to Dan, and said, "Thank you, Brother, for doing the baby because I don't think I

throughout the apartment of a major struggle Id

md it in me " Dan replied, " It was no problem " Id at %\5
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty of the State's Motion
31

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-four of the State's Motion
35

Fifteen-month-old Enca lay m a puddle of her own blood and propped against the back

In Wendover, the four men rented a small kitchenette apartment where they cleaned up,

ofher cnb with her head slumped over Enca's throat was cutfromear to ear The incision sliced through

ite, and spent the night The next night, Mr Knapp and Mr Carnes, afraid ofwhat the Lafferty brothers

both her carotid arteries, both jugular veins, and her esophagus and cut her cervical spinal column Only

bone and a little tissue attached her head to her body Id at |18

ARGUMENT

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-five of the State's Motion
36

I. STATE IS NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE ITS
ARGUMENTS FAIL ON THE FACE OF LAW.

Both Brenda and Enca were alive when their throats were slit Id

Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the

Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-six of the State's Motion
37

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law See Rule 56(c) Utah R Civ Pro There are

The State charged petitioner with capital murder and related crimes Ajury convicted him

genuine issues ofmaterial fact which preclude entry ofsummary judgment Ifsummaryjudgment is granted,

and sentenced him to death on the capital murder charges The Utah Supreme Court affirmed State v

then Petitioner has no opportunity to present his case to the court Because summaryjudgment prevents

Lafferty, 749 P 2d 1239 (Utah 1988)

litigants from fully presenting their case to the court, courts are, and should be, reluctant to evoke this
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-seven of the State's Motion
remedy Brandt v Sptmgvdle Banking Co, 353 P 2d 460 (1960)
38

Petitioner did not seek collateral relief in the State courts, instead, he proceeded directly
n . STATE DID NOT COMPLY WITH UTAH R. CTV. P. RULE 7(c)(2).

to federal collateral review The United States District for the District of Utah denied relief However, the
Pursuant to Utah R Civ P Rule 7(c)(2), a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed on the ground that the trial court had applied

Judgment cannot exceed ten pages ofthe argument without leave ofthe court The State did not apply for
the incorrect legal standard for evaluating petitioner's competency Lafferty v Cook, 949 F 2d 1546
permission to file an overlength memorandum and, thus, any pages over the allowed page limit should not

(10th Cir 1991) The Tenth Circuit ordered petitioner's convictions and sentences vacated, however, it

be considered Without waiving this objection to the overlength memorandum, Petitioner filed his
elaborated that "[t]he state is of course free to retry Lafferty " Id at 1557
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-eight of the State's Motion
39

The State chose to retry petitioner A second jury convicted petitioner and sentenced him

to death The Utah Supreme Court again affirmed State v Laffet ty, 2001 UT 19,20 P 3d 342 The
United States Supreme Court denied review Laffet ty v Utah 534 U S 1018 (2001)
Petitioner admits the statements contained in paragraph thirty-nine of the State's Motion

r
I

memorandum in opposition to all arguments advanced by the State
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HI. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RAISE THE CLAIMS FOR 7-10,14,18, 21, 23, 32, tf"2
28, 41, 43, 45 DUE TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND DUE TO THE q j
FACT THAT SOME OF THE CLAIMS WERE NOT PREVIOUSLY RAISED.

The State argues that the claims should not be considered because some ofthem were previously

litigated, some of them were not raised at trial or on direct appeal, and some are simply not sufficient to
entitle the defendant to a post-conviction relief (See State's Memorandum at ffl]8-12) These arguments
should fail since the Utah Post Conviction Remedies Act allows to raise claims if failure to raise them was

8

9

due to ineffective assistance ofcounsel See §78-3 5a-106(2) Effective assistance of counsel allows the

(See State's Memorandum at \ 9 )

defendant not only to raise the claims that were previously litigated, but also the ones that were not raised

Even the cursory comparison between the claims on appeal and in the Writ of Habeas Corpus

on direct appeal and the ones that the State believes are insufficient

shows that the only claims that even remotely can be considered similar are the following claims number

On appeal, the Petitioner raised eight separate challenges

1 (shifting the burden ofthe penalty phase to the Petitioner), number 2 (removal of juror 220 for cause),

(1) whetherthe trial court erred in determining that he was competent to stand trial, (2)
whether the trial court erred in granting the State's challenge for cause to remove Juror
220, (3) whether Utah's insanity defense, section 76-2-305 ofthe Utah Code, violates the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 ofthe Utah
Constitution, (4) whether the trial court erred by admitting victim impact evidence during
the penalty phase, (5) whether the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of
statements made by defendant and his brother Dan Lafferty to the media, (6) whether the
trial court erred by refusing to give defendant's requested instruction that the jury could
consider sympathy or mercy in reaching its verdict during the penalty phase, (7) whether
Utah's death penalty statute, section 76-3-207 ofthe Utah Code, is unconstitutional under
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, sections 7 and 9 of
the Utah Constitution, and (8) whether the retrial of defendant violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause ofthe Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 12 of the Utah Constitution

number 3 (admission ofa videotape at the penalty phase), number 4 (erroneous admission ofthe videotape
ofPetitioner's media interview), number 9 (competency to stand trial issue), and number 10 (denial of the
Petitioner's motion for new trial)
However, claims of shifting of the burden at the penalty phase, claim 4,14 and 18 (partial), 5,
penalty phase sympathy instruction 6, double jeopardy claim 21, or discretion to choose to charge with
capital murder claim 32 (partial), were not raised dunng the appeal Therefore, the State's argument fails
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in December 1991 vacated the Petitioner's original sentence and
conviction and indicated that the State was free to retry the Petitioner The reversal was made due to

See State v Lafferty, 20 P 3d 342 (Utah 2001)
errors made by the courts regarding the Petitioner's competency to stand trial in thefirstcase which is a
In his Writ of Habeas Corpus, however, Petitioner raised the following claims
pr unafacie case ofthe ineffective assistance of counsel According to the Stncklandtest, Petitioner has
1) Utah law unconstitutionally shifted the burden to him at the penalty phase because the
State has already proven at least one aggravator by the time the penalty phase begins
(claims 4, 14, and 18 (partial)), 2) the Court erroneously removed juror 220 for cause
(claim 7), 3) the Court erroneously admitted at the penalty phase a videotape ofthe crime
scene showing the victims' bodies (claim 8), 4) the Court erroneously admitted a videotape
of petitioner's media interview (claim 9), 5) the Court erroneously denied petitioner's
request for a penalty-phase sympathy instruction (claim 10), 6) petitioner's retrial violated
double jeopardy (claim 21), 7) the large number ofaggravators gives prosecutors unlimited
discretion in choosing whether to charge capital murder (claim 32 partial), 9) the Court
erroneously found petitioner competent to stand trial (claim 43), and 10) the Court
erroneously denied petitioner's motion for a new trial (claim 45) These claims repeat
claims that petitioner raised and lost on direct appeal See State v Lafferty, 20 P 3d
342, 2001 UT 19, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001)

to demonstrate that the counsel wasn't functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment
should have and that his "defense was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance to the extent that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial

" See Strickland v

Washington 466 U S 668, 690 (1984), Fernandez v Cook, 870 P 2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) The
defendant did not receive the benefit of counsel that was functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment and he was prejudiced by the counsel's deficient performance Any proper functioning
counsel would not allow a biased jury to be sitting on a death penalty case Such jury deprived Petitioner

>f his chance to a fair trial Therefore, the State's arguments should fail

the previous counsel for the Petitioner to hire a mitigation specialist, is a brand new claim not raised on

Also, the court in Parsons v Barnes, 871 P 2d 516 (Utah 1994) stated that

appeal Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to raise that claim in his Habeas Corpus petition

absent the existence ofunusual circumstances, a 'party may not raise the issues in a habeas
corpus petition that could or should have been raised on direct appeal' We have held
that unusual circumstances exist when trial counsel represented the defendant on direct
appeal and the defendant in a subsequent habeas proceeding contends that he had
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, on appeal, or both

TV. PETITIONER DID NOT RAISE THE CLAIMS ON APPEAL DUE TO INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. THEREFORE, HE IS ENTITLED TO RAISE THEM IN
HIS HABEAS CORPUS PETITION.
The StateacknowledgesthatPetitioner'sHabeasCorpus claims 1-3,5-6,11 (partial), 12 (partial),

See id

13,15-17,18 (partial), 19,20 (partial), 30,32 (partial), 33-35,37-38,42,46-47 have not been raised
This is exactly the circumstances of the Lafferty case where the same counsel represented
on appeal Failure of the Petitioner's previous counsel to raise those claims is a direct evidence of the
Defendant at trial and on appeal Thus, the Petitioner has such unusual circumstances that would allow him
ineffective assistance of counsel Therefore, m accordance with §78-3 5a-106(2), Petitioner is entitled to
o raise the issue of an ineffective assistance of counsel
raise them in his Habeas Corpus petition at this time

/
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Moreover, pursuant to §78-3 5 a-106(2),
Moreover, pursuant to §78-35a-107(3)
[notwithstanding Subsection (1 )(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the
ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, ifthe failure to raise that
ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel
See id
In this case, due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the claims as referred to supra have not been
raised and therefore entitle the Petitioner to argue these clanris in his Habeas Corpus Writ
On page 10 ofits Memorandum, the State acknowledges that Petitioner's habeas corpus claim 41,
i e his brother and co-defendant's life sentence, entitled Petitioner to challenge his death sentence The
State acknowledges that Petitioner uses a different label for the claim However, the State argues that in
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[i]f the courtfindsthat the interests ofjustice require, a court may excuse a petitioner's
failure to file within the time limitations
It is obvious that when the legislature drafted the statute it was very concerned with giving all
opportunities to Petitioners like Mr Lafferty to advance their claims Therefore, State's arguments should
fail
V. EVIDENCE IN REGARDS TO STEVEN GOLDING, PH.D'S TESTIMONY IS NOT
JUST AN IMPEACHMENT OF EVIDENCE, BUT NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
THAT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED PREVIOUSLY.
The State argues that Steven Goldmg, Ph D's testimony is merely an impeachment of evidence

substance it has already been litigated However, the State does not explain where in the appeal Petitioner

(See State's Memorandum at 11) However, the evidence offered by Dr Golding in his recent testimony

raised that issue In fact, that issue has not been raised on appeal and only in the Habeas Corpus petition

at State v Mitchell, Third Distirct Court Case No 031901884, contradicts the testimony he offered in

Therefore, this State'sargumentalsofails FinaUy,thePeutioner'sHabeasCorpusclaim23,i e failureof

Petitioner's case and clearly falls within §78-35a-104(e)(i) that states that the court is required to vacate
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le conviction or sentence where

Any diligent counsel would have investigated exculpatory evidence and any facts of evidence

newly discovered material evidence exists
[that]
(l) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of [the evidence] at the time oftrial
or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previouslyfiledpost-tnal motion or
post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered through the
exercise of reasonable diligence

tampering Failure to do so would render a deficient performance that would fall below the objective

Neither Petitioner nor Petitioner's counsel knew, or could have known ofthis new opinion ofDr

871P 2d516(Utahl994) Therefore, the State's argument fails The United States Supreme Court in

joldmg at the time ofthe mental health hearing in 2004 and 2005 Therefore, the State's argument fails

the recent case of Wiggins v Smith, 539 U S 510,123 S Ct 2527,156 L Ed 2d 471 (U S 2003), holds

VI. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY. THIS OPPORTUNITY
HAS NOT BEEN PROVIDED TO HIM.

that the absence of a thorough mitigation investigation is per se ineffective assistance of counsel

The State objects to Petitioner's claim that his Sixth Amendment right to an effective assistance of
ounsel was violated in where the counsel did not move to sequester the jury when one of the jurors
lisclosed the fact that he had been given an instruction by his religious teachers The State argues that
'etitioner's only right is the right to trial by an impartial jury (See State's Memorandum at TJ13)

standards of a reasonable professional judgment Failure to discover exculpatory evidence or facts of
evidence tampering would prejudice the defendant at the trial and at sentencing See Par sons v Barnes,

VIII. THE TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO PRESENT RELEVANT MITIGATION
EVIDENCE WHICH IS NOT SIMPLY CUMULATIVE BUT MATERIAL TO THE TRIAL
AND SENTENCING.
The State argues that the social history that was prepared by the currently retained mitigation
specialist, Manssa Sandall, and additional material facts listed in Petitioner's Writ are just cumulative

Where Lafferty's defense counsel has allowed to have a jury where every member was in favor

evidence (See State's Memorandum at If 16) The State relies on Castro v Ward, 13 8 F 3 d 810,828-

ifthe death penalty, such jury was not an impartial jury It was ajury biased in favor of the death penalty

29 (10th Cir) However, in Castro, the counsel for defendant argued mainly additional evidence about drug

The only juror that was against the death penalty was dismissed

and alcohol abuse in Mr Castro's family, I e hisbrother'spredatoryandabusivebehaviortowardwomen,

Vn. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE SAME EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WHETHER REPRESENTATION IS IN TRIAL COURT, ON APPEAL, OR

evidence of organic brain damage and drug and alcohol abuse in the family In the present case, mitigation

HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS.
The State argues that the Petitioner is not entitled to an effective assistance of counsel in habeas
-orpus proceedings This argument is totally without ment It is absurd to suggest that Petitioner is entitled
o a substandard representation in habeas corpus that falls short the requirements ofthe Str ickland test
]ee Stucklandv

Washington, 466 U S 668, 690 (1984)

expert actually researched and uncovered the records pertaining to the Petitioner himself, I e educational
recordsfromhigh school and B YU, mental health records and psychological test results, Utah County Jail
records, Utah Department ofCorrections records, itemsfromPetitioner's journal, as well as broader social
history that shows Petitioner being influenced by the fundamentalist LDS philosophy as well as his
childhood illnesses, medical issues and mjunes
Petitioner's educational records and employment records show particularly Petitioner's good
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adaptability and getting along with other people around him and provide mitigating factors for the penalty

See Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668,695(1984) Even if trial counsel's failure to object to

phase Therefore, pursuant to Castto there is a probability that those circumstances would lead to a

prosecutor's closing argument by itselfdoes not raise to the Strickland standard which the Petitioner claims

different outcome when weighing in aggravating and mitigating factors

it is, then the cumulative evidence ofthe misconduct does rise to the Strickland'level Moreover, the court

DC PETITIONER DOES NOT BASE HIS CHALLENGE TO HIS FORMER COUNSEL
ONLY ON RULE 8.

stated in Galetka that "to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, Carter must rebut the strong

The State argues that Rule 8(f) ofthe Utah R Cnm P states that mere non-compliance with Rule
8 certification shall not be "ofitself' grounds for the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that the
Petitioner does not have a right to claim such ineffective assistance (See State's Memorandum at \ 52)
However, Petitioner is not solely relying on Rule 8 when arguing ineffective assistance ofcounsel, but rather
gives a variety of circumstances as listed supra Therefore, the State's argument fails
X. TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO RAISE OBJECTION TO PROSECUTOR'S
CLOSING ARGUMENT AFFECTED OUTCOME OF THE APPEAL.

presumption that 'under the circumstances, the challenged action' might be considered sound trial strategy "
Id at 689 Failure to object to the damaging prosecutor's closing argument cannot possibly be considered
a sound trial strategy but clearly is a serious omission Such omission, if preserved on appeal, could have
resulted in reversal Therefore, the State's argument should fail and its reliance on Car ter v Galetka is
misplaced See Carter v Galetka, 44 P 3d 626
XI. APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE DENIAL OF THE CHANGE
OF VENUE MOTION.
The State argues that since Petitioner didn't allege that any juror was biased and didn't plea any

The State argues that even despite the fact that the Supreme Court noted that the trial counsel failed
facts demonstrating the biased jury, then his argument should fail as to any challenges to impartiality of the
to preserve the claim of prosecutorial misconduct at the closing argument, such misconduct, nevertheless,
jury and any challenges to the venue (See State's Memorandum at H 54) In accordance with State v
has not affected the appellate outcome (See State's Memorandum at U 53) The State is relying in its
James, 75 7 P 2d 549 (Utah 1989), the four factors need to be considered when making a change ofvenue
argument on State v Lafferty, 20 P 3d 342, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001) and on State v Kell,
request First, defendant has to have little standing in the community Second, the crime should take place
61 P 3d 1019 (2002) However, in Kell, the prosecutor made certain inappropriate jokes, which
in a small community Third, the nature and the gravity ofthe offense has to be extreme And fourth, there
however, did not add up to the misconduct resulting in plain error See State v Kell, id This is quite
has to be an extensive trial publicity and gossip about the defendant See id Surely the Petitioner's case
different from the facts in Lafferty case where the Supreme Court acknowledged that the prosecutor
meets all four requirements in where the Petitioner had little standing in the community, the community was
indeed made improper comments by acknowledging that the trial counsel failed to preserve the claim
small, Petitioner had a negative reputation as the killer of a mother and the child which was an offense of
Failure of the previous Lafferty counsel to preserve the claim affected further reviewability ofthe claim
an extreme nature and the pretrial publicity was extreme See also State v Widdison, 28 P 3d 1278 (Utah
Moreover, the cumulative effect of the ineffective assistance of counsel satisfies Strickland test
16

2001) As the court stated m Lafferty and Widdison, "the ultimate test of whether a failure to change
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Xffl. PETITIONER'S DISSATISFACTION WITH CONDITIONS ON DEATH ROW.

venue constitutes an abuse of discretion is whether the defendant was tried by a fair and impartial jury "

Petitioner, is dissatisfied with the conditions on death row However, he argues that pursuant to

See State v Lafferty, 749 P 2d 1239, 1250 (Utah 1988) See also Widdison, id In the Petitioner's

the United States Constitution Amendment VIII and Utah Constitution Article I §9 (1896), the fact that

case, the counsel failed to request that the jury be sequestered All jurors were pro death sentence biased

he has been held on death row for twenty years is cruel and unusual punishment in itself

Therefore, failure to request a change of venue and failure to preserve the issue of change of venue on

XIV. THE PETITIONER COULD NOT HAVE WAIVED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGE IF HE WAS INCOMPETENT TO STAND TRIAL AND INCOMPETENT AT
THE TIME OF SENTENCING.

appeal significantly prejudices the Petitioner
XII. COUNSEL'S INABILITY TO COMPLY WITH ABA GUIDELINES AMOUNTS TO
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The State argues that since the Petitioner, at the time ofsentencing, chose his method of execution
byfiringsquad, he cannot now argue that that was a cruel and unusual punishment firing squad was legally

The State argues in its Memorandum that Petitioner's argument that failure of the Petitioner's
present as a choice at that time and that by choosing his own execution method, Petitioner waived any
counsel to comply with the ABA guidelines in a post conviction case has no merit under Utah Code Ann
further challenges to the method (See State's Memorandum at ^ 58) In its argument, the State relies on
§78-35a-104 (West 2004) (See State's Memorandum at \ 56) Although §78-35a-104 does not
Stewart v LeGrand, 526 U S 115 (1999) The State's reliance would be valid if the defendant was
specifically refer to the ABA guidelines, in subsection (d) it refers to the ineffective assistance of counsel
afforded an effective representation of counsel and if he was competent to stand trial and during the
Merely a failure to comply with the ABA guidelines may have been insufficient However, the fatality of
sentencing phase However, Petitioner argued ineffective assistance of counsel and his lack of competency
all the mistakes and omissions made by the Petitioner's counsel amounts to the ineffective assistance and
Therefore, Petitioner's ability to choose his own method ofexecution and his counsel' s assistance has been
falls within the above-referenced sections of §78-35a-104 Therefore, the State's argument should fail
questioned
In addition, m Wiggmsv Smith, 539U S 510,123 S Ct 2527,156 L Ed 2d 471 (U S 2003),
XV. PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF MENTAL RETARDATION WARRANTS RELIEF.
the Supreme Court ofthe United States stated that the ABA guidelines on the standards for capital aefense
The State argues that Petitioner's reliance on Atkins v Virginia is misplaced because Petitioner
work serve as " guides to determining what is reasonable '" See id Thus, the ABA guidelines list the
did not claim that he was mentally retarded and didn't allege any facts that would demonstrate that
minimum requirements that the defense counsel should meet in death penalty cases Since the Petitioner's
(See State's Memorandum at Tffl 58-59) InAtkinsv Virginia, 536V S 304 (2002), the Supreme Court
former counsel does not meet the ABA guidelines, he does not meet even the minimum requirements for
reasoned that mental retardation requires not only sub-average intellectual functioning, but also significant
handling such cases
limitations m adaptive skills See id The Court stated that mentally retarded defendants have "diminished

opacity to understand and process information, to communicate, to abstractfrommistakes and learn from

The interest of co-defendants were adverse as the issue was co-defendants' guilt in committing the crime

'xpenence, to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand others reactions " See

This clearly points to the fact that the interests of the two clients were materially adverse

d Moreover, the Court stated that "mentally retarded defendants may be less able to give meaningful

" Moreover, the State did not show at what time on the time-line of representation Mr Esplm

issistance to their counsel and are typically poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an unwarranted

/withdrew from representing Dan Lafferty and if he withdrew at all Therefore, the State's allegation that

mpression of lack of remorse for their crimes " See id

Dan's representation was concluded by the time the counsel was representing Ronald Lafferty is not

In the present case, although Petitioner has not been labeled as mentally retarded, based on the

supported by evidence The State's argument about the conclusion of the representation on the co-

facts uncovered in his social history and even facts already presented to the court, he had a diminished

Defendant does not mean that there was not a conflict still remaining and Petitioner has an absolute right

capacity to communicate, to make conclusions from his mistakes, to engage in logical reasoning, or to

to conflict free counsel The merefinalizationof one case does not remove the possible conflict in the

control his impulses Therefore, the claim is valid In addition, Petitioner is advancing his claims for inability

companion case Especially when there are still appellate and post-conviction remedies available as were

to stand trial due to his insanity and ineffective assistance ofcounsel Cumulatively, all those claims warrant

available to Dan Lafferty at the time /

close consideration by the court

XVTI. PLANTED EVIDENCE

XVI. THE STATE DID NOT PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE THAT A CONFLICT OF
INTEREST WAS ABSENT.
The State argues that the Petitioner didn't show an actual conflict of interest and that such conflict

The State argues that the Petitioner's claim that the prosecution planted evidence at the trial
proceeding should have been raised at trial or on direct appeal and that at this time this claim is time barred
However, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise this issue Therefore,

adversely effected counsel's performance
Pursuant to Rule 1 9 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct,
/ [a] lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter
J (a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially factually related matter in which
that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests ofthe former client unless the
former client consents after consultation, or
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage ofthe former client
except as Rule 1 6 would permit with respect to a client or when the information has
become generally known
The former counsel ofRon Lafferty, Mr Esplm represented him in the same matter as Dan Lafferty

pursuant to §78-3 5a-106(2) (West 2004), the Petitioner's claim falls within the exception for the ineffective
assistance of counsel and the general time bar does not apply
XVHI. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The State also argues that Petitioner's claim for doublejeopardy was litigated on appeal and lost,
therefore, it should not be re-litigated again The State also argues that because the probable cause
statement is questioned, the subsequent conviction should not be invalidated (See State's Memorandum
at TJ 61) The State is relying on cases like UmtedStatesv Gen's, 445 U S 463,474 (1980), Statev

2D
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2uas, 837P 2d 565 (Utah 1992), and Statev Schreuder, 712P 2d 264 (Utah 1985) In all those cases
here was an unlawful arrest and a subsequent charge, a trial and a conviction The Petitioner is arguing
hat he has not even been re-arrested, re-charged, or properly re-arraigned on the current charges
See Petitioner's Writ at H 4) This is a crucial distinction in the facts of the cases cited by the State and
the facts of the case at bar Therefore, the State's argument fails
XIX. 120 DAY DISPOSITION REQUEST

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 1x9 day of May, 2005,1 served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to State's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss upon the
following parties via U S mail
Thomas B Brunker
Christopher D Ballard
Assistant Attorneys General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P O Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Finally, the State argues that the failure of Petitioner's counsel tofilea 120 day disposition request
did not prejudice the Petitioner and therefore, Petitioner's claim should fail (See State's Memorandum
at TI61) The Petitioner is prejudiced by not filing the 120 day disposition request because it allows the
press to pollute the jury pool with negative information which led to the fact that the Plaintiff could not get
a fair and unbiased jury
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner's claims should stay
DATED this IQ

day of May, 2005
CRAMER & CRAMER, L.L.C.

'
Aric Cramer
Cramer
Attorney for Petitioner
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ARGUMENT
I.

PETITIONER HAS NOT OPPOSED THE STATE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON CLAIMS 28 AND 31, THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JUDGMENT IN
THE STATE'S FAVOR ON THOSE CLAIMS (OPENING MEMORANDUM
POINTS XI AND XII)

identified were litigated on direct appeal, and 2) he may proceed under the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act ("PCRA") procedural bar exception for ineffective assistance of counsel claims
Memorandum m Opposition to State's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss ("Opposition
Memorandum") point III

Petitioner has not opposed the State's motion on his post-conviction claims that 1) appellate
Petitioner contends that the direct appeal did not address his post-conviction claims that 1)
counsel should have argued that the Court erroneously excluded evidence of Dan Lafferty's sentence
the Court erroneously admitted at the penalty phase a videotape of the victims' bodies (claim 8), 2)
(claim 28), and 2) his counsel in this proceeding cannot meet his obligations under the American Bar
the Court erroneously denied petitioner's request for a penalty-phase sympathy instruction (claim
Association guidelines (claim 31) ! Because petitioner has not opposed the motion the Court should
10), 3) petitioner's retrial violated double jeopardy (claim 21), and 4) Utah's death statutes give
grant judgment in the State's favor on those claims
prosecutors unlimited discretion in choosing whether to charge capital murder (claim 32 partial)
II.

THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS
PETITIONER ALREADY RAISED AND LOST ON DIRECT APPEAL
(OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT I, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM
POINT HI)
The State moved for summary judgment on claims that petitioner litigated and lost on direct

Opposition Memorandum at 11 Petitioner appears both to concede and to contest whether the direct
appeal disposed of his post-conviction burden shifting claims (claims 4,14, and 18 (partial)) Id
Petitioner's argument is false The Utah Supreme Court rejected on direct appeal all of the

appeal Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment

claims that petitioner contends it did not The supreme court held that 1) the Court properly

("Opening Memorandum") point I Petitioner responds that 1) not all of the claims that the State

admitted at the penalty phase a videotape that showed the murder victims' bodies, State v Lafferty,
20 P 3d 342, 2001 UT 19,ffl[79-84,cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001), 2) controlling federal law

Petitioner purports to oppose summary judgment on the latter claim Opposition
Memorandum at 18 However, petitioner argues only that the ABA Guidelines apply in assessing
whether his trial and appellate counsel satisfied their constitutional obligations Id These
arguments do not rebut the State's argument that petitioner cannot obtain post-conviction relief if his
post-conviction counsel cannot comply with the ABA Guidelines
Moreover, petitioner misstates that the "ABA guidelines list the minimum requirements that
the defense counsel should meet in death penalty cases " Id The ABA Guidelines provide a
"guide" in assessing the reasonableness of counsel's performance See e g Wiggins v Smith, 539
U S 510, 525 (2003) They do not establish minimum performance standards
Petitioner also asserts that his former counsel did "not meet even the minimum requirements

foreclosed giving the jury a sympathy instruction, Id at ^108-12, 3) petitioner's retrial did not
violate double jeopardy, Id at ^142-49, 4) Utah's death statutes did not give prosecutors
unconstitutionally broad charging discretion, Id at ^140-41, and 5) Utah's death statutes do not
shift the penalty phase burden to the defendant, Id atfflJ12528 Petitioner litigated and lost on
direct appeal all of the claims that the State identified in its opening memorandum
Petitioner misstates that he may rely on the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel exception to a

en, but were not raised on direct appeal Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-106(2) (West 2004)
lotwithstanding Subsection (l)(c) [precluding post-conviction relief based on a ground that could
ve been, but was not raised at tnal or on direct appeal]_a_person may be eligible for relief on a
sis that the ground could have been but was not raised at tnal or on appeal, if the failure to raise

35a-105 (West 2004) To avoid the procedural bar under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
exception, petitioner has the burden of proving that his appellate counsel was ineffective because the
omitted claims 1) were obvious from the record, and 2) probably would have resulted in reversal
Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96148,44 P 3d 626
Petitioner makes no attempt to demonstrate how any of the barred claims meet that standard

it ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel") It does not apply to claims that were
sed and lost on direcrappeaMJtah Code Ann § 78-35a-106(l)(b) (West 2004) See also

Instead, he states only that "failure of Petitioner's previous counsel to raise those claims is a direct

irdner v Holden, 888 P 2d 608, 615-16 (Utah) (petitioner cannot avoid the procedural bar to a

evidence of the ineffective assistance of counsel " Petitioner's mere statement that his counsel was

Piously litigated substantive claim by recasting it in post-conviction proceedings as an ineffective

ineffective does not satisfy his burden of proving it to a demonstrable reality See eg Parsons v

.istance of counsel claim), cert denied, 516 U S 828 (1995)

Barnes, 871 P 2d 516, 526 (Utah), cert denied, 513 U S 966 (1994), and Fernandez v Cook, 870

The Court must grant summary judgment without addressing the merits of the claims
titioner litigated and lost on direct appeal Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96 f6, 44 P 3d 626
THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIMS
THAT PETITIONER COULD HAVE, BUT DID NOT RAISE ON DIRECT
APPEAL (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT II; OPPOSITION
MEMORANDUM POINT IV)
Petitioner does not dispute that the PCRA bars collateral relief for claims that petitioner
aid have, but did not raise on direct appeal Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-l 06(1 )(c) (West 2004)
titioner also does not dispute that he could have, but did not raise claims 1-3, 5-6,11 (partial),
[partial), 13,15-17,19, 20(partial), 30, 32(partial), 33-35, 37-38, 42, and 46-47 on direct appeal
tead, petitioner claims that the Court should excuse his default

P 2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) (petitioner must prove ineffective assistance to a demonstrable reality,
mere repetition of the legal standard will not suffice)
To the extent petitioner intends to argue that he had a constitutional right to counsel who
would raise every non-frivolous appellate claim, he misstates the law See e g Jones v Barnes,
463 U S 745, 751 (1983) (indigent appellants have no constitutional right "to compel appointed
counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional
judgment, decides not to present those points"), Cargyle v Mullin, 317 F 3d 1196,1202 (10th Cir
2003) ("counsel 'need not (and should not) raise every nonfrivolous claim, but rather may select
from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal'") (quoting Smith v
Robbins, 528 U S 259,288 (2000))

The Court may excuse the default if petitioner's counsel was ineffective for failing to raise
claims on direct appeal Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-106(2) (West 2004) Because respondent
sed the procedural bar defense, petitioner bears the burden of disproving it Utah Code Ann § 78-

Moreover, even if he had such a right, he still cannot succeed without proving prejudice that
the omitted claims probably would have resulted in reversal Smith v Robbins, 528 U S 259, 28586 (2000), Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96 J48 Petitioner has not attempted to demonstrate that any
4

3

the omitted claims probably would have succeed That failure alone requires dismissing the
lms that petitioner's counsel did not raise on direct appeal

2

THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
PETITIONER'S NEWLY-DISCOVERED-EVIDENCE CLAIM (OPENING
MEMORANDUM POINT III; OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT V)

the PCRA prohibits post-conviction relief The claim fails as a matter of law, and the Court should
enter judgment in the State's favor on it
V.

PETITIONER HAS NOT ALLEGED FACTS OR CITED LEGAL
PRECEDENT SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS COUNSEL
COST HIM HIS RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY (OPENING
MEMORANDUM POINT IV, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT VI)

Petitioner claims that he has learned of new evidence related to Stephen Golding, Ph D , that
Petitioner's challenge to counsel's failure to move to sequester the jury centers on the Court's
tifies post-conviction relief

The State moved for summary judgment on the claim because the
dismissal of a juror during the trial Second Amended Petition at 10 Petitioner contends that "if the

,v evidence was, at most, impeachment evidence Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-104(e)(in) (West
jury had been sequestered, the Petitioner would have had the advantage of perhaps one juror who
34) (post-conviction relief unavailable for newly discovered evidence that is "mere[]
would have voted for life without parole, thereby sparing the petitioner's life " Id
peachment evidence")
The State moved for summary judgment on this claim because petitioner had the right only to
Petitioner responds only that he could not have discovered the evidence in time for trial The
an impartial jury Petitioner responds that counsel "allowed

a jury where every member was in

te did not argue that petitioner could have discovered the evidence sooner 4 Petitioner has not
favor of the death penalty, such jury was not an impartial jury

The only juror that was against

puted the State's argument that the new evidence is "mere[] impeachment evidence" for which
the death penalty was dismissed " Opposition Memorandum at 14
Petitioner also states that, pursuant to § 78 35a 107(3), the Court may excuse an untimely
ng in the interests of justice Opposition Memorandum at 13 Respondent has not argued that
ltioner filed an untimely petition, the exception does not apply
Petitioner contends further that "it is obvious that when the legislature drafted the statute it
s very concerned with giving all opportunities to Petitioners like Mr Lafferty to advance their
lms Therefore, State's arguments should fail" Id "It is obvious" that the legislature intended to
it post-conviction review of claims that could have been, but were not raised on direct appeal to
.umstances where appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise them Utah Code Ann §
35a-106(l)(c) and (2) (West 2004) Petitioner has not attempted to meet that standard, the Court
•uld grant judgment m the State's favor on the procedurally barred claims
3

Dr Golding was one of four evaluators who found petitioner competent to stand trial State
Mfferty, 20 P 3d 342, 2001 UT 19 1Hf23-26, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001)
4

The State did not waive its right to challenge that assertion at a later time if necessary

Petitioner provides no support for his legal and factual conclusions First, to the extent
petitioner means that every remaining juror had a pre-disposition to sentence him to death, he cites
nothing to support that conclusion To the extent petitioner means that the dismissed juror had a predisposition to spare his life, he also cites nothing to support that conclusion Even the allegation in
his petition establish only that the juror agreed with petitioner's religious and constitutional views
Second Amended Petition at 10 Despite that agreement, the dismissed juror may have agreed to
sentence petitioner to death for masterminding the murders of a young mother and her fifteenmonth-old daughter

Second, to the extent petitioner argues that the jury lacked the requisite impartiality because
each juror approved of the death penalty in the abstract, the claim fails as a matter of law '"On the

VI.

PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT HE HAS THE RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS COUNSEL FAILS AS A
MATTER OF LAW (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT V; OPPOSITION
MEMORANDUM POINT VII)

issue of capital punishment, the object of voir dire is to obtain a jury that can hear the evidence and
In claim 20, petitioner challenged his federal habeas corpus counsel's failure to file a release
apply the law without legal partiality for or against capital punishment Approval of or opposition to
order after the federal court granted habeas corpus relief The State argued, in part, that petitioner
capital punishment in general is not legal partiality for this purpose

'" State v Lafferty, 749
cited to no cases demonstrating that he had the nght to the effective assistance of federal habeas

P 2d 1239,1252 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted), habeas corpus granted on other grounds, 949 F 2d
corpus counsel
1546 (10th Cir 1991)
Petitioner responds that the State's argument "is totally without merit" He continues that "it
Petitioner had no right to jurors who opposed the death penalty He had no right to jurors
is absurd to suggest that Petitioner is entitled to a substandard representation in habeas corpus that
pre-disposed to spare his life He only had the right to jurors who could hear the evidence and apply
falls short [of] the requirements of the Strickland test" Opposition Memorandum at 14 Petitioner
the law impartially He has not argued and points to nothing to suggest any juror who sat could not
relies solely on Strickland to support his conclusions Id
or did not fulfill that responsibility Therefore, he alleges nothing to demonstrate that counsel's
Strickland delineates the criteria for determining when a violation of the Sixth Amendment
conduct cost him the "opportunity" for trial by "an impartial jury "
right to counsel has occurred Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668,687-88,690(1984) The
Petitioner has not addressed the State's other arguments in support of summary judgment
Sixth Amendment only guarantees counsel during the criminal proceedings U S Const Amend
He still cites to no facts that would have required counsel to move to sequester the jury before the
VI Petitioner has no Sixth Amendment right to federal habeas counsel, Strickland does not apply to
Court dismissed one juror whom he now considers sympathetic He still cites to no facts or authority
federal habeas counsel's performance Because petitioner had no right to the effective assistance of
demonstrating a reasonable probability that the Court would have granted the motion Opening
federal habeas counsel, he has not established a constitutional violation that would entitle him to
Memorandum at 41 n 6
post-conviction relief Utah Code Ann § 78-35a-104 (West 2004)
Petitioner's claim fails as a matter of law on the undisputed facts The Court should enter
Moreover, even if petitioner had such a right, he cannot established that it was violated
judgment in the State's favor on it
The Tenth Circuit plainly held that the State was "free to retry" petitioner Lafferty v Cook, 949
F 2d 1546, 1557 (10th Cir 1991), cert denied, 504 U S 911 (1992) When the State chose that

8

7

option, petitioner was not entitled to be released It would have been inappropriate for federal

he merely restates the legal standard he must satisfy in order to prevail on this claim Petitioner

habeas corpus counsel to file a release order

cannot prevail merely by reciting that standard See e g Parsons v Barnes, 871 P 2d 516, 526

The claim is frivolous, and the Court should grant judgment in the State's favor
VII.

PETITIONER STILL FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM BASED ON COUNSEL'S
FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE UNIDENTIFIED EXCULPATORY
EVIDENCE OR UNSPECIFIED EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE TAMPERING;
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JUDGMENT IN THE STATE'S FAVOR
(OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT VI; OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM
POINT VII)
Petitioner contends that his counsel inadequately investigated exculpatory evidence or the

possibility of evidence tampering The State moved to dismiss this claim because petitioner 1)
identified no facts known to counsel that would have triggered a constitutional duty to investigate
exculpatory evidence or the possibility of evidence tampering, and 2) identified no exculpatory
evidence or evidence of evidence tampering that his counsel would have found, let alone that they
would have found evidence so significant that it would have made a more favorable outcome
reasonably likely Opening Memorandum at 15
Petitioner responds that "any diligent counsel would have investigated exculpatory evidence
and any facts of evidence tampering " He continues that "failure to do so" constitutes deficient
performance, and that the "failure to discover exculpatory evidence or facts of evidence tampering
would prejudice the defendant at the trial and sentencing " Opposition Memorandum at 15
Petitioner proffers no evidence and alleges no facts that would prove his ineffective
assistance claim to a demonstrable reality He still has not identified what should have triggered the
investigation he contends counsel omitted or what counsel could have discovered, let alone that it

(Utah), cert denied, 513 U S 966 (1994), and Fernandez v Cook, 870 P 2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)
As petitioner apparently cannot meet the burden he recites, the Court should grant judgment
in the State's favor
VIII. PETITIONER'S CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO
INTRODUCE RELEVANT MITIGATING EVIDENCE LACKS ANY
FACTUAL BASIS AND THEREFORE FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW
(OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT VII, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM
POINT VIII)
Petitioner claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce relevant
mitigation evidence at the penalty phase of his trial Second Amended Petition claim 24 He
included a "Social History" report detailing the evidence that he contends his trial counsel omitted
The State responded that trial counsel did introduce all of the evidence that petitioner contended
should have been introduced—with the exception of petitioner's insignificant National Guard
records Opening Memorandum at 16 17, 51-52 Twenty pages of the State's memorandum detail
the mitigating evidence that trial counsel introduced during both phases of petitioner's trial, and
argued to the jury in the penalty phase Id at 27-46
Alternatively, the State asserted that even if petitioner's "Social History" contained some
additional evidence that trial counsel did not present, petitioner still could not demonstrate that
counsel was ineffective because the additional evidence, if any, was not materially distinguishable
from the evidence that was presented to the jury Opening Memorandum at 51 -52 The State relied
on Castro v Ward, 138 F 3d 810, 828 29 (10th Cir 1998), to support its alternative argument Id

In his opposition, petitioner ignores the State's primary argument and addresses only its

showing, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice Consequently, even under the State's alternative

eraative argument Opposition Memorandum at 15-16 Petitioner fails to acknowledge any of the

argument, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim

tigating evidence that trial counsel introduced He makes no attempt to explain how that evidence

IX.

s insufficient, or what additional evidence counsel should have presented, but did not Petitioner

PETITIONER DOES NOT ARGUE AGAINST GRANTING JUDGMENT TO
THE STATE ON HIS CHALLENGES TO HIS TRIAL AND APPELLATE
COUNSEL'S QUALIFICATIONS (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT VIII,
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT IX)

>vides no factual support for his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce
In claims 25 and 29, petitioner argued that his trial and appellate counsel did not meet the
ditional mitigation evidence Therefore, the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this
qualifications established in Utah R Crim P 8 and by the American Bar Association Guidelines for
nm
representing capital defendants The State moved for summary judgment on this claim because
Petitioner's response to the State's alternative argument is unpersuasive because he fails to
tmguish Castro v Ward Petitioner argues that the omitted mitigating evidence m Castro was
id to be insignificant and cumulative because that additional evidence only related to Castro's
nily circumstances, and not directly to Castro himself Opposition Memorandum at 15 On the
ntrary, the omitted evidence related directly to Castro See 138 F 3d at 827-28 Castro claimed

petitioner had a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel, not to counsel who met
certain qualifications Opening Memorandum at 52 As to his rule 8 argument, the State pointed out
that Utah R Crim P 8(f) specifically precluded relief5 Id at 52 n 8 Petitioner responds only that
he is not relying solely on rule 8, instead, he asserts that he "gives a variety of circumstances as
listed supra " Opposition Memorandum at 16

tt his mitigation case should have included more detailed testimony regarding his mental status,
luding a diagnosis that he suffered from organic brain damage Id at 828-29 Therefore,
titioner fails to distinguish Castro

The State addresses petitioner's specific ineffective assistance claims in the other points in
this and its Opening Memorandum Because petitioner has not disputed the State's argument that he
had no constitutional right to counsel who met the qualifications delineated in the ABA Guidelines

After reviewing the additional evidence of Castro's mental state, the 10th Circuit held that

or in Utah R Crim P 8, the Court should grant judgment in the State's favor on claims 25 and 29

hough the evidence was "obviously relevant, [it was] not so different in kind from the evidence
at was already] presented as to require us to find Mr Castro's due process rights violated " Id at
8 Likewise, in this case, even assuming that petitioner could demonstrate the existence of some
ditional mitigating evidence that his trial counsel did not introduce, petitioner cannot show that the
ditional evidence is "different in kind" from the evidence that was presented Absent such a

5
The State also pointed out that petitioner made the allegations on "information and belief,"
which failed to satisfy his obligation to plead all the facts supporting his claim Utah R Civ P
65C(c)(3)
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THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON PETITIONER'S CLAIM
THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL SHOULD HAVE OBJECTED TO THE
PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT (OPENING MEMORANDUM
POINT IX, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT X)

Counsel's failure to object at trial did not affect the outcome on appeal This claim fails as a matter
of law 7
XI.

lly for plain error Amended Petition claim 26 Trial counsel's failure to object imposed on

PETITIONER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT A BIASED JUROR SAT;
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JUDGMENT IN THE STATE'S FAVOR ON
PETITIONER'S CLAIMS THAT HIS APPELLATE COUNSEL SHOULD
HAVE SOUGHT REVERSAL BECAUSE THE COURT DENIED
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO CHANGE THE TRIAL VENUE (OPENING
MEMORANDUM POINT X, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINT XI)

titioner the added appellate burden of demonstrating that the prosecutor made obviously improper

After trial, the only relevant inquiry remaining on a denied venue change motion was

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's closing argument
ference to killing a fifteen-month-old girl, which resulted in the supreme court reviewing the claim

>mments See e g State v Kell, 61 P 3d 1019, 2002 UT 106 132 However, even if trial counsel

whether denying the motion resulted in denying petitioner his right to a constitutionally impartial

id objected, petitioner still would have had to convince the Utah Supreme Court that 1) the

jury State v Widdison, 28 P 3d 1278,2001 UT 601137-39 (refusing to reverse for the denial of a

osecutor called to the jury's attention matters that it should not consider in reaching a verdict, and

venue change where Widdison failed to prove that any juror was biased) The State argued that

absent the prosecutor's improper statements, there would exist a reasonable likelihood of a more

petitioner failed to state a claim because he had not alleged that any juror was biased Opposition

vorable result See State v Lafferty, 20 P 3d 342,2001 UT 191186-87, cert denied, 534 U S
)18 (2001) Thus, petitioner's challenge to the trial counsel's failure to object would have merit if

Memorandum at 54
In response, petitioner concludes that "all jurors were pro death sentence biased " As with

e supreme court found that the prosecutor made improper comments, and that, absent the

his argument that counsel should have moved to sequester the jury, petitioner does not define what

)mments, there would exist a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result, but refused to

he means or provide any support for the conclusion For the reasons argued in point V, his failure to

verse only because the comments were not obviously improper

do so defeats the claim The Court should grant judgment in the State's favor on it

However, the supreme court refused to reverse on the elements that petitioner would have
id to prove even if trial counsel had objected State v Lafferty, 2001 UT 1186-87, 89-93 6

Petitioner misrepresents that the supreme court "acknowledged that the prosecutor indeed

'Petitioner makes a vague reference to "the cumulative evidence of the misconduct"
Opposition Memorandum at 17 Petitioner limited his claim to a single argument He has not

XII.

PETITIONER'S DISSATISFACTION WITH DEATH-ROW CONDITIONS
DOES NOT JUSTIFY POST-CONVICTION RELIEF; HE HAS ALREADY
LITIGATED AND LOST HIS CLAIM THAT HOLDING HIM ON DEATH
ROW FOR TWENTY YEARS IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
(OPENING MEMORANDUM AT POINT XIII, OPPOSITION
MEMORANDUM AT POINT XIII)

provides no analysis for his claim that post-conviction and post-sentence confinement conditions
may justify post-conviction relief As established in the State's Opening Memorandum, the PCRA
provides relief only for constitutional defects in the conviction and sentence Opening Memorandum
at 57 Post-conviction and post-sentence confinement conditions demonstrate neither

Petitioner asked for post-conviction relief because, as a death-row inmate, he has limited
The claim fails as a matter of law, the should grant judgment in the State's favor
access to programs available to other inmates Amended Petition, claim 36 The State sought
summary judgment because the PCRA only permits relief for constitutional defects in how a

XIII. THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON PETITIONER'S
CHALLENGE TO HIS CHOSEN EXECUTION METHOD (OPENING
MEMORANDUM AT XIV, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM AT XIV)

conviction is obtained or a sentence is imposed and petitioner's housing conditions on death row has
The State moved for summary judgment on petitioner's challenge to the firing squad because
nothing to do with either Opening Memorandum at 57
petitioner waived that challenge when he chose firing squad as the method for execution Opening
Petitioner responds only that he "is dissatisfied with the conditions on death row " Petitioner
Memorandum at 58 Petitioner responds that the State's argument "would be valid if [petitioner]
cites to nothing that demonstrates that his dissatisfaction with death row conditions warrants
was afforded an effective representation of counsel and if he was competent" He continues that his
vacating his conviction or sentence For the reasons argued, the claim fails as a matter of law, and
ability to choose "has been questioned" because he has argued ineffective assistance of counsel and
the Court should grant summary judgment in the State's favor
asserts that he was incompetent Opposition Memorandum at 19
Petitioner also states that he claims that being held on death row for twenty years is cruel and
Petitioner's competency at the time he chose his execution method is not at issue Petitioner
unusual punishment Opposition Memorandum at 19 Petitioner already raised and lost a claim that
already litigated and lost his competency challenge It is not subject to further litigation Utah Code
it would be unconstitutional to execute him after twenty years on death row See State v Lafferty, 20
Ann § 78-35a-106(l)(b) (West 2004)(post-conviction relief is unavailable for claims that were
P 3d 342,2001 UT 19 ffll35-39, cert denied, 534 U S 1018 (2001) To the extent he seeks to
raised and lost on direct appeal), Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96 \6, 44 P 3d 626
rehtigate that claim, the Court should deny it as an abuse of the writ Utah Code Ann § 78-35a106(l)(b) (West 2004)(post-conviction relief is unavailable for claims that were raised and lost on
direct appeal), Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 96 \6, 44 P 3d 626
If petitioner contends that he is entitled to post-conviction relief because his housing
conditions are cruel and unusual, the claim fails as a matter of law Petitioner cites no authority and

Petitioner may be able to obtain relief from his confinement conditions in a civil rights
action if he can convince a court that his limited access to privileges and the amount of time he has
to spend in his cell somehow violate his constitutional rights
16

15

Petitioner has raised no ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to his choice of

In response to Atkins, the Utah legislature enacted Utah Code Ann §§ 77-15a-101 through

execution method He asserts no facts in either his Second Amended Petition or his Opposition

106 (West 2004) Section 102 defines "mentally retarded" for purposes of excluding a person from

Memorandum that would support such a claim

execution 9 Petitioner has not even acknowledged that standard, let alone attempted to demonstrate

The claim fails as a matter of law, the Court should grant judgment in the State's favor on it
XIV. PETITIONER STILL FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM THAT THE STATE
CANNOT EXECUTE HIM BECAUSE HE IS MENTALLY RETARDED
(OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT XV, OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM
POINT XV)

that he meets it
Second, petitioner unfairly parses the language from Atkins Petitioner quotes the Supreme
Court as finding that mentally retarded persons "have diminished capacities to understand and
process information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to

Petitioner claimed that he was denied due process because the United States Supreme Court
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others "
did not decide that it was unconstitutional to execute mentally persons until after his trial Second
Opposition Memorandum at 19-20, quoting Atkins v Virginia However, the quote continues that
Amended Petition claim 40 The State moved to dismiss the claim because petitioner had not
"there is abundant evidence that [mentally retarded persons] often act on impulse rather than
claimed that he was mentally retarded or alleged facts demonstrating that he was mentally retarded
pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders "
Opening Memorandum at 58-59
Atkins v Virginia, 506 U S at 318 Based on these characteristics, the Supreme Court concluded
Petitioner now appears to allege that he is mentally retarded Opposition Memorandum at

that mentally retarded persons were less culpable for their crimes

19-20 He alleges that "the facts uncovered in his social history and even facts already presented to
Petitioner did not act on impulse or without premeditation He purported to receive a
the court" demonstrate that he meets some of the traits that the United States Supreme Court
revelation that Brenda Lafferty and her fifteen-month-old daughter needed to be "removed " He
attributed to mental retardation Id
believed that Brenda encouraged his wife to leave him and that Erica would grow up to be a "bitch"
Petitioner's allegations fail to state a claim on which the Court may grant relief First,
9

As used m this chapter, a defendant is "mentally retarded" if

petitioner's focus on some of the traits that the Supreme Court attributed to mentally retarded
Dersons misses the point The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited executing

(1) the defendant has significant subaverage general intellectual functioning that results in
and exists concurrently with significant deficiencies in adaptive functioning that exist primarily in
the areas of reasoning or impulse control, or in both of these areas, and

nentally retarded persons Atkins v Virginia, 536 U S 304 (2002) However, the Supreme Court
iid not attempt to define mental retardation for purposes of excluding from execution a person who

(2) the subaverage general intellectual functioning and the significant deficiencies in adaptive
functioning under Subsection (1) are both manifested prior to age 22

e her mother He purported to receive another revelation to "consecrate" an instrument to carry

one case does not remove the "possible" conflict in a companion case Opposition Memorandum at

t the removal He communicated the "revelations" to his brother Dan On the day petitioner and

21.

in murdered Brenda and Erica, petitioner went to another brother's home to get a rifle to go

Petitioner's response misses the point The State does not have the burden of proving that his

anting" for "any fucking thing" that got m his way State v Lafferty, 20 P 3d 342,2001 UT 19

trial counsel did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel Petitioner has the

3-13, cerr denied, 534 V S 1018(2001)

burden proving that he did Utah Code Ann §78-35a-105 (West 2004) Therefore, he has the

Petitioner did not murder Brenda and her baby on impulse and he did not follow Dan's lead

burden of proving 1) that an actual conflict remained, one that forced his counsel to make choices

titioner masterminded Brenda's and Erica's murders through his "revelation " He and Dan went

that advanced Dan's interests to the detriment of petitioner's, and 2) that his counsel actually

Brenda's home to carry out that "revelation "

compromised petitioner's interests for Dan's benefit See, e g Strickland v Washington, 466 U S

In short, petitioner alleges insufficient facts to demonstrate that he meets that definition of

668, 692 (1984), United States v Alvarez, 137 F 3d 1249,1252 (10th Cir 1998), Edens v Hanmgan,

ntal retardation The Court should dismiss the claim

87 F 3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir 1996), State v Lovell, 1999 UT 40122, 984 P 2d 382, 387, cert

L

denied, 528 U S 1083 (2000), State v Taylor, 947 P 2d 681,686 (Utah 1997), cert denied, 525 U S

PETITIONER STILL ALLEGES NO FACTS TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM
THAT HIS COUNSEL HAD A SIXTH AMENDMENT CONFLICT OF
INTEREST; THE COURT SHOULD GRANT JUDGMENT IN THE STATE'S
FAVOR (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT XVI; OPPOSITION
MEMORANDUM POINT XVI)
Petitioner claims that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest because he represented

ltioner's brother and co-defendant Dan Lafferty The State moved to dismiss the claim because

833 (1998) Petitioner also has the burden of pleading all of the facts that support this claim Utah
R Civ P 65C(c)(3)
Petitioner has not met his burden Instead, he speculates that his trial counsel may still have
represented Dan when he undertook petitioner's representation for the retrial He asserts that their

ltioner alleged insufficient facts to demonstrate a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to confhct-

interests conflicted on the issue of who committed the crimes, but alleges no facts suggesting that

e counsel The State also argued that petitioner likely could not meet his burden because, by the

this asserted conflict caused his counsel to compromise his interests in order to further Dan's

le the State retried petitioner, Dan's case had been concluded Opening Memorandum at 59-60

concludes that the "mere finahzation of one case does not remove the possible conflict," but alleges

10

He

Petitioner responds that 1) the State has never shown when his trial counsel withdrew from
•resenting Dan or even if counsel ever withdrew from representing Dan, and 2) even if counsel's
iresentation of Dan concluded, a conflict of interest may have remained because the conclusion of

1
Petitioner ignores that his counsel called Dan at petitioner's trial to testify that Dan
physically committed both murders State v Lafferty, 20 P 3d 342,2001 UT 19 ^117, cert denied,
534 U S 1018(2001)

20

19

facts that would demonstrate the necessary actual conflict that caused counsel to compromise his
erests to further Dan's
Petitioner has not met his burden of alleging facts that, if proven, would demonstrate that he
s denied his right to conflict free counsel Because it appears that he cannot do so, the Court

Petitioner's double jeopardy claim merely repeats his claim 20 from his Second Amended
Petition For the reasons explained in the Opening Memorandum at point V, and above at point VI,
that claim is frivolous and the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law denying the claim
For the same reasons, the State is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law on petitioner's

)uld grant judgment in the State s favor on this claim

claim that he has never been properly rearrested, recharged, or rearraigned on the current charges

n.

THE CLAIMS IN "PART TWO" OF THE SECOND AMENDED PETITION
FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW (OPENING MEMORANDUM POINT XVII;
OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM POINTS XVII-XIX)

The Tenth Circuit plainly held that the State was "free to retry" petitioner after it vacated his

In "Part Two" of his Second Amended Petition, petitioner alleged that (1) the prosecution

U S 911 (1992) Petitioner cites no authority, nor is the State aware of any, that requires the State to

nted evidence at the trial proceedings and witnesses were tampered with by way of a plea bargain,

formally rearrest, recharge, and rearraign a defendant who has been convicted and is in custody, but

his second trial violated his protection against double jeopardy, (3) he has yet to be arrested,

is granted a new trial

harged or properly arraigned on the current charges, and (4) his counsel erroneously advised him
to file a 120-day disposition request Second Amended Petition "Part Two" at 1-2 The State

convictions and sentences Lafferty v Cook, 949 F 2d 1546, 1557 (10th Cir 1991), cert denied, 504

Even if the State was required to follow different preliminary procedures prior to petitioner's
retrial, it is well-established that "an error at the preliminary stage is cured if the defendant is later

mtered that these claims either failed as a matter of law, or failed to state a claim Petitioner has

convicted beyond a reasonable doubt" State v Quas, 837 P 2d 565, 566 (Utah Ct App 1992), see

led to demonstrate otherwise

also State v Schreuder, 712 P 2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985) Petitioner argues that Quas and Schreuder

The State argued that petitioner's substantive claims of "planted evidence" and "witness
ipering" were procedurally barred because they could have been raised at trial or on appeal

are distinguishable because they involved only an illegal arrest, followed by a proper charge, trial
and conviction Opposition Memorandum at 21-22 While it is true that Schreuder only involved an

ening Memorandum at 61 Petitioner counters that the claims are not procedurally barred because

illegal arrest, Quas was not so limited The issue in Quas was whether a district court had

has alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issues Opposition

jurisdiction to review a magistrate's bindover order 837 P 2d at 566 The court of appeals held that

morandum at 21 This ineffectiveness claim merely repeats claim 22 from his Second Amended

the district court did, because otherwise, a subsequent conviction would moot any claimed error in

ltion For the reasons already stated above in point VII, the State is entitled to summary

the bindover Id In reaching this holding, the court of appeals relied not only on cases dealing with

gment on this claim

the effect of an illegal arrest on subsequent criminal proceedings, but also on cases addressing errors

(presence of two witnesses in grand jury room, although illegal, is harmless beyond a reasonable

Petitioner has attempted to allege facts supporting his claim 40, asserting that he is mentally

doubt in light of subsequent conviction), and Holt v United States, 218 U S 245, (1910) (conviction

retarded However, he has still failed to state a claim Nevertheless, because it is not entirely certain

upheld where errors such as hearsay and incompetent evidence occurred at indictment stage)) The

that he cannot ever state a claim of mental retardation, the Court should simply dismiss claim 40

rule m Quas applies to errors in both the arrest and charging stages of a criminal proceeding

DATED this \f

day of June 2005
MARKL SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

Petitioner fails to distinguish Quas He also fails to demonstrate that any error m the preliminary
stages of his retrial entitle him to relief Therefore, his claim fails as a matter of law
Finall>, petitioner claims that his counsel was ineffective because his failure to file a 120 day

THOMASB BRUNKER
CHRISTOPHER D BALLARD
Assistant Attorneys General

disposition request allowed the press to pollute the jury pool with negative information and
prevented petitioner from being tried by a fair and unbiased jury Opposition Memorandum at 22
Petitioner ignores the State's argument that counsel's advice not to file the request was reasonable
trial strategy because it allowed counsel sufficient time to prepare for a lengthy capital trial
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Moreover, petitioner's claim of prejudice fails As explained above in Points V and XI, petitioner

foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR

has not established that any biased juror sat Absent such a showing, petitioner's claim of prejudice

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to

fails Petitioner cannot satisfy either prong of the Strickland test Therefore, the State is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on this claim
CONCLUSION
In its motion and opening memorandum, the State moved the Court for summary judgment
on all of petitioner's claims, with the exception of claims 22,27,40, and 44 The State moved the
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Court to dismiss these claims for failure to state a claim Petitioner has now had the opportunity to
allege facts sufficient to support these claims As to claims 22, 27, and 44, petitioner has not even

iwr^ryoZ^Z

attempted to do so Therefore, the Court should also grant judgment in the State's favor on claims
22, 27,and 44
23

24

